Jan Koehler

Insurgency-informed governance in the North Caucasus: observations from Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria

Abstract In this article we analyse the dynamics of the insurgencies and the corresponding counter-insurgency measures in the North Caucasus over the past 25 years. By comparing three cases – Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria – we identify similarities and differences in the way insurgencies and counter-insurgency measures influence governance in the region. Analysing different dynamics and outcomes under similar framework conditions – a federal state with a centralised government trying to govern a region with a shared history of rebellions against central rule and with similar geographic, social, and cultural features facilitating resistance and insurgencies – is a promising approach to better understanding conditions and implications of insurgency-induced governance in post-Soviet Russia.

Institutions and the organisation of stability and violence

I   and in Former Yugoslavia the collapse of the socialist empires has caused more hot conflicts and wars than in any other transition region. In each region there were four major armed conflicts. In the Caucasus, there was the disagreement between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh (1988–93: no political settlement); the wars about Chechnya (1994–96 and 1999–today: no settlement); the internal war in Georgia (1991–92) and Georgia’s war with breakaway Abkhazia (1992–93: no settlement); and breakaway South-Ossetia (1989–92: no settlement). In Yugoslavia, the four major violent conflicts were the short campaign of the Yugoslav Army against the breakaway republic of Slovenia in June 1991; the wars between Croats and Serbs in eastern Slovenia and in the Krajina (1991–95); the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–95); and the war about Kosovo, which was fought on the one hand between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians in Kosovo, and on the other hand between NATO and Serbia (1998–99). Both the Caucasus and Former Yugoslavia are typical high-risk regions. At least four factors commonly held responsible for increasing the risk of violence are present.1 First, there is the legacy of the socialist system of ethno-federalism (Brubaker 1994; Bunce 1999). Socialist ethno-federalism had linked territories with a titular nation and provided these territories with quasi-state institutions, such as citizenship, borders, symbols, political institutions, and in the case of Yugoslavia, armed forces. Ethno-national mobilisation for independence was thus prepared by the socialist systems. Secondly, in most cases there was also a past history of grievance and conflicts. Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Chechens and Russians, Serbs and Kosovars, Croats and Serbs all have stories and experiences of old animosity. Thirdly, the peoples of Yugoslavia and the USSR experienced economic hardships during the 1980s. Lastly, all polities in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus (that is, the former Federal Republics and the former

State formation as it happens: insights from a repeated cross-sectional study in Afghanistan, 2007–2015

Abstract This paper contributes to an empirical understanding of state formation. Based on an original household-level data set, we provide a detailed picture of the process of state formation in Afghanistan over the last decade. State formation happens when state and society engage in reciprocal relations. Central to this relationship is an exchange of services for the acceptance of authority and increased legitimacy. Our data allows us to assess state-society relations across different dimensions. We focus on the provision of services, on the responsiveness of the state, on conflict regulation and on taxation. As a result we find more evidence of state formation than expected, but also see this as a contested process that unfolds unevenly and with different speed across different sectors.

The International Intervention and its Impact on Security Governance in North-East Afghanistan

The challenge of building a security sector effective in terms of protecting the population and the state from challengers, and which at the same time fulfils minimum standards of good governance, was a daunting one in Afghanistan. These difficulties were compounded by what in hindsight seem to be obvious mistakes on the part of the intervention. In our paper, we investigate how security sector building fared under such adverse conditions in north-east Afghanistan. We find that in spite of the formidable challenges and the mistakes made by the international intervention, it did not fail completely. Neither did it succeed. Based on the results of quantitative surveys and qualitative research, we suggest that (a) the international intervention was partly successful in building up Afghan National Security Forces – both as a fighting force and in terms of security sector institutions that are restrained to some extent by the rule of law; (b) the problems caused by setting up informal local militias (violent feuds, criminality, human rights abuses and extortion of the population) could be partly mitigated by transforming them into an official local police programme.

Governing the local in the North Caucasus

Abstract The article provides an in-depth analysis of local governance in the North Caucasus, by example of land tenure conflicts in Kabardino-Balkaria. We follow an iterative analytical strategy, systematically combining qualitative case studies to develop grounded hypotheses, with subsequent statistical hypothesis testing. Based on fieldwork conducted in Kabardino-Balkaria, we identify the most relevant patterns and dynamics of natural resource governance. Our research shows that there are three dominant patterns. The first pattern is formed in areas where land is of little value and communities are left to themselves to solve issues. In the second case, larger businesses with state backing manage to monopolize land resources and sideline local communities. In the third case, local communities are strong enough to defend their control over external attempts to take hold of land resources. Finally, we use original survey data to further investigate plausible causes for stronger and weaker local self-governance and its consequences for state-society relations. We show that local self-government (LSG) lacks independence, and its functional quality depends on the degree of state interference via patronage. Despite this challenging environment, we find that higher perceptions of LSG quality predict more trust in the state at central and subnational level.