Janice A. Beecher

What matters to performance? Structural and institutional dimensions of water utility governance

A prolific theoretical and empirical literature has examined the relevance of structures and institutions to public utility performance, with a particular emphasis on the discrete role of ownership. The empirical findings are inconsistent and mostly indeterminate. A narrow emphasis on ownership deflects attention from the inextricable role of governance. The impact of privatization may be marginal compared with alternative governance reforms. Offered here is an informal, practical, and parsimonious conceptual model that distinguishes between structural (endogenous) and institutional (exogenous) governance. Three structural dimensions (ownership form, practice standards, and enterprise autonomy) are juxtaposed against three institutional dimensions (market contestability, external review, and economic regulation). Each dimension may be complementary or substitutive. Given persistent monopoly, privatization may be unnecessary and will be insufficient for ensuring performance. Economic regulation is a prerequisite for privatization but privatization is not a prerequisite for reform. Focusing on the US water sector, this paper offers a descriptive analysis for understanding why this is the case. A pragmatic approach is to strengthen core governance capacities in relation to performance priorities, which ultimately matter most of all.

Applied Political Science: Bridging the Gap or a Bridge Too Far?

less space is devoted to reviewing by the APSR than by the major journal in history. A particular area of concern, and one the APSR Book Review is working hard to improve, is timeliness. It is imperative that books are reviewed as quickly as possible after they are published so that the discipline is informed about recent scholarship. Doing so is difficult because time is required to invite and commission a potential reviewer and to allow the reviewer to complete the task. The six to nine month lag time inherent in the submission/publication process adds an additional delay in timely reviews of books. The performance of the APSR in reviewing books may well be a reflection of the relative importance in conveying scholarship of books as compared with journal articles. Clearly historians place rather more stock in authoring books than do political scientists. In contrast with the social sciences, the art of criticism has greater stature in the humanities where the ability to fashion an incisive and witty critique is a significant professional asset. Even so, political scientists have a definite interest in the quality of the APSR Book Review Section since it is the most widely read part of the journal.

Water efficiency programs for integrated water management

OBJECTIVES: The objectives of this project were to (1) develop a rigorous and universally-applicable set of definitions of benefit and cost components from different perspectives, (2) compile, in an easily-accessible form, the best available information on water use efficiency (WUE) program costs and savings, and (3) provide clear guidance to water utilities on program cost and benefit estimation.

Water Utility Privatization and Regulation: Lessons from the Global Experiment

ABSTRACT Privatization of the water and wastewater industries is a global experiment that raises a variety of issues, including whether and how economic regulation should be applied to private service providers. Alternate models are emerging both for privatization and regulation. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Argentina provide contrasting approaches. In the course of privatizing state-owned enterprises, nations may need to build their institutional capacity to regulate in order to prevent abuses of monopoly power and further policy goals, including efficiency economic development, environmental protection, and equity goals.

Private Water and Economic Regulation in the United States

The water industry in the United States exhibits complex structural features. Compared with other public utilities, and despite substantial capital investment needs, the water industry in the US continues to be dominated by public ownership - as it does in most corners of the world. The reality of [privatization[ in the form of expanded ownership or operation of water supply assets does not seem to match the rhetoric. Effective economic regulation is a necessary but insufficient condition for private involvement in the water sector because of waters monopolistic character, reinforced by other market imperfections. Expansion of the private role may depend on the industrys ability to demonstrate clear economic advantages, regulatory and other policy reforms, and political and public acceptance.

NARUC as Network: A Perspective on the U.S. Regulatory Policy Community

While much has been written about network industries, somewhat less attention has been paid to the policy networks among regulators themselves. Networks serve the collective and individual interests of members through professional socialization, capacity development, and institutionalization. Regulatory networks are particularly valuable if they help address information asymmetry, an inherent strategic advantage of regulated firms. Given potential tradeoffs associated with networking, regulatory networks must be vigilant about protecting institutional integrity. The history and culture of U.S. regulation are inextricably tied to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC). This paper presents an historical and cultural account of ‘NARUC as network’ and offers a perspective for thinking about regulatory policy networks generally.