Jason A. Laska
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
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Publication
Featured researches published by Jason A. Laska.
international conference on machine learning and applications | 2012
Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska
A trend in machine learning is the application of existing algorithms to ever-larger datasets. Support Vector Machines (SVM) have been shown to be very effective, but have been difficult to scale to large-data problems. Some approaches have sought to scale SVM training by approximating and parallelizing the underlying quadratic optimization problem. This paper pursues a different approach. Our algorithm, which we call Sampled SVM, uses an existing SVM training algorithm to create a new SVM training algorithm. It uses randomized data sampling to better extend SVMs to large data applications. Experiments on several datasets show that our method is faster than and comparably accurate to both the original SVM algorithm it is based on and the Cascade SVM, the leading data organization approach for SVMs in the literature. Further, we show that our approach is more amenable to parallelization than Cascade SVM.
international conference on machine learning and applications | 2012
Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska; Robert A. Bridges
Intrusion detection is often described as having two main approaches: signature-based and anomaly-based. We argue that only unsupervised methods are suitable for detecting anomalies. However, there has been a tendency in the literature to conflate the notion of an anomaly with the notion of a malicious event. As a result, the methods used to discover anomalies have typically been ad hoc, making it nearly impossible to systematically compare between models or regulate the number of alerts. We propose a new, principled approach to anomaly detection that addresses the main shortcomings of ad hoc approaches. We provide both theoretical and cyber-specific examples to demonstrate the benefits of our more principled approach.
2013 6th International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS) | 2013
Alexander M. Melin; Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska; David Fugate; Roger A. Kisner
The increasingly recognized vulnerability of industrial control systems to cyber-attacks has inspired a considerable amount of research into techniques for cyber-resilient control systems. The majority of this effort involves the application of well known information security techniques to protect system networks. These techniques are primarily concerned with the prevention of unauthorized access and the protection of data integrity. While these efforts are important to protect the control systems that operate critical infrastructure, they are never perfectly effective thus motivating a need to develop control systems that will operate successfully during a cyber attack. Little research has focused on the design of control systems with closed-loop dynamics that are resilient to cyber-attack. An understanding of the types of modifications to the system and signals that could be employed by an attacker after they have gained access to the control system and the effects of these attacks on the behavior of the control systems can guide efforts to develop attack detection and mitigation strategies. To formulate this problem, consistent mathematical definitions of concepts within resilient control need to be established to enable a mathematical analysis of the vulnerabilities and resiliencies of a particular control system design methodology and architecture. In this paper, we propose rigorous definitions for state awareness, operational normalcy, and resiliency as they relate to realtime control systems. We will also discuss some mathematical consequences that arise from the proposed definitions. The goal is to begin to develop a mathematical framework and testable conditions for resiliency that can be used to build a sound theoretical foundation for resilient control research.
visual analytics science and technology | 2012
Lane Harrison; Jason A. Laska; Riley Spahn; Michael D. Iannacone; Evan P Downing; Erik M. Ferragut; John R. Goodall
Our entry into the VAST 2012 Mini Challenge 2 is a streaming visual analytic system that scores events based on anomalousness and maliciousness and presents each event to the user in a user-defined groupings in animated small-multiple views. The anomaly detection algorithm identifies low probability events, supporting awareness regarding atypical traffic patterns on the network. The maliciousness classifier incorporates both situated knowledge of an environment (policy and machine roles) and domain knowledge (encoded in the IDS alerts). We discuss the visualization design and classification techniques, as well as provide examples of timely detection from the challenge dataset.
advances in computing and communications | 2014
Seddik M. Djouadi; Alexander M. Melin; Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska; Jin Dong
Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) from attacks has been in securing the networks using information security techniques. Effort has also been applied to increasing the protection and reliability of the control system against random hardware and software failures. However, the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop systems under optimal signal attacks are provided. Finally, an illustrative numerical example using a power generation network is provided together with distributed LQ controllers.
cyber security and information intelligence research workshop | 2013
Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska; Bogdan D. Czejdo; Alexander M. Melin
The consolidation of cyber communications networks and physical control systems within the energy smart grid introduces a number of new risks. Unfortunately, these risks are largely unknown and poorly understood, yet include very high impact losses from attack and component failures. One important aspect of risk management is the detection of anomalies and changes. However, anomaly detection within cyber security remains a difficult, open problem, with special challenges in dealing with false alert rates and heterogeneous data. Furthermore, the integration of cyber and physical dynamics is often intractable. And, because of their broad scope, energy grid cyber-physical systems must be analyzed at multiple scales, from individual components, up to network level dynamics. We describe an improved approach to anomaly detection that combines three important aspects. First, system dynamics are modeled using a reduced order model for greater computational tractability. Second, a probabilistic and principled approach to anomaly detection is adopted that allows for regulation of false alerts and comparison of anomalies across heterogeneous data sources. Third, a hierarchy of aggregations are constructed to support interactive and automated analyses of anomalies at multiple scales.
