Jean-Baptiste Van der Henst

Strategies in sentential reasoning

Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that have no deterministic account. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the construction of incremental diagrams corresponding to mental models, and the pursuit of the consequences of a single model step by step. Moreover, the difficulty of a problem (i.e., the number of mental models required by the premises) predisposes reasoners towards certain strategies. Likewise, the sentential connectives in the premises also bias reasoners towards certain strategies, e.g., conditional premises tend to elicit reasoning step by step whereas disjunctive premises tend to elicit incremental diagrams.

Recomposing a fragmented literature: How conditional and relational arguments engage different neural systems for deductive reasoning

Deductive reasoning is traditionally viewed as a unitary process involving either rule-based or visuo-spatial mechanisms. However, there is a disagreement in the neuroimaging literature on whether the data support one alternative over the other. Here we test the hypothesis that discrepancies in the literature result from the reasoning materials themselves. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measure brain activity of participants while they integrate the premises of conditional arguments (primarily Modus Tollens: If P then Q; not-Q) and Relational Syllogisms (i.e., linear arguments of the sort P is to the left of Q; Q is to the left of R). We find that reasoning with Modus Tollens activates the left inferior frontal gyrus to a greater extent than the Relational Syllogisms. In contrast, the Relational Syllogisms engage the right temporo-parieto-occipital junction more than conditional arguments. This suggests that conditional reasoning relies more on so-called syntactic processes than relational reasoning, while relational reasoning may rely on visuo-spatial processes and mental imagery more than conditional reasoning. This investigative approach, together with its results, clarifies some apparently inconsistent findings in this literature by showing that the nature of the logical argument, whether it is relational or conditional, determines which neural system is engaged.

What’s behind a P600? Integration Operations during Irony Processing

The combined knowledge of word meanings and grammatical rules does not allow a listener to grasp the intended meaning of a speaker’s utterance. Pragmatic inferences on the part of the listener are also required. The present work focuses on the processing of ironic utterances (imagine a slow day being described as “really productive”) because these clearly require the listener to go beyond the linguistic code. Such utterances are advantageous experimentally because they can serve as their own controls in the form of literal sentences (now imagine an active day being described as “really productive”) as we employ techniques from electrophysiology (EEG). Importantly, the results confirm previous ERP findings showing that irony processing elicits an enhancement of the P600 component (Regel et al., 2011). More original are the findings drawn from Time Frequency Analysis (TFA) and especially the increase of power in the gamma band in the 280–400 time-window, which points to an integration among different streams of information relatively early in the comprehension of an irony. This represents a departure from traditional accounts of language processing which generally view pragmatic inferences as late-arriving. We propose that these results indicate that unification operations between the linguistic code and contextual information play a critical role throughout the course of irony processing and earlier than previously thought.

What's behind an Inference? An EEG Study with Conditional Arguments.

Conditional reasoning studies typically involve presenting a major conditional premise (If P then Q), a minor premise (P) and a conclusion (Q). We describe how most fMRI studies investigate reasoning and point out that these studies neglect to take into consideration the temporal sequence of cognitive steps generated by the interaction of the premises. The present study uses EEG to address this issue and compares the processing of the minor premise P when it is presented before vs. after the conditional statement (P; If P then Q vs. If P then Q; P). When the minor premise comes after the conditional statement and matches the antecedent its processing results in a P3b component, known to reflect the satisfaction of expectations, and in two later components, a PSW component and a CNV component. These two components are discussed in light of a conclusion generation phase and a maintenance phase. We also investigated the effect of violating expectations through the presentation of a minor premise that mismatches the antecedent of the conditional statement (If P then Q; R). The data indicate that the processing of such a premise yields an N2 component which is known to reflect perceptual conflict.

When is a conclusion worth deriving? A relevance-based analysis of indeterminate relational problems

When is a conclusion worth deriving? We claim that a conclusion is worth deriving to the extent that it is relevant in the sense of relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). To support this hypothesis, we experiment with “indeterminate relational problems” where we ask participants what, if anything, follows from premises such as A is taller than B, A is taller than C. With such problems, the indeterminate response that nothing follows is common, and we explain why. We distinguish several types of determinate conclusions and show that their rate is a function of their relevance. We argue that by appropriately changing the formulation of the premises, the relevance of determinate conclusions can be increased, and the rate of indeterminate responses thereby reduced. We contrast these relevance-based predictions with predictions based on linguistic congruence.

