Jason D. Runyan

A role for prefrontal cortex in memory storage for trace fear conditioning

The prefrontal cortex has been shown to participate in the association of events separated by time. However, it is not known whether the prefrontal cortex stores the memory for these relationships. Trace conditioning is a form of classical conditioning in which a time gap separates the conditioned stimulus (CS) from the unconditioned stimulus (US), the association of which has been shown to depend on prefrontal activity. Here we demonstrate that inhibition of extracellular signal-regulated kinase (Erk) cascade (a biochemical pathway involved in long-term memory storage) in the rat medial prefrontal cortex did not interfere with memory encoding for trace fear conditioning but impaired memory retention. In addition, animals displayed impaired memory for the irrelevancy of the training context. Hippocampal Erk phosphorylation was found to have a later time course than prefrontal Erk phosphorylation after trace fear conditioning, indicating a direct role for the prefrontal cortex in associative memory storage for temporally separated events as well as in memory storage of relevancy.

A Smartphone Ecological Momentary Assessment/Intervention “App” for Collecting Real-Time Data and Promoting Self-Awareness

We have designed a flexible ecological momentary assessment/intervention smartphone (EMA/EMI) “app”. We examine the utility of this app for collecting real-time data, and assessing intra-subject variability, by using it to assess how freshman undergraduates spend their time. We also explore whether its use can promote greater self-awareness. Participants were randomly divided into an experimental group, who used the app, and a control group, who did not. We used the app to collect both randomized in-the-moment data as well as end-of-day data to assess time use. Using a posttest survey we asked participants questions about how they spent time throughout the school semester. We also asked the experimental group about their experience with the app. Among other findings, 80.49% participants indicated that they became more aware of how they spent their time using the app. Corroborating this report, among the experimental group, end-of-semester self-assessment of time spent wasted, and time spent using electronics recreationally, predicted semester GPA at a strength comparable to high school GPA and ACT score (two of the best single predictors for first semester college GPA), but had no correlation among controls. We discuss the advantages and limitations of using apps, such as ours, for EMA and/or EMI.

Inhibition of prefrontal protein synthesis following recall does not disrupt memory for trace fear conditioning

BackgroundThe extent of similarity between consolidation and reconsolidation is not yet fully understood. One of the differences noted is that not every brain region involved in consolidation exhibits reconsolidation. In trace fear conditioning, the hippocampus and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) are required for consolidation of long-term memory. We have previously demonstrated that trace fear memory is susceptible to infusion of the protein synthesis inhibitor anisomycin into the hippocampus following recall. In the present study, we examine whether protein synthesis inhibition in the mPFC following recall similarly results in the observation of reconsolidation of trace fear memory.ResultsTargeted intra-mPFC infusions of anisomycin or vehicle were performed immediately following recall of trace fear memory at 24 hours, or at 30 days, following training in a one-day or a two-day protocol. The present study demonstrates three key findings: 1) trace fear memory does not undergo protein synthesis dependent reconsolidation in the PFC, regardless of the intensity of the training, and 2) regardless of whether the memory is recent or remote, and 3) intra-mPFC inhibition of protein synthesis immediately following training impaired remote (30 days) memory.ConclusionThese results suggest that not all structures that participate in memory storage are involved in reconsolidation. Alternatively, certain types of memory-related information may reconsolidate, while other components of memory may not.

Virtues, ecological momentary assessment/intervention and smartphone technology

Virtues, broadly understood as stable and robust dispositions for certain responses across morally relevant situations, have been a growing topic of interest in psychology. A central topic of discussion has been whether studies showing that situations can strongly influence our responses provide evidence against the existence of virtues (as a kind of stable and robust disposition). In this review, we examine reasons for thinking that the prevailing methods for examining situational influences are limited in their ability to test dispositional stability and robustness; or, then, whether virtues exist. We make the case that these limitations can be addressed by aggregating repeated, cross-situational assessments of environmental, psychological and physiological variables within everyday life—a form of assessment often called ecological momentary assessment (EMA, or experience sampling). We, then, examine how advances in smartphone application (app) technology, and their mass adoption, make these mobile devices an unprecedented vehicle for EMA and, thus, the psychological study of virtue. We, additionally, examine how smartphones might be used for virtue development by promoting changes in thought and behavior within daily life; a technique often called ecological momentary intervention (EMI). While EMA/I have become widely employed since the 1980s for the purposes of understanding and promoting change amongst clinical populations, few EMA/I studies have been devoted to understanding or promoting virtues within non-clinical populations. Further, most EMA/I studies have relied on journaling, PDAs, phone calls and/or text messaging systems. We explore how smartphone app technology provides a means of making EMA a more robust psychological method, EMI a more robust way of promoting positive change, and, as a result, opens up new possibilities for studying and promoting virtues.

