Jan Steutel

Political Liberalism, Civic Education and the Dutch Government

Abstract Recently two members of the Dutch government, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education and Science, have stressed publicly the importance of “the transmission of norms and values”. In this paper their public statements are evaluated from the perspective of a liberal conception of civic education. Such an assessment seems to be fair, since both people are, in their public role as ministers, key representatives of a liberal constitutional state. First, a brief analysis of the concept of civic education is presented. Subsequently, an explanation of the central aims of liberal education for citizenship is given. Finally, the educational statements of the ministers are tested against the explained liberal conception.

Sex Education, State Policy and the Principle of Mutual Consent.

Constitutive of the prevalent sexual morality in most Western European countries is the liberal principle of mutual consent (PMC). This sociological fact may give rise to the ethical question as to whether or not the state has the right to make sure that its citizens will observe PMC, among other ways by prescribing some form of sex education which has PMC as its moral content. With reference to the ambiguity of the term ‘morally permissible’, it is argued that PMC can be interpreted in two fundamentally different ways, namely, as the freedom to arrange ones sexual life according to ones own values and preferences (PMC(a)) or as the view that consensual sex is morally all right or morally unobjectionable (PMC(b)). The claim is defended that PMC(a) should be taken as part of the public morality, whereas PMC(b) should be seen as a private morality. Accordingly, the state has the right to take PMC(a) as a basis for its educational policy, but the state is not allowed to prescribe any form of sex education that has PMC(b) as its moral content. The importance of the distinction between PMC(a) and PMC(b) is shown by giving an evaluation of the Dutch states responses to recent public statements of orthodox religious leaders about the moral status of homosexuality. Also on the basis of this distinction, the central differences between liberal orthodox and fundamentalist orthodox religious views on sexuality and the role of the state are pointed out. In this connection, it is argued that any view which takes PMC(b) as part of the public morality should be disavowed as a kind of ‘liberal funda‐ mentalism’.

Towards a sexual ethics for adolescence

Which moral principles should guide us in evaluating sexual contacts of adolescents? This paper tries to answer this question by taking two steps. First, the implications of a liberal sexual ethics for adolescence are spelled out, assessed and refuted. The core principle of the liberal ethical view, the principle of valid consent, takes competence as a necessary condition of morally permissable sex. Because adolescents are not yet sufficiently capable of judging and acting prudently in the sexual sphere of life, their consent to sexual relations cannot meet the criterion of competence. Hence, if judged from the principle of valid consent, sexual contacts in which adolescents are involved are morally impermissible. This rather illiberal implication of a liberal sexual ethics is rejected for several reasons. Second, an alternative moral principle for evaluating sexual contacts of adolescents is proposed, explained and defended. Precisely because they are not yet sufficiently capable of looking after their own interests, adolescents are still placed under parental authority. With reference to that, it is argued that their free and informed consent to sexual contacts is not enough for making these contacts morally permissible. What is also required is the considerate consent of their parents. Finally, three guidelines for parental interaction with adolescents are recommended. If parents take these guidelines seriously, exercising their authority will be at the same time an important way of promoting the growth of adolescents into competent actors in the field of sexual relations.

On Emotion and Rationality: A Response to Barrett.

Abstract In a recent paper Richard Barrett criticises Solomon (and the so‐called cognitivists in general) for dismissing irrational emotions as marginal and atypical. This paper argues that Barretts criticism is unwarranted. Two explanations are suggested for his misconception of Solomons view (and, more generally, of the cognitive view) on irrational emotions. First, Barrett mistakenly conceives the reconciliation of emotion and reason as a conciliation of emotion and rationality in an evaluative or normative sense. Secondly, Barrett disregards the difference between the cognitive conception of (ir)rationality and his own definition of (ir)rationality in terms of coping. Some implications of the argument for the education of (moral) emotions are spelled out.

Sexual Identity and Moral Virtuousness

This chapter’s aim is twofold: (i) to give a brief account of the nature and components of sexual identity, and (ii) to evaluate, on the basis of this account, the Aristotelian and Kantian view on the affective life of the virtuous person. First, the Aristotelian view is explained in terms of the harmony thesis (virtuousness is expressed in emotions and feelings that are in harmony with the judgements of practical reason) and the responsibility thesis (the indicated harmony may be produced by cultivating our feelings and emotions, which involves that we can be held responsible for our affective life as such). The Kantian view is presented as an account of virtuousness which challenges both the harmony and the responsibility thesis. Second, different components of sexual identity are distinguished, in particular our feelings and appetites that are expressive of our sexual orientation, our normative views and attitudes regarding sexual desires and behaviour, our interpretation of our basic sexual preferences, and our public presentation of our sexual orientation. There may be all kinds of tensions or conflicts between these components, as will be explained by introducing the example of a paedophile. Third, it is argued that our intuitions regarding the example of the paedophile sustain the harmony thesis and, therefore, give some support to the Aristotelian view. However, on the basis of empirical research into the treatment of so-called paraphiliacs it is demonstrated that the example of the paedophile disconfirms the responsibility thesis and, consequently, gives some support to the Kantian view.