Testing the Cognitive and Communicative Principles of Relevance

A general theory is testable not directly but through consequences it implies when it is taken together with auxiliary hypotheses. The test can be weaker or stronger depending, in particular, on the extent to which the consequences tested are specifically entailed by the theory (as opposed to being mostly entailed by the auxiliary hypotheses and being equally compatible with other general theories). The earliest experimental work based on Relevance Theory (Jorgensen, Miller and Sperber, 1984; Happe 1993) tested and confirmed Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) echoic account of irony (and much experimental work done since on irony has broadly confirmed it and refined it further). While this account of irony is part and parcel of Relevance Theory, it is nevertheless compatible with different pragmatic approaches. The experimental confirmation of this account, therefore, provides only weak support for Relevance Theory as a whole. More recent experimental work has made explicit, tested and confirmed other and more specific and central consequences of Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber, Cara and Girotto, 1995; Politzer, 1996; Gibbs and Moise, 1997; Hardman, 1998; Nicolle and Clark, 1999; Matsui, 2000, 2001; Girotto, Kemmelmeir, Sperber and Van der Henst, 2001; Noveck, 2001; Noveck, Bianco and Castry, 2001; Van der Henst, Sperber and Politzer, 2002, Van der Henst, Carles and Sperber, 2002, Noveck and Posada, 2003; Ryder and Leinonen, 2003).

Mental model theory versus the inference rule approach in relational reasoning

Researchers currently working on relational reasoning typically argue that mental model theory (MMT) is a better account than the inference rule approach (IRA). They predict and observe that determinate (or one-model) problems are easier than indeterminate (or two-model) problems, whereas according to them, IRA should lead to the opposite prediction. However, the predictions attributed to IRA are based on a mistaken argument. The IRA is generally presented in such a way that inference rules only deal with determinate relations and not with indeterminate ones. However, (a) there is no reason to presuppose that a rule-based procedure could not deal with indeterminate relations, and (b) applying a rule-based procedure to indeterminate relations should result in greater difficulty. Hence, none of the recent articles devoted to relational reasoning currently presents a conclusive case for discarding IRA by using the well-known determinate vs indeterminate problems comparison.Researchers currently working on relational reasoning typically argue that mental model theory (MMT) is a better account than the inference rule approach (IRA). They predict and observe that determinate (or one-model) problems are easier than indeterminate (or two-model) problems, whereas according to them, IRA should lead to the opposite prediction. However, the predictions attributed to IRA are based on a mistaken argument. The IRA is generally presented in such a way that inference rules only deal with determinate relations and not with indeterminate ones. However, (a) there is no reason to presuppose that a rule-based procedure could not deal with indeterminate relations, and (b) applying a rule-based procedure to indeterminate relations should result in greater difficulty. Hence, none of the recent articles devoted to relational reasoning currently presents a conclusive case for discarding IRA by using the well-known determinate vs indeterminate problems comparison.

How Preschoolers Use Cues of Dominance to Make Sense of Their Social Environment

A series of four experiments investigated preschoolers’ abilities to make sense of dominance relations. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that as early as 3 years old, preschoolers are able to infer dominance not only from physical supremacy but also from decision power, age, and resources. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that preschoolers have expectations regarding the ways in which a dominant and a subordinate individual are likely to differ. In particular, they expect that an individual who imposes his choice on another will exhibit higher competence in games and will have more resources.

Spatial associations in relational reasoning: Evidence for a SNARC-like effect

Relational reasoning (A > B, B > C, therefore A > C) shares a number of similarities with numerical cognition, including a common behavioural signature, the symbolic distance effect. Just as reaction times for evaluating relational conclusions decrease as the distance between two ordered objects increases, people need less time to compare two numbers when they are distant (e.g., 2 and 8) than when they are close (e.g., 3 and 4). Given that some remain doubtful about such analogical representations in relational reasoning, we determine whether numerical cognition and relational reasoning have other overlapping behavioural effects. Here, using relational reasoning problems that require the alignment of six items, we provide evidence showing that the subjects’ linear mental representation affects motor performance when evaluating conclusions. Items accessible from the left part of a linear representation are evaluated faster when the response is made by the left, rather than the right, hand and the reverse is observed for items accessible from the right part of the linear representation. This effect, observed with the prepositions to the left of and to the right of as well as with above and below, is analogous to the SNARC (Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes) effect, which is characterized by an interaction between magnitude of numbers and side of response.

The Influence of Power and Reason on Young Maya Children's Endorsement of Testimony

Two important parenting strategies are to impose ones power and to use reasoning. The effect of these strategies on childrens evaluation of testimony has received very little attention. Using the epistemic vigilance framework, we predict that when the reasoning cue is strong enough it should overcome the power cue. We test this prediction in a population for which anthropological data suggest that power is the prominent strategy while reasoning is rarely relied on in the interactions with children. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-old children from a traditional Maya population are shown to endorse the testimony supported by a strong argument over that supported by a weak argument. In Experiment 2, the same participants are shown to follow the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate. The participants are then shown to endorse the testimony of a subordinate who provides a strong argument over that of a dominant who provides either a weak argument (Experiment 3) or no argument (Experiment 4). Thus, when the power and reasoning cues conflict, reasoning completely trumps power.