Jane K. Dokko

The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions

A central question in the literature on mortgage default is at what point underwater homeowners walk away from their homes even if they can afford to pay. We study borrowers from Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada who purchased homes in 2006 using non-prime mortgages with 100 percent financing. Almost 80 percent of these borrowers default by the end of the observation period in September 2009. After distinguishing between defaults induced by job losses and other income shocks from those induced purely by negative equity, we find that the median borrower does not strategically default until equity falls to -62 percent of their home’s value. This result suggests that borrowers face high default and transaction costs. Our estimates show that about 80 percent of defaults in our sample are the result of income shocks combined with negative equity. However, when equity falls below -50 percent, half of the defaults are driven purely by negative equity. Therefore, our findings lend support to both the “double-trigger” theory of default and the view that mortgage borrowers exercise the implicit put option when it is in their interest.

Monetary policy and the global housing bubble

What caused the housing boom of the 2000s? A number of researchers have suggested that loose monetary policy during the first half of the 2000s was a primary cause of the substantial run-up in house prices in many countries. However, using a common statistical approach, we find that monetary policy was not the main factor. That should not be surprising: Although low interest rates raise house prices, the increase in prices during the mid-2000s was much larger than the historical relationship between the two variables would suggest. Instead, we investigate further the link between the marked loosening in terms and standards for mortgage credit and the most rapid increases in house prices. This link provides some evidence for a story where credit provision and the demand for housing fed on each other and helped spur the housing boom. Our work suggests a greater role for macroprudential regulation rather than monetary policy in managing asset price booms.

Does the NEA Crowd Out Private Charitable Contributions to the Arts

In this paper, I extend a theoretical model of the crowding out hypothesis, whereby government contributions to a public good displace private giving, in order to illustrate how dollar-for-dollar crowding out is possible even when individuals regard their own contributions and government grants as imperfect substitutes. I estimate that private charitable contributions to arts organizations increased by 60 cents to a dollar due to a major funding cut to the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) during the mid-1990s. These increases, however, also coincided with, on average, a 25 cent increase in fund-raising expenditures by arts organizations for every dollar decrease in government grants. The estimate of crowding out found in this paper is large, particularly for a study using a micro-data set. I argue that an appropriate interpretation of an estimate of a crowding out parameter, in general, depends crucially on the context.

Liquidity Problems and Early Payment Default Among Subprime Mortgages

We compare the twelve-month default probability among subprime borrowers differing only in the number of months before their first lump-sum property tax payment, after which time they may be exposed to reduced liquidity. We show that borrowers with an earlier property tax bill—within three months of origination—have 2% to 6% higher first-year default rates than borrowers facing their first property tax bill ten to twelve months after origination. Lump-sum property tax payments appear to produce a persistent state of low liquidity, the length of which raises the likelihood of default. These results are about one-third the effect size of a transition from 10% positive to 20% negative equity found in the literature. This paper provides causal evidence that liquidity constraints are important predictors of mortgage default.

Mortgage Choice: Behavioural Finance

Borrowers often face the mortgage choice decision (i.e., choosing among different mortgage contracts) in a highly complicated and convoluted environment. Often, households have few resources to consult as they navigate this decision. This article describes this environment, characterises the possible cognitive limitations of households as they choose among the myriad housing finance options, and discusses the possible mistakes households are prone to make based on existing research in behavioural economics. The article concludes with a discussion of the empirical literature characterising borrowers’ cognitive mistakes.