european control conference | 2015
Seddik M. Djouadi; Alexander M. Melin; Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska; Jin Dong; Anis Drira
As control system networks are being connected to enterprise level networks for remote monitoring, operation, and system-wide performance optimization, these same connections are providing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors for attack, financial gain, and theft of intellectual property. Much effort in cyber-physical system (CPS) protection has focused on protecting the borders of the system through traditional information security techniques. Less effort has been applied to the protection of cyber-physical systems from intelligent attacks launched after an attacker has defeated the information security protections to gain access to the control system. In this paper, attacks on actuator signals are analyzed from a system theoretic context. The threat surface is classified into finite energy and bounded attacks. These two broad classes encompass a large range of potential attacks. The effect of theses attacks on a linear quadratic (LQ) control are analyzed, and the optimal actuator attacks for both finite and infinite horizon LQ control are derived, therefore the worst case attack signals are obtained. The closed-loop system under the optimal attack signals is given and a numerical example illustrating the effect of an optimal bounded attack is provided.
Physical Review A | 2017
Ryan S. Bennink; Erik M. Ferragut; Travis S. Humble; Jason A. Laska; James J. Nutaro; Mark G. Pleszkoch; Raphael C. Pooser
Modeling and simulation is essential for predicting and verifying the behavior of fabricated quantum circuits, but existing simulation methods are either impractically costly or require an unrealistic simplification of error processes. We present a method of simulating noisy Clifford circuits that is both accurate and practical in experimentally relevant regimes. In particular, the cost is weakly exponential in the size and the degree of non-Cliffordness of the circuit. Our approach is based on the construction of exact representations of quantum channels as quasiprobability distributions over stabilizer operations, which are then sampled, simulated, and weighted to yield unbiased statistical estimates of circuit outputs and other observables. As a demonstration of these techniques we simulate a Steane [[7,1,3]]-encoded logical operation with non-Clifford errors and compute its fault tolerance error threshold. We expect that the method presented here will enable studies of much larger and more realistic quantum circuits than was previously possible.
Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences | 2013
Bogdan D. Czejdo; Erik M. Ferragut; John R. Goodall; Jason A. Laska
Abstract In this presentation, we discuss how a data warehouse can support situational awareness and data forensic needs for investigation of event streams violating rules. The data warehouse for event streams can contain summary tables showing rule violation on different aggregation level. We will introduce the classification of rules and the concept of a general aggregation graph for defining various classes of rules violation and their relationships. The data warehouse system containing various rule violation aggregations will allow the data forensics experts to have the ability to “drill-down” into event data across different data warehouse dimensions. The event stream real-time processing and other software modules can also use the summarizations to discover if current events bursts satisfy rules by comparing them with historic event bursts.
Social Network Analysis and Mining | 2016
Robert A. Bridges; John P. Collins; Erik M. Ferragut; Jason A. Laska; Blair D. Sullivan
This work presents a modeling and analysis framework for graph sequences which addresses the challenge of detecting and contextualizing anomalies in streaming graph data. Our goal is to detect changes at multiple levels of granularity, thereby identifying specific nodes and subgraphs causing a graph to appear anomalously. In particular, the framework detects changes in community membership, density, and node degree in a sequence of graphs where these are relatively stable. In route to this end, we introduce a new graph model, a generalization of the BTER model of Seshadhri et al., by adding flexibility to community structure, and use this model to perform multi-scale graph anomaly detection. This technique provides insight into a graph’s structure and internal context that may shed light on a detected event. Additionally, this multi-scale analysis facilitates intuitive visualizations by allowing users to narrow focus from an anomalous graph to particular subgraphs or nodes causing the anomaly. For evaluation, two hierarchical anomaly detectors are tested against a baseline Gaussian method on a series of sampled graphs. We demonstrate that our graph statistics-based approach outperforms both a distribution-based detector and the baseline in a labeled setting with community structure, and it accurately detects anomalies in synthetic and real-world datasets at the node, subgraph, and graph levels. To illustrate the accessibility of information made possible via this technique, the anomaly detector and an associated interactive visualization tool are tested on NCAA football data, where teams and conferences that moved within the league are identified with perfect recall, and precision >0.786.