Jan-Willem Romeijn

Data-driven subtypes of major depressive disorder: a systematic review

BackgroundAccording to current classification systems, patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) may have very different combinations of symptoms. This symptomatic diversity hinders the progress of research into the causal mechanisms and treatment allocation. Theoretically founded subtypes of depression such as atypical, psychotic, and melancholic depression have limited clinical applicability. Data-driven analyses of symptom dimensions or subtypes of depression are scarce. In this systematic review, we examine the evidence for the existence of data-driven symptomatic subtypes of depression.MethodsWe undertook a systematic literature search of MEDLINE, PsycINFO and Embase in May 2012. We included studies analyzing the depression criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV) of adults with MDD in latent variable analyses.ResultsIn total, 1176 articles were retrieved, of which 20 satisfied the inclusion criteria. These reports described a total of 34 latent variable analyses: 6 confirmatory factor analyses, 6 exploratory factor analyses, 12 principal component analyses, and 10 latent class analyses. The latent class techniques distinguished 2 to 5 classes, which mainly reflected subgroups with different overall severity: 62 of 71 significant differences on symptom level were congruent with a latent class solution reflecting severity. The latent class techniques did not consistently identify specific symptom clusters. Latent factor techniques mostly found a factor explaining the variance in the symptoms depressed mood and interest loss (11 of 13 analyses), often complemented by psychomotor retardation or fatigue (8 of 11 analyses). However, differences in found factors and classes were substantial.ConclusionsThe studies performed to date do not provide conclusive evidence for the existence of depressive symptom dimensions or symptomatic subtypes. The wide diversity of identified factors and classes might result either from the absence of patterns to be found, or from the theoretical and modeling choices preceding analysis.

Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks

While probabilistic logics in principle might be applied to solve a range of problems, in practice they are rarely applied - perhaps because they seem disparate, complicated, and computationally intractable. This programmatic book argues that several approaches to probabilistic logic fit into a simple unifying framework in which logically complex evidence is used to associate probability intervals or probabilities with sentences. Specifically, Part I shows that there is a natural way to present a question posed in probabilistic logic, and that various inferential procedures provide semantics for that question, while Part II shows that there is the potential to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework. The book is intended for researchers in philosophy, logic, computer science and statistics. A familiarity with mathematical concepts and notation is presumed, but no advanced knowledge of logic or probability theory is required.

Evaluating expectations about negative emotional states of aggressive boys using Bayesian model selection.

Researchers often have expectations about the research outcomes in regard to inequality constraints between, e.g., group means. Consider the example of researchers who investigated the effects of inducing a negative emotional state in aggressive boys. It was expected that highly aggressive boys would, on average, score higher on aggressive responses toward other peers than moderately aggressive boys, who would in turn score higher than nonaggressive boys. In most cases, null hypothesis testing is used to evaluate such hypotheses. We show, however, that hypotheses formulated using inequality constraints between the group means are generally not evaluated properly. The wrong hypotheses are tested, i.e.. the null hypothesis that group means are equal. In this article, we propose an innovative solution to these above-mentioned issues using Bayesian model selection, which we illustrate using a case study.

Measurement invariance versus selection invariance: Is fair selection possible?

This article shows that measurement invariance (defined in terms of an invariant measurement model in different groups) is generally inconsistent with selection invariance (defined in terms of equal sensitivity and specificity across groups). In particular, when a unidimensional measurement instrument is used and group differences are present in the location but not in the variance of the latent distribution, sensitivity and positive predictive value will be higher in the group at the higher end of the latent dimension, whereas specificity and negative predictive value will be higher in the group at the lower end of the latent dimension. When latent variances are unequal, the differences in these quantities depend on the size of group differences in variances relative to the size of group differences in means. The effect originates as a special case of Simpsons paradox, which arises because the observed score distribution is collapsed into an accept-reject dichotomy. Simulations show the effect can be substantial in realistic situations. It is suggested that the effect may be partly responsible for overprediction in minority groups as typically found in empirical studies on differential academic performance. A methodological solution to the problem is suggested, and social policy implications are discussed.

