Jan Österberg

Value Based on Preferences

What distinguishes preference utilitarianism (PU) from other utilitarian positions is the axiological component: the view concerning what is intrinsically valuable. According to PU, intrinsic value is based on preferences. Intrinsically valuable states are connected to our preferences (wants, desires) being satisfied.

The Interpretation of Strong Egoism

Suppose that you and I do not know each other. As you drive home one evening, you see me standing by the roadside looking at a car with a gloomy expression on my face. You realize that something is wrong with my car. Perhaps you can help me; at all events you can give me a lift. But you are tired and hungry and want to get home as quickly as possible; stopping to help me will delay you. Having reflected on the situation for some moments you choose to stop.

Arguments for Ethical Egoism

In this chapter I shall discuss arguments that have been given for the strong form of Ethical Egoism. In the following two chapters I discuss arguments that have been given against it. I have tried to attain completeness: with the exception of some clearly misdirected objections, I have tried to take into consideration all arguments for and against Ethical Egoism put forward in books and articles primarily concerned with this theory. (I have not gone through every text-book in Moral Philosophy, however, so there may of course be some argument that I have missed.)

Ethical Egoism and Rationality

In the preceding two chapters, I tried to show that no version of Ethical Egoism, whether strong or weak, is tenable. But even if my arguments are accepted, a lingering doubt may remain. ‘Is there not something wrong with these arguments? For, obviously, it is rational to (try to) act as Ethical Egoism prescribes.’ As I said in 4.5, one argument for Ethical Egoism, and, I think, a main reason why it is found plausible, is that it connects with a widely held conviction of what it is to act rationally.1

The Strong Form of Ethical Egoism

In the preceding two chapters I have reviewed and assessed the objections to Strong Egoism that I am acquainted with. The upshot is that none of the objections, it seems to me, succeed. Although several objections show that Ethical Egoism is not easily held—the ethical egoist must be very tenacious indeed—it has not been shown that Ethical Egoism cannot be consistently held, that it has to be rejected.

Kinds of Ethical Egoism

In the Introduction I characterized Ethical Egoism as that set of normative theories which prescribe or permit that anyone to whom they address themselves act so as to promote his own good (‘good’ being taken to embrace anything that ethical egoists have stated as ultimate ends worth aiming at). The historical survey in Chapter 1 should have given some idea of the great variety of egoistic theories. In this chapter I shall distinguish between different forms and interpretations of Ethical Egoism, discussing the Subjective Conception of Intrinsic Value at some length. I shall also set about sorting out forms and interpretations that are either not tenable or not interesting. The upshot of my discussion is that (a certain version of what I call) Strong Egoism is the most tenable one. The further interpretation of Strong Egoism will be discussed in Chapter 3.

A Short History of Ethical Egoism

In contemporary debates on Ethical Egoism it is not infrequently said that its history goes back to Classical Times. This gives the impression of one and the same set of ethical positions, labelled ‘Ethical Egoism’, being debated throughout history. I think that a historical survey will correct such an impression and help us to better understand what is characteristic of modern Ethical Egoism, the chief topic of this essay. The history of Ethical Egoism—unlike, for example, that of Utilitarianism—has never been written, and even the following rough survey may, therefore, serve some useful purpose.

Weak Forms of Egoism

In 2.2, I distinguished between Strong and Weak Egoism, saying that an egoistic principle is strong ‘if it prescribes to all those to whom it is directed that they ought always, all things considered, to act in a certain egoistically specified way; otherwise it is weak’. In the preceding chapter I have attempted to assess principles of Strong Egoism. In this chapter I turn to principles of Weak Egoism.

Normative and Semantic Objections

Consider a story told by James Rachels: A friend of mine who lives in a very small town in south Georgia told me about the following incident which occurred within the past year. The town is so small that there is only one doctor, and he is, as one might expect, one of the town’s more affluent citizens. One day the doctor was visited by a poor, uneducated black woman with a variety of minor complaints. A brief examination showed that she was suffering from malnutrition. The problem was that the woman did not have enough money to buy food for herself and her several small children. She worked, whenever she could, as a cleaning-woman in the homes of the better-off people in town, but she was able to earn only a few dollars in this way. All this was known to the doctor. After spending no more than five minutes with the woman, and having done absolutely nothing for her, the doctor told her that the charge would be twenty-five dollars. The woman only had twelve dollars—this was, literally, all the money she had in the world—so the doctor took that. (James Rachels, ‘Two Arguments against Ethical Egoism’, p. 308 f.)