Janusz Marecki

Deployed ARMOR protection: the application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based on their complex costs and benefits. To this end, this paper describes a promising transition of the latest in multi-agent algorithms -- in fact, an algorithm that represents a culmination of research presented at AAMAS - into a deployed application. In particular, it describes a software assistant agent called ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes) that casts this patrolling/monitoring problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, allowing the agent to appropriately weigh the different actions in randomization, as well as uncertainty over adversary types. ARMOR combines three key features: (i) It uses the fastest known solver for Bayesian Stackelberg games called DOBSS, where the dominant mixed strategies enable randomization; (ii) Its mixed-initiative based interface allows users to occasionally adjust or override the automated schedule based on their local constraints; (iii) It alerts the users if mixed-initiative overrides appear to degrade the overall desired randomization. ARMOR has been successfully deployed since August 2007 at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. This paper examines the information, design choices, challenges, and evaluation that went into designing ARMOR.

Approximation methods for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games: modeling distributional payoff uncertainty

Game theory is fast becoming a vital tool for reasoning about complex real-world security problems, including critical infrastructure protection. The game models for these applications are constructed using expert analysis and historical data to estimate the values of key parameters, including the preferences and capabilities of terrorists. In many cases, it would be natural to represent uncertainty over these parameters using continuous distributions (such as uniform intervals or Gaussians). However, existing solution algorithms are limited to considering a small, finite number of possible attacker types with different payoffs. We introduce a general model of infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games that allows payoffs to be represented using continuous payoff distributions. We then develop several techniques for finding approximate solutions for this class of games, and show empirically that our methods offer dramatic improvements over the current state of the art, providing new ways to improve the robustness of security game models.

Letting loose a SPIDER on a network of POMDPs: generating quality guaranteed policies

Distributed Partially Observable Markov Decision Problems (Distributed POMDPs) are a popular approach for modeling multi-agent systems acting in uncertain domains. Given the significant complexity of solving distributed POMDPs, particularly as we scale up the numbers of agents, one popular approach has focused on approximate solutions. Though this approach is efficient, the algorithms within this approach do not provide any guarantees on solution quality. A second less popular approach focuses on global optimality, but typical results are available only for two agents, and also at considerable computational cost. This paper overcomes the limitations of both these approaches by providing SPIDER, a novel combination of three key features for policy generation in distributed POMDPs: (i) it exploits agent interaction structure given a network of agents (i.e. allowing easier scale-up to larger number of agents); (ii) it uses a combination of heuristics to speedup policy search; and (iii) it allows quality guaranteed approximations, allowing a systematic tradeoff of solution quality for time. Experimental results show orders of magnitude improvement in performance when compared with previous global optimal algorithms.

GUARDS and PROTECT: next generation applications of security games

We provide an overview of two recent applications of security games. We describe new features and challenges introduced in the new applications.

Conflicts in teamwork: hybrids to the rescue

Today within the AAMAS community, we see at least four competing approaches to building multiagent systems: belief-desire-intention (BDI), distributed constraint optimization (DCOP), distributed POMDPs, and auctions or game-theoretic approaches. While there is exciting progress within each approach, there is a lack of cross-cutting research. This paper highlights hybrid approaches for multiagent teamwork. In particular, for the past decade, the TEAMCORE research group has focused on building agent teams in complex, dynamic domains. While our early work was inspired by BDI, we will present an overview of recent research that uses DCOPs and distributed POMDPs in building agent teams. While DCOP and distributed POMDP algorithms provide promising results, hybrid approaches help us address problems of scalability and expressiveness. For example, in the BDI-POMDP hybrid approach, BDI team plans are exploited to improve POMDP tractability, and POMDPs improve BDI team plan performance. We present some recent results from applying this approach in a Disaster Rescue simulation domain being developed with help from the Los Angeles Fire Department.