Editorial: Inner Experiences: Theory, Measurement, Frequency, Content, and Functions

It is safe to posit that human beings have been interested in their own inner mental experiences from the moment they became aware of them, arguably over 60,000 years ago (Leary, 2004). In sharp contrast, growth in the actual scientific examination of these inner experiences is remarkably recent (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski, 1982; Klinger and Cox, 1987–1988; Goldstein and Kenen, 1988; Hurlburt, 1990). Inner speech, in particular, has been the focus of even more recent efforts (e.g., Morin et al., 2011; Brinthaupt and Dove, 2012; Hurlburt et al., 2013; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015; Alderson-Day et al., 2015). We present 14 articles that cover theoretical ideas as well as current research results pertaining to the measurement, frequency, content, and functions of inner experiences. In what follows we summarize some exciting key findings highlighted in this research topic.

Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences

Agent-causal libertarians maintain we are irreducible agents who, by acting, settle matters that aren’t already settled. This implies that the neural matters underlying the exercise of our agency don’t conform to deterministic laws, but it does not appear to exclude the possibility that they conform to statistical laws. However, Pereboom (Noûs 29:21–45, 1995; Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; in: Nadelhoffer (ed) The future of punishment, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013) has argued that, if these neural matters conform to either statistical or deterministic physical laws, the complete conformity of an irreducible agent’s settling of matters with what should be expected given the applicable laws would involve coincidences too wild to be credible. Here, I show that Pereboom’s argument depends on the assumption that, at times, the antecedent probability certain behavior will occur applies in each of a number of occasions, and is incapable of changing as a result of what one does from one occasion to the next. There is, however, no evidence this assumption is true. The upshot is the wild coincidence objection is an empirical objection lacking empirical support. Thus, it isn’t a compelling argument against agent-causal libertarianism.

Smartphone delivery of a hope intervention: Another way to flourish

Positive interventions have shown promise for fostering hedonic (happiness) and eudaimonic (flourishing) well-being. However, few studies have focused on positive interventions that target hope as a means of increasing well-being, and none have examined the use of smartphone app-based systems for delivering interventions in the moments and contexts of daily life—an approach called ecological momentary intervention (EMI). We conducted a quasi-experimental pilot study using a pretest and posttest design to examine the feasibility and potential impact of a mobile app-based hope EMI. Participants appeared to engage with the intervention and found the experience to be user-friendly, helpful, and enjoyable. Relative to the control group, those receiving the intervention demonstrated significantly greater increases in hope; however, there were no between-group differences in hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. The authors recommend future research to examine the potential of EMI mobile apps to cultivate hope and promote flourishing.

Teaching Empathic Concern and Altruism in the Smartphone Age.

Abstract Numerous studies show empathic concern promotes altruistic motivation and prosocial behavior. Here, we discuss empathic concern, its relation to altruistic motivation, and how empathic concern is invoked in experimental studies. We do this with an eye toward applying laboratory techniques in the classroom, and everyday life, to foster empathic concern and altruistic responding. This goes beyond teaching about empathic concern to setting up conditions that help people experience this psychological state, and its benefits, firsthand. Smartphone-based ecological momentary interventions (EMIs) can help us do this by raising self- and other-awareness, and by promoting empathic states and practices in daily life. While smartphones often pull us away from direct personal interaction, we explore ways of using these devices to redirect our attention to those around us. We end by suggesting that these ways of helping people regularly experience and act upon empathic concern in daily life might help nurture a compassionate disposition.