Mind the Gap: a psychometric approach to the reduction problem

Cognitive neuroscience involves the simultaneous analysis of behavioral and neurological data. Common practice in cognitive neuroscience, however, is to limit analyses to the inspection of descriptive measures of association (e.g., correlation coefficients). This practice, often combined with little more than an implicit theoretical stance, fails to address the relationship between neurological and behavioral measures explicitly. This article argues that the reduction problem, in essence, is a measurement problem. As such, it should be solved by using psychometric techniques and models. We show that two influential philosophical theories on this relationship, identity theory and supervenience theory, can be easily translated into psychometric models. Upon such translation, they make explicit hypotheses based on sound theoretical and statistical foundations, which renders them empirically testable. We examine these models, show how they can elucidate our conceptual framework, and examine how they may be used to study foundational questions in cognitive neuroscience. We illustrate these principles by applying them to the relation between personality test scores, intelligence tests, and neurological measures.

Modeling Mind and Matter: Reductionism and Psychological Measurement in Cognitive Neuroscience

The article presents the authors response to an article related to reductionism and psychological measurement in cognitive neuroscience by Rogier A. Kievit and Denny Borsboom, published in a previous issue of the periodical. The author says that the commentaries by the writers in the article suggests that the implementation of conceptually guided psychometric models is viable. He also focuses on the relation between people and reductionism mentioned by the writers in the article.

An introduction to Bayesian model selection for evaluating informative hypotheses

Most researchers have specific expectations concerning their research questions. These may be derived from theory, empirical evidence, or both. Yet despite these expectations, most investigators still use null hypothesis testing to evaluate their data, that is, when analysing their data they ignore the expectations they have. In the present article, Bayesian model selection is presented as a means to evaluate the expectations researchers have, that is, to evaluate so called informative hypotheses. Although the methodology to do this has been described in previous articles, these are rather technical and havemainly been published in statistical journals. The main objective of thepresent article is to provide a basic introduction to the evaluation of informative hypotheses using Bayesian model selection. Moreover, what is new in comparison to previous publications on this topic is that we provide guidelines on how to interpret the results. Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses is illustrated using an example concerning psychosocial functioning and the interplay between personality and support from family.

Psychiatric comorbidity: fact or artifact?

The frequent occurrence of comorbidity has brought about an extensive theoretical debate in psychiatry. Why are the rates of psychiatric comorbidity so high and what are their implications for the ontological and epistemological status of comorbid psychiatric diseases? Current explanations focus either on classification choices or on causal ties between disorders. Based on empirical and philosophical arguments, we propose a conventionalist interpretation of psychiatric comorbidity instead. We argue that a conventionalist approach fits well with research and clinical practice and resolves two problems for psychiatric diseases: experimenter’s regress and arbitrariness.

Commentary: "Consistent Superiority of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors Over Placebo in Reducing Depressed Mood in Patients with Major Depression".

In the past decades, almost all research in psychiatry and clinical psychology has been directed at the level of disorders, such as major depressive disorder (MDD) or schizophrenia. As has been argued by many scholars in recent work, this organization of the psychiatric research program has yielded limited insights, which justifies the investigation of psychopathology at a more fine-grained level: the level of symptoms (1, 2). In the present letter, we indicate two primary directions for this research program, which we propose to call symptomics. We will focus our discussion on MDD specifically and discuss possibilities in relation to the recently published work by Hieronymus et al. (3).

Psychiatric comorbidity and causal disease models

In psychiatry, comorbidity is the rule rather than the exception. Up to 45% of all patients are classified as having more than one psychiatric disorder. These high rates of comorbidity have led to a debate concerning the interpretation of this phenomenon. Some authors emphasize the problematic character of the high rates of comorbidity because they indicate absent zones of rarities. Others consider comorbid conditions to be a validator for a particular reclassification of diseases. In this paper we will show that those at first sight contrasting interpretations of comorbidity are based on similar assumptions about disease models. The underlying ideas are that firstly high rates of comorbidity are the result of the absence of causally defined diseases in psychiatry, and second that causal disease models are preferable to non-causal disease models. We will argue that there are good reasons to seek after causal understanding of psychiatric disorders, but that causal disease models will not rule out high rates of comorbidity--neither in psychiatry, nor in medicine in general. By bringing to the fore these underlying assumptions, we hope to clear the ground for a different understanding of comorbidity, and of models for psychiatric diseases.