Jan-Erik Lane

Public sector reform : rationale, trends and problems

Introduction - Jan-Erik Lane New Public Sector Models - John Halligan Reform in Australia and New Zealand The Bewildering Pace of Public Sector Reform in Canada - Evert A Lindquist The Privatization of Infrastructures in Germany - Ira Denkhaus and Volker Scheider Re-Building the State - Joachim Jens Hesse Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe Farewell to the British State? - Michael J Goldsmith and Edward C Page Anglo-Saxon Public Management and European Governance - Walter J M Kickert The Case of Dutch Administrative Reforms Public Sector Reform in the Nordic Countries - Jan-Erik Lane Public Sector Reform in France - Thierry Postif Local Government in Britain after Thatcher - Gerry Stoker Fiscal and Financial Decentralization - Bernard Steunenberg and Nico Mol A Comparative Analysis of Six West European Countries Searching for Competitiveness - Carles Boix The Role of the Spanish Public Sector in the 1980s and 1990s Incorporation as Public Sector Reform - Jan-Erik Lane

Relevance of Voting Power

Democratic decision-making in groups requires institutions that aggregate the preference of the choice participants into a collective choice under the restriction that no player is a dictator. Constitutions deliver alternative rules for democratic decision-making, the consequences of which are best analysed using cooperative game theory. The emergence of a power index literature in the 1980s reflects the relevance of this type of modelling of institutions for groups like the European Union, stating modalities of power for the players.

Explaining the growth of government

Introduction and International Comparison. Editors Introduction and Summary (M. Henrekson, J.A. Lybeck). Explaining the Growth of Government: International Perspectives (B.S. Frey). Comparing Government Growth Rates: The Non-Institutional vs. the Institutional Approach (J.A. Lybeck). Permanent Income, Rational Expectations and Government Consumption: A Multi-Country Study (V.K. Borooah). Public Expenditure Decision-Making: A Comparative Analysis (T.R. Cusack). Country Studies. Swedish Government Growth: A Disequilibrium Analysis (M. Henrekson). Fiscal Behaviour and the Growth of Government in The Netherlands (P.S.A. Renaud, F.A.A.M. van Winden). The Expansion of the Public Sector in Denmark - A Post Festum? (M. Paldam, H.E. Zeuthen). The Growth of Public Expenditure in Italy since The Second World War (G. Brosio, C. Marchese). The Growth of Public Expenditure in France (C. Aubin et al.). The Growth of the Public Sector in Austria: An Exploratory Analysis (R. Neck, F. Schneider). The Growth of Public Spending in Norway 1865-1985 (R.J. Sorensen). The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, 1960-86 (V.K. Borooah). Government Spending in Federal Systems: A Comparison between Switzerland and Germany (G. Kirchgassner, W.W. Pommerehne). The Finnish Public Sector: Its Growth and Changing Role in 1960-1984 (I. Heiskanen, T. Martikainen). Indexes.

WILL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT DRIVE OUT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The public management approach to public sector reform has had such an appeal that it must be examined more closely. It raises a number of key issues about the public sector to which it offers answers that are radically different from the public administration framework. The management state may have pros when compared with the administrative state, but there are cons involved when one takes several evaluation criteria into account.

Voting Power under the EU Constitution

Decision making rules in the EU Council of Ministers need to be revised in light of enlargements since 1958. Under the qualified majority rules, the more countries join, the less the voting power of the large states, leading necessarily to coalition-building process, two possible examples of which are described. The situation would be less paradoxical if the EU were to adopt a single rule, the simple majority vote.

Party System Instability in Europe: Persistent Differences in Volatility between West and East?

To fully understand the function of volatility in todays European democracies, it is necessary to employ the principal-agent model. Where democracy is exercised in the form of party government, then it is especially essential to enquire into how the electorate can monitor politicians. Electoral volatility may increase the responsiveness of the party system to the electorate and increase the accountability of politicians. Party system instability is persistently higher in the east European democracies than in western Europe. System transition in eastern Europe passes through the party system, as new parties enter the electoral arena. Political innovation in western Europe also passes through the party system, where new movements appear alongside the established parties. However, there are signs of decreasing volatility in the east, whereas volatility is on the rise in several west European democracies. There will be convergence between west and east European democracies: both will experience considerable volatility in the future. This is a positive gain for democratic vitality in Tingstens conception. The level of party system fractionalization is already the same over the regions of Europe. The principal-agent model would favour several agents as well as agent switches, which means a moderate level of party system instability.

From-Long Term To Short-Term Contracting

One can look at the arrival of New Public Management and the extensive public sector reforms inspired by this theory from many angles. Here we examine the shift from long-term contracting, typical of bureaucracy and traditional enterprises, to short-term contracting, borrowed from private sector governance methods. Short-term contracting has three principal uses in the governance of the public sector: (a) contracting with service providers after a tendering/bidding process; (b) contracting with the CEOs of the incorporated public enterprises; and (c) contracting with executive agencies about what they should deliver. Theoretical analysis, supported by substantial empirical evidence, suggests that short-term contracting eliminates the extensive post-contractual opportunism connected with long-term contracting, but is vulnerable to precontractual opportunism. Short-term contracting is not just another public sector reform fad, but constitutes a new tool for government which increases efficiency when handled with prudence.

Strategic management and public leadership

Abstract As a new and flatter organization replaces the traditional public organization, it would need more of strategic public management. Key decisions in team production relate to the employment of outcome measures for both monitoring of real activities as well as the reform of the structuring of these activities. Only outcome measures could constitute the starting-point for public sector strategic management. A concept of strategic management for public services must include a theory of public leadership, resulting from the mechanism of credit and commitment on the part of the team providing services. A theory of strategic public management must take into account the specific features of the public sector as well as include the implications of rule of law. Given the criticisms of the rational decision model, a theory of strategic management must pay attention to the lessons from public administration about bounded rationality and the possibility of pathologies or organized foolishness in public organization.

Constitutional analysis: The power index approach

A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective uponthe EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the groups collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU council.

Contractualism In the Public Sector

Contractualism in the public sector is more than just another fad. Its use will continue into the next century, meaning that we need to model what a pure model of contractualism entails for the delivery of services in the public sector. The article suggests such a model and states the limits of its employment.