Jan Willem Wieland

Infinite Regress Arguments

Infinite regress arguments play an important role in many distinct philosophical debates. Yet, exactly how they are to be used to demonstrate anything is a matter of serious controversy. In this paper I take up this metaphilosophical debate, and demonstrate how infinite regress arguments can be used for two different purposes: either they can refute a universally quantified proposition (as the Paradox Theory says), or they can demonstrate that a solution never solves a given problem (as the Failure Theory says). In the meantime, I show that Black’s view on infinite regress arguments (1996, this journal) is incomplete, and how his criticism of Passmore can be countered.

Responsibility for Strategic Ignorance

Strategic ignorance is a widespread phenomenon. In a laboratory setting, many participants avoid learning information about the consequences of their behaviour in order to act egoistically. In real life, many consumers avoid information about their purchases or the working conditions in which they were produced in order to retain their lifestyle. The question is whether agents are blameworthy for such strategically ignorant behaviour. In this paper, I explore quality of will resources, according to which agents are blameworthy, roughly, depending on their moral concern. The account I will propose—the Maximal Account—has three innovative features: (1) it utilizes a suitable concept of maximal moral concern, (2) it offers an accountability version of the account which significantly differs from the more familiar attributability variant, and (3) it maintains that agents without maximal concern are blameworthy (in some sense, to some degree).

Withstanding Tensions: Scientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreement to be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an account of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scientists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Even though some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance, the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more generally, for the scientific practice have been insufficiently explicated in the literature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in which disagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notion of epistemic tolerance.

Access and the Shirker Problem

It is often controversial what conclusion should be drawn from an infinite regress. In this chapter, I will present a case study to illustrate this kind of controversy in some detail: a regress concerning the so-called Access principle, which places an epistemic restriction on our obligations. Restrictions like Access fall prey to the Shirker Problem, namely the problem that shirkers could evade their obligations by evading certain epistemic circumstances. To block this problem, it has been suggested that shirkers have the obligation to learn their obligations. This solution yields a regress, yet it is controversial what the moral of the regress actually is. There will be two, related questions throughout this chapter: first, what possible conclusions can regresses have? And second: how can those conclusions be defended on the basis of a regress, and how might those conclusions be resisted?

Can Pyrrhonists act normally

Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following, I take up this systematic query and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus’ ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to ensure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.

Evidence One Does Not Possess

Unpossessed evidence abounds. There is much to be seen and much to be had. Much of it will never have an impact on our epistemic standings, but some of it does. Some evidence is such that we are blameworthy for not having it, and there is a tricky question about how to delineate this class of evidence. In this paper, I address and propose a solution to the dilemma posed by lazy agents on the one hand and agents facing exceptional evidence on the other. One familiar suggestion is that agents are blameworthy when their conduct results from their vices, and I will make a proposal which further analyses such vices in terms of exceptionality facts.

Attributionism and Counterfactual Robustness

ABSTRACT In this journal (AJP 2016), Vishnu Sridharan presents a novel objection to attributionism, the view according to which agents are responsible for their conduct when it reflects who they are or what they value. The key to Sridharans objection is that agents can fulfil all attributionist conditions for responsibility while being under the control of a manipulator. In this paper, we show that Sridharans objection falls prey to a dilemma—either his manipulator is counterfactually robust, or she is not—and that neither of its horns undermines attributionism.

De opschorting van het oordeel

opschorting. 1 Stel je kijkt naar een praatprogramma op televisie en er is een heftige discussie over een bepaalde gevoelige stelling. Er zijn felle voor en tegenstanders, en sterke argumenten pro en contra. Tegen het eind van het programma wordt het duidelijk dat beide partijen er niet in slagen om alle tegenargumenten van tafel te vegen, en vraagt de moderator of er nog iemand iets aan toe te voegen heeft. Wat er nu werkelijk nooit gebeurt, is dat er iemand besluit zijn of haar mening op te schorten. Of stel dat je het Maagdenhuis bent binnengelopen en de studenten ziet discussieren met de bestuurders. Volgens de studenten is de universiteit meer dan een bedrijf, en moeten ze de vrijheid hebben om zich te kunnen ontplooien. De bestuurders zijn het oneens en benadrukken de noodzaak van efficientie en rendement. De groep is verdeeld tussen voorstanders en tegenstanders, met sterke en minder sterke argumenten aan beide zijden. Maar opeens zijn er ook mensen die hun mening opschorten. Het gebeurt wellicht niet vaak. Als we naar de opinie van alledag kijken (van het kaliber zwarte piet discussie), dan is het al te makkelijk om een mening te hebben, en heel wat moeilijker om een mening op te schorten (vgl. Bransen 2014). Je zou kunnen denken dat opschorting in zo’n situatie best eens de rationele optie is: immers, vanuit jouw perspectief kun je niet goed uitmaken wie er gelijk heeft, of misschien heb je wel een vermoeden, maar je bent niet goed in staat om alle tegenargumenten te weerleggen (laat staan je tegenstanders te overtuigen). Opschorting is veilig. Je kan het nooit mis hebben en iets onwaars geloven. Aan de andere kant heb je het met opschorting ook nooit goed. Waarom geen gok wagen, zelfs al kun je het debat niet helemaal overzien en niet alle argumenten op hun waarde schatten? Je kunt ook denken dat opschorting een laffe optie is. Als je opschort ben je te angstig om te oordelen, te laf om op te staan voor een mening (vgl. Kamp 2010). Het lijkt nogal makkelijk om je mening op te schorten, terwijl de anderen zich moeten verweren tegen tegenargumenten. 1 In dit artikel hebben de termen ‘oordeel’, ‘mening’, ‘opvatting’ en ‘geloof’ dezelfde betekenis.

Case Study: Carroll’s Tortoise

It is often controversial whether a certain infinite regress is generated in the first place. In this chapter, I will present a case study to illustrate this kind of controversy in some detail: a recent application of Lewis Carroll’s famous case to the debate on rationality. The main question throughout this chapter will be: is the regress suggested by Carroll’s Tortoise indeed generated? As we will see, this is a delicate issue and it is easy to be mistaken. At the end of the chapter, I will formulate a straightforward tool to check whether or not a given regress is generated.

The Paradox Theory

In this chapter, it is explained for what purposes an infinite regress argument can be used, and how an infinite regress argument should be evaluated, according to the Paradox Theory.