Jay R. Corrigan

Estimating the impact of pictorial health warnings and "plain" cigarette packaging: Evidence from experimental auctions among adult smokers in the United States

OBJECTIVE To estimate differences in demand for cigarette packages with different packaging and health warning label formats. METHODS Adult smokers (n=404) in four states participated in experimental auctions. Participants bid on two of four experimental conditions, each involving a different health warning label format but with the same warning message: (1) text on 50% of pack side; (2) text on 50% of the pack front and back; (3) text with a graphic picture on 50% of the pack front and back; and (4) same as previous format, but without brand imagery. RESULTS Mean bids decreased across conditions (1:

Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

3.52; 2:

Comparing Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions: An Application to Golden Rice

3.43; 3:

The Effect of Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions

3.11; 4:

Estimating the Welfare Loss to Consumers When Food Labels Do Not Adequately Inform: An Application to Fair Trade Certification

2.93). Bivariate and multivariate random effects models indicated that there was no statistically significant difference in demand for packs with either of the two text only warnings; however, demand was significantly lower for both packs with prominent pictorial warnings, with the lowest demand associated with the plain, unbranded pack. CONCLUSIONS Results suggest that prominent health warnings with graphic pictures will reduce demand for cigarettes. Regulators should not only consider this type of warning label, but also plain packaging policies for tobacco products.

Which Deceptive Practices, If Any, Should Be Allowed in Experimental Economics Research? Results from Surveys of Applied Experimental Economists and Students

In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Aesthetic Values of Lakes and Rivers

We use two experimental valuation methods to estimate consumer demand for genetically modified golden rice. The first is an open-ended choice experiment (OECE) where participants name the quantities of golden rice and conventional rice demanded at each of several price combinations, one of which will be randomly chosen as binding. This allows us to estimate market demand by aggregating demand across participants. This estimate of market demand also allows us to estimate own-price elasticity and consumer surplus for golden rice. Comparing willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates from the OECE with those from a uniform-price auction, we find that OECE WTP estimates exhibit less affiliation across rounds, and the effects of positive and negative information under the OECE are more consistent with prior expectations and existing studies. We also find that, while auction WTP estimates more than double across five rounds, OECE WTP estimates are stable across rounds and are always roughly equal to those from the final auction round.

Local Residential Sorting and Public Goods Provision: A Classroom Demonstration

We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value estimates elicited from experimental auctions. Comparing bids for one unit of a good, two units of a good, and a second unit of a good when endowed with the first unit, we find that willingness to pay for the second unit of a good is, on average, as much as 75% higher when endowed with the first unit. We go on to advance two theories that could potentially reconcile our results with neoclassical consumer theory.

Do Monetary Incentives Matter in Classroom Experiments? Effects on Course Performance.

Government officials and other policymakers often face difficult decisions determining what information must be provided to consumers in the limited space available on food labels. An ideal label will cause consumers to make the same purchase that they would make if they had all relevant information, while an inferior label will induce a consumer to purchase a product he would not purchase if more information were available or to forgo purchasing a product that would have yielded positive consumer surplus. We present the design and results of an experimental auction that allows researchers to compare several alternative labels in order to determine the welfare loss from labels that do not adequately inform consumers. Further, we compare a set of candidate labels to assess whether one of the labels is better or worse at informing consumers.

Effect of brand and advertising medium on demand for e-cigarettes: Evidence from an experimental auction

Deceptive experimental practices are banned in some professions but are standard in others. Recently, the journals of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association introduced guidelines that allow researchers to publish articles that use some forms of deception. However, in their present form, these guidelines leave room for interpretation. This situation is not ideal for researchers, and a clearer definition of which deceptive practices should be banned could be beneficial. Our aim is to help provide greater clarity and potential guidance for journal policies regarding deception by using the results of surveys of both researcher and student subjects. Evaluating ten potentially deceptive experimental techniques, we find consistent support for banning certain practices while allowing others.