Jason F. Shogren

An ounce of prevention or a pound of cure: bioeconomic risk analysis of invasive species

Numbers of non–indigenous species—species introduced from elsewhere—are increasing rapidly worldwide, causing both environmental and economic damage. Rigorous quantitative risk–analysis frameworks, however, for invasive species are lacking. We need to evaluate the risks posed by invasive species and quantify the relative merits of different management strategies (e.g. allocation of resources between prevention and control). We present a quantitative bioeconomic modelling framework to analyse risks from non–indigenous species to economic activity and the environment. The model identifies the optimal allocation of resources to prevention versus control, acceptable invasion risks and consequences of invasion to optimal investments (e.g. labour and capital). We apply the model to zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha), and show that society could benefit by spending up to US

Hardnose the Dictator

324 000 year−1 to prevent invasions into a single lake with a power plant. By contrast, the US Fish and Wildlife Service spent US

Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets

825 000 in 2001 to manage all aquatic invaders in all US lakes. Thus, greater investment in prevention is warranted.

CVM-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction Markets

Lab experiments have gone to extremes to isolate and repress other-regarding behavior in extensive-form bargaining games, with limited success. Consider, for example, Elizabeth Hoffman et al.’s (1996; hereafter HMS) Anonymous Dictator game. This game controls self-interested strategic behavior by giving a person complete control over the distribution of wealth, and complete anonymity from all others including the experimenter. While theory predicts people with complete control and complete anonymity will offer up nothing to others, in fact they still share the wealth in about 40 percent of the observed bargains. Such other-regarding choice is another example in which individual behavior differs from that predicted by subgame perfection, and supports the call for a new “behavioral game theory” (Colin F. Camerer, 1997). Herein we extend the work of HMS to reveal a setting in which 95 percent of dictators follow game-theoretic predictions. In contrast to previous studies, our design has people bargain over earned wealth rather than unearned wealth granted by the experimenter. We argue that just as rewards must be salient (Kyung Hwan Baik et al., 1999), the assets in a bargain must be legitimate to produce rational behavior. Our results support this conjecture. Dictators bargaining over earned wealth were more selfinterested than observed in previous studies; and when they had complete anonymity, selfless behavior is essentially eliminated.

Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation

In this paper, we value food safety in a nonhypothetical setting - experimental auction markets. First, subjects underestimate the relatively low probabilities of food-borne illness. Second, measures of value are within a relatively fiat range across a wide range of risks, even with repeated market experience and full information on the objective probability and severity of illness, suggesting subjects rely on prior perceptions. Third, marginal willingness to pay decreases as risk increases, suggesting that the perceived quality of new information can affect the weight the individuals place on the information. Finally, pathogen-specific values seem to act as surrogates for general food safety preferences.

Looming global-scale failures and missing institutions

We design and implement a method, CVM-X, to calibrate hypothetical survey values using experimental auction markets. We test the procedure using consumer willingness-to-pay for irradiated/nonirradiated meat. Our results show that calibration factors for those who favor the irradiation process (0.67–0.69) are less severe than for those with an initial dislike of the process (0.55–0.59), suggesting that calibration may be commodity specific. Copyright 1998, Oxford University Press.

Linking Adaptation and Mitigation in Climate Change Policy

This paper examines an experiment conducted to explore a voluntary incentive mechanism, the agglomeration bonus, designed to protect endangered species and biodiversity by reuniting fragmented habitat across private land. The goal is to maximize habitat protection and minimize landowner resentment. The agglomeration bonus mechanism pays an extra bonus for every acre a landowner retires that borders on any other retired acre. The mechanism provides incentive for non-cooperative landowners to voluntarily create a contiguous reserve across their common border. A government agency’s role is to target the critical habitat, to integrate the agglomeration bonus into the compensation package, and to provide landowners the unconditional freedom to choose which acres to retire. The downside with the bonus, however, is that multiple Nash equilibria exist, which can be ranked by the level of habitat fragmentation. Our lab results show that a no-bonus mechanism always created fragmented habitat, whereas with the bonus, players found the first-best habitat reserve. Once pre-play communication and random pairings was introduced, players found the first-best outcome in nearly 92% of play.

Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions

Navigating global changes requires a coevolving set of collaborative, global institutions. Energy, food, and water crises; climate disruption; declining fisheries; increasing ocean acidification; emerging diseases; and increasing antibiotic resistance are examples of serious, intertwined global-scale challenges spawned by the accelerating scale of human activity. They are outpacing the development of institutions to deal with them and their many interactive effects. The core of the problem is inducing cooperation in situations where individuals and nations will collectively gain if all cooperate, but each faces the temptation to take a free ride on the cooperation of others. The nation-state achieves cooperation by the exercise of sovereign power within its boundaries. The difficulty to date is that transnational institutions provide, at best, only partial solutions, and implementation of even these solutions can be undermined by internation competition and recalcitrance.

On Behavioral-Environmental Economics

How people privately and collectively adapt to climate risk can affect the costs and benefits of public mitigation policy (e.g., Kyoto); an obvious point often neglected in actual policy making. Herein we use the economic theory of endogenous risk to address this optimal mix of mitigation and adaptation strategies, and examine how increased variability in climate change threats affects this mix. We stress that a better understanding of the cross-links between mitigation and adaptation would potentially make it possible to provide more risk reduction with less wealth. Policies that are formulated without considering the cross-links can unintentionally undermine the effectiveness of public sector policies and programs because of unaddressed conflicts between the strategies. We also discuss the cross-disciplinary lessons to be learned from this literature, and identify important research questions to spur discussion in the next round of inquiry.

Auction mechanisms and the measurement of WTP and WTA

Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.