The Defacto System: Coordinating Human-Agent Teams for the Future of Disaster Response

Enabling effective interactions between agent teams and humans for disaster response is a critical area of research, with encouraging progress in the past few years. However, previous work suffers from two key limitations: (i) limited human situational awareness, reducing human effectiveness in directing agent teams and (ii) the agent team’s rigid interaction strategies that limit team performance. This paper presents a software prototype called DEFACTO (Demonstrating Effective Flexible Agent Coordination of Teams through Omnipresence). DEFACTO is based on a software proxy architecture and 3D visualization system, which addresses the two limitations described above. First, the 3D visualization interface enables human virtual omnipresence in the environment, improving human situational awareness and ability to assist agents. Second, generalizing past work on adjustable autonomy, the agent team chooses among a variety of “team-level” interaction strategies, even excluding humans from the loop in extreme circumstances.

On opportunistic techniques for solving decentralized Markov decision processes with temporal constraints

Decentralized Markov Decision Processes (DEC-MDPs) are a popular model of agent-coordination problems in domains with uncertainty and time constraints but very difficult to solve. In this paper, we improve a state-of-the-art heuristic solution method for DEC-MDPs, called OC-DEC-MDP, that has recently been shown to scale up to larger DEC-MDPs. Our heuristic solution method, called Value Function Propagation (VFP), combines two orthogonal improvements of OC-DEC-MDP. First, it speeds up OC-DEC-MDP by an order of magnitude by maintaining and manipulating a value function for each state (as a function of time) rather than a separate value for each pair of sate and time interval. Furthermore, it achieves better solution qualities than OC-DEC-MDP because, as our analytical results show, it does not overestimate the expected total reward like OC-DEC- MDP. We test both improvements independently in a crisis-management domain as well as for other types of domains. Our experimental results demonstrate a significant speedup of VFP over OC-DEC-MDP as well as higher solution qualities in a variety of situations.

The DEFACTO system for human omnipresence to coordinate agent teams: the future of disaster response

Enabling interactions of agent-teams and humans is a critical area of research, with encouraging progress in the past few years. However, previous work suffers from three key limitations: (i) limited human situational awareness, reducing human effectiveness in directing agent teams, (ii) the agent teams rigid interaction strategies that limit team performance, and (iii) lack of formal tools to analyze the impact of such interaction strategies. This paper presents a software prototype called DEFACTO (Demonstrating Effective Flexible Agent Coordination of Teams through Omnipresence). DEFACTO is based on a software proxy architecture and 3D visualization system, which addresses the three limitations mentioned above.

Coordinating randomized policies for increasing security of agent systems

We consider the problem of providing decision support to a patrolling or security service in an adversarial domain. The idea is to create patrols that can achieve a high level of coverage or reward while taking into account the presence of an adversary. We assume that the adversary can learn or observe the patrolling strategy and use this to its advantage. We follow two different approaches depending on what is known about the adversary. If there is no information about the adversary we use a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to represent patrols and identify randomized solutions that minimize the information available to the adversary. This lead to the development of algorithms CRLP and BRLP, for policy randomization of MDPs. Second, when there is partial information about the adversary we decide on efficient patrols by solving a Bayesian–Stackelberg games. Here, the leader decides first on a patrolling strategy and then an adversary, of possibly many adversary types, selects its best response for the given patrol. We provide two efficient MIP formulations named DOBSS and ASAP to solve this NP-hard problem. Our experimental results show the efficiency of these algorithms and illustrate how these techniques provide optimal and secure patrolling policies. We note that these models have been applied in practice, with DOBSS being at the heart of the ARMOR system that is currently deployed at the Los Angeles International airport (LAX) for randomizing checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals.

A Decision Theoretic Approach to Data Leakage Prevention

In both the commercial and defense sectors a compelling need is emerging for rapid, yet secure, dissemination of information. In this paper we address the threat of information leakage that often accompanies such information flows. We focus on domains with one information source (sender) and many information sinks (recipients) where: (i) sharing is mutually beneficial for the sender and the recipients, (ii) leaking a shared information is beneficial to the recipients but undesirable to the sender, and (iii) information sharing decisions of the sender are determined using imperfect monitoring of the (un)intended information leakage by the recipients. We make two key contributions in this context: First, we formulate data leakage prevention problems as Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes; we show how to encode one sample monitoring mechanism---digital watermarking---into our model. Second, we derive optimal information sharing strategies for the sender and optimal information leakage strategies for a rational-malicious recipient as a function of the efficacy of the monitoring mechanism. We believe that our approach offers a first of a kind solution for addressing complex information sharing problems under uncertainty.