Jean-Benoit Pilet

It's Not Only About Lists: Explaining Preference Voting in Belgium

This article analyses the decision of Belgian voters to cast a preference vote on the occasion of the 2009 regional elections. And what appears is that preference votes could be given three meanings. First, preference voting appears to be a sophisticated voting behaviour more accessible to politically interested and involved voters. Less politically active voters more often limit themselves to marking their ballot on the top of the list without differentiating their support among candidates. Second, preference voting is very much a token of voter–candidate proximity. Voters are more likely to support candidates when they know one or several specific candidates directly or via the media. Finally, preference voting is also very much dependent on the structure of institutional incentives. The more influence a preference vote has on the process of intra-party seat allocation, the more likely voters are to make the effort. All in all, this article shows the diversity of motivations behind preference voting, and more importantly the different meanings it could take in elections.

Faces on the ballot. The personalization of electoral systems in Europe

PART 1. ARE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS BECOMING MORE PERSONALIZED? PART 2. WHAT EXPLAINS ELECTORAL SYSTEM PERSONALIZATION? PART 3. DO PERSONALIZING ELECTORAL REFORMS HAVE ANY EFFECTS?

Party Preferences and Electoral Reform: How Time in Government Affects the Likelihood of Supporting a Change

Most of the literature asserts that political parties rationally define their preference for electoral reform with respect to their possible gains and the balance of power between and within parties. Other scholars moderate this rationality, underlining the role of the uncertainty inherent to any change in the electoral system. This article shows how risk and expected gains interact. Through an analysis of the preferences of 84 parties in 13 different electoral reform debates, it shows that risk impedes parties from supporting even advantageous change. However, it also points out that not all parties are equally sensitive to risk. Parties that are dissatisfied with the current system are more willing to favour a reform from which they expect gains. In other words, dissatisfaction makes parties more seat-maximising.

The selection of political party leaders in contemporary parliamentary democracies : a comparative study

1. The Selection of Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet 2. The Selection of Party Leaders in the UK Tim Bale and Paul Webb 3. The Selection of Party Leaders in Belgium Jean-Benoit Pilet and Bram Wauters 4. Unanimous, By Acclamation? Party Leadership Selection in Norway Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen 5. The Selection of Party Leaders in Austria: Channeling Ambition Effectively Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C. Muller 6. Party Leader Selection in Germany Klaus Detterbeck and Ingo Rohlfing 7. The Selection of Party Leaders in Italy Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino 8. The Selection of Party Leaders in Spain Oscar Barbera, Juan Rodriguez-Teruel, Astrid Barrio, and Montse Baras 9. The Selection of Party Leaders in Portugal Marco Lisi and Andre Freire 10. Lets Not Risk Too Much: The Selection of Party Leaders in Romania Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina 11. Stable Leadership in the Context of Party Change: The Hungarian Case Gabriella Ilonszki and Reka Varnagy 12. Selecting Party Leaders in Israel Ofer Kenig and Gideon Rahat 13. Party Leadership in Canada William P. Cross 14. Leadership Selection in Australia Anika Gauja 15. The Selection of Party Leaders in Comparative Perspective Jean-Benoit Pilet and William P. Cross

The selection of party leaders in contemporary parliamentary democracies

1. The Selection of Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet 2. The Selection of Party Leaders in the UK Tim Bale and Paul Webb 3. The Selection of Party Leaders in Belgium Jean-Benoit Pilet and Bram Wauters 4. Unanimous, By Acclamation? Party Leadership Selection in Norway Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen 5. The Selection of Party Leaders in Austria: Channeling Ambition Effectively Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C. Muller 6. Party Leader Selection in Germany Klaus Detterbeck and Ingo Rohlfing 7. The Selection of Party Leaders in Italy Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino 8. The Selection of Party Leaders in Spain Oscar Barbera, Juan Rodriguez-Teruel, Astrid Barrio, and Montse Baras 9. The Selection of Party Leaders in Portugal Marco Lisi and Andre Freire 10. Lets Not Risk Too Much: The Selection of Party Leaders in Romania Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina 11. Stable Leadership in the Context of Party Change: The Hungarian Case Gabriella Ilonszki and Reka Varnagy 12. Selecting Party Leaders in Israel Ofer Kenig and Gideon Rahat 13. Party Leadership in Canada William P. Cross 14. Leadership Selection in Australia Anika Gauja 15. The Selection of Party Leaders in Comparative Perspective Jean-Benoit Pilet and William P. Cross

The adaptation of the electoral system to the ethno-linguistic evolution of Belgian consociationalism

Abstract Complying with the idea that institutions could be used “to manage conflict democratically in divided societies” (Belmont et al., 2002, p. 3), the Belgian state has reformed its institutions in the past 40 years to accommodate ethno-linguistic tensions between Dutch-speakers and French-speakers. While less frequently mentioned, electoral rules have also been adapted to this ‘ethnicization’ of Belgian politics. Interestingly, changes made to the electoral system for managing tensions between the two linguistic communities followed the core principles of consociationalism. This observation supports the idea that, when an existing pattern of conflict resolution has existed in a country for decades, it tends to remain the guiding line to accommodate tensions even when new types of conflicts emerge.

The international diffusion of electoral systems: The spread of mechanisms tempering proportional representation across Europe

There is an assumption in much of the electoral engineering literature that domestic episodes of electoral system choice occur in a vacuum, isolated from international influences. Yet this assumption remains largely untested, despite the comparative focus of much of that literature. This article focuses on part of this gap by considering two electoