Jason K. Clark

Attitudinal Ambivalence and Message-Based Persuasion: Motivated Processing of Proattitudinal Information and Avoidance of Counterattitudinal Information

Attitudinal ambivalence has been found to increase processing of attitude-relevant information. In this research, the authors suggest that ambivalence can also create the opposite effect: avoidance of thinking about persuasive messages. If processing is intended to reduce experienced ambivalence, then ambivalent people should increase processing of information perceived as proattitudinal (agreeable) and able to decrease ambivalence. However, ambivalence should also lead people to avoid processing of counterattitudinal (disagreeable) information that threatens to increase ambivalence. Three studies provide evidence consistent with this proposal. When participants were relatively ambivalent, they processed messages to a greater extent when the messages were proattitudinal rather than counterattitudinal. However, when participants were relatively unambivalent, they processed messages more when the messages were counterattitudinal rather than proattitudinal. In addition, ambivalent participants perceived proattitudinal messages as more likely than counterattitudinal messages to reduce ambivalence, and these perceptions accounted for message position effects on amount of processing.

Not all stereotyping is created equal: Differential consequences of thoughtful versus nonthoughtful stereotyping.

Much research emphasizes heuristic use of stereotypes, though stereotypes have long been considered as capable of influencing more thoughtful processing of social information. Direct comparisons between thoughtful and non-thoughtful stereotyping are lacking in the literature. Recent research in attitude change emphasizes the different consequences of judgments arising from relatively thoughtful versus non-thoughtful processes. Therefore, increased thought could not only fail to decrease stereotyping but might also create stereotypic perceptions that are more likely to have lasting impact. The current studies demonstrate thoughtful and non-thoughtful stereotyping within the same setting. More thoughtful stereotyping is more resistant to future attempts at change and to warnings of possible bias. Implications are discussed for the typical research questions asked after observing stereotypic judgements.

Source Expertise and Persuasion: The Effects of Perceived Opposition or Support on Message Scrutiny

Compared to nonexperts, expert sources have been considered to elicit more processing of persuasive messages because of expectations that the information is likely to be valid or accurate. However, depending on the position of an advocacy, source expertise could activate other motives that may produce a very different relation from that found in past research. When messages are counterattitudinal (disagreeable), experts should motivate greater processing than nonexpert sources because of expectations that they will likely provide robust opposition to one’s existing views. In contrast, when advocacies are proattitudinal (agreeable), nonexpert rather than expert sources should elicit more scrutiny because of perceptions that they will likely provide inadequate support to recipients’ current views. Two studies offer evidence consistent with these predictions. Manipulations of source expertise created different expectations regarding the strength of opposition or support, and these perceptions accounted for effects of source expertise on the amount of message scrutiny.

Source entitativity and the elaboration of persuasive messages: the roles of perceived efficacy and message discrepancy.

Compared with nonentitative groups, entitative targets are considered to elicit more elaborative processing because of the singularity or unity they represent. However, when groups serve as sources of persuasive messages, other dynamics may operate. The current research suggests that entitativity is intrinsically linked to perceptions of a groups efficacy related to the advocacy, and this efficacy combines with the position of the appeal to determine message elaboration. When messages are counterattitudinal, entitative (efficacious) sources should elicit greater processing than nonentitative groups because of concern that the entitative sources may be more likely to bring about the negative outcomes proposed. However, when appeals are proattitudinal, sources low in entitativity (nonefficacious) should initiate more elaboration due to concern that they may be unlikely to facilitate the positive outcomes proposed. These hypotheses were supported in a series of studies. Preliminary studies established the entitativity-efficacy relation (Studies 1A and 1B). Primary persuasion studies showed that manipulations of source entitativity (Studies 2 and 3) and source efficacy (Studies 4A and 4B) have opposite effects on processing as a function of message discrepancy.

Feeling Conflicted and Seeking Information When Ambivalence Enhances and Diminishes Selective Exposure to Attitude-Consistent Information

To date, little research has examined the impact of attitudinal ambivalence on attitude-congruent selective exposure. Past research would suggest that strong/univalent rather than weak/ambivalent attitudes should be more predictive of proattitudinal information seeking. Although ambivalent attitude structure might weaken the attitude’s effect on seeking proattitudinal information, we believe that conflicted attitudes might also motivate attitude-congruent selective exposure because proattitudinal information should be effective in reducing ambivalence. Two studies provide evidence that the effects of ambivalence on information choices depend on amount of issue knowledge. That is, ambivalence motivates attitude-consistent exposure when issue knowledge is relatively low because less familiar information is perceived to be effective at reducing ambivalence. Conversely, when knowledge is relatively high, more unambivalent (univalent) attitudes predicted attitude-consistent information seeking.

Discovering That the Shoe Fits: The Self-Validating Role of Stereotypes

Stereotypes can influence social perceptions in many ways. The current research examined a previously unexplored possibility—that activation of a stereotype can validate thoughts about other people when the thoughts are stereotype consistent (i.e., that stereotype activation can increase peoples confidence in their previous stereotype-consistent thoughts). Given previous results for other forms of metacognition, this thought validation from stereotype activation should be most likely when people have the cognitive capacity to carefully process individuating information. In two experiments, participants were given information about a target person and then a description designed to activate a stereotype. When processing capacity was high, confidence in thoughts was greater when the initial information produced thoughts consistent, rather than inconsistent, with the stereotype that was later activated, and higher confidence in thoughts was associated with stronger perception-consistent recommendations related to the target. When processing capacity was low, an activated stereotype served its familiar heuristic role in judgment, and thought confidence played no role in judgment-related recommendations.

Seeking Confirmation in Times of Doubt Selective Exposure and the Motivational Strength of Weak Attitudes

Strong attitudes exert greater influence on social perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Some research indicates that strong attitudes are associated with exposure to attitude-confirming information. However, we believe that uncertain attitudes might produce strong selective exposure to attitude-consistent information, especially when available information is unfamiliar. In three experiments, participants reported attitude favorability, reported attitude confidence (Study 1A and 2) or completed a doubt-priming manipulation (Study 1B), and selected information supporting or opposing an issue. When chosen information was relatively unfamiliar (in all three studies), uncertainty led to more attitude-consistent exposure than certainty did. However, when chosen information was more familiar (in Study 2), the pattern of effects was significantly reversed: Certainty led to more attitude-consistent exposure than did uncertainty. This finding suggests that under certain conditions, uncertainty can motivate people to seek attitude-confirming information, thereby creating a motivational basis for weak attitudes to have strong influences on information seeking.

Southern Discomfort: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on the Intellectual Performance of US Southerners

Compared to other negatively stereotyped groups, a paucity of research has examined stereotypes of US southerners. Building from past research and theory on the phenomenon of stereotype threat, the current research examined the possibility that activating negative stereotypes of people from the southern US can undermine their performance on intellectual tasks. In four studies, southern US college students took a test consisting of difficult mathematical and verbal questions. When negative stereotypes about their group were activated, performance was lower compared to conditions in which stereotypes were not made salient. In addition, performance decrements associated with stereotype activation were found to be linked with individual differences in group identification. Results showed that higher levels of identification as a southerner predicted lower levels of test performance.

Chapter Four – Message Position, Information Processing, and Persuasion: The Discrepancy Motives Model

When a person encounters a persuasive appeal, a salient perception of the message is often the extent to which it is relatively proattitudinal or counterattitudinal. Some studies suggest that counterattitudinal communications are processed more deeply than proattitudinal messages. However, other research has found the opposite processing relation. Similarly, various properties of premessage attitudes and attributes of message sources have been shown to affect message processing. Yet, in some cases, these findings have appeared inconsistent with one another. We suggest that this variety of findings can be organized and understood by considering the motivational states that guide processing of agreeable and disagreeable information, respectively. When encountering counterattitudinal advocacies, people should often be motivated to defend their views, and variables that influence defense motives should determine the amount of processing. Conversely, proattitudinal information presents an opportunity to bolster the premessage attitude. Thus, variables that affect the degree of bolstering motivation can affect the amount of proattitudinal message processing. In this chapter, we present the Discrepancy Motives Model—an integrative framework for organizing how persuasion variables interact with message position to affect the depth of information processing. In addition to processing differences, we discuss implications that this new account holds for understanding other attitude change phenomena.

Evaluating the Message or the Messenger? Implications for Self-Validation in Persuasion

Characteristics of persuasive message sources have been extensively studied. However, little attention has been paid to situations when people are motivated to form an evaluation of the communicator rather than the communicated issue. We postulated that these different foci can affect how a source validates message-related cognitions. Participants focused on the source (Studies 1 and 2) or the issue (Study 2) while reading weak or strong message arguments. Later, the communicator was described as low or high in credibility. When focused on the source, highly motivated participants were more confident and their attitudes were more reflective of thoughts when argument quality matched (e.g., weak arguments-low credibility) rather than mismatched (e.g., weak arguments-high credibility) source credibility. Conversely, when participants were focused on the issue, self-validation was greater when credibility was high rather than low—regardless of argument quality. Implications of these findings for the study and practice of persuasion are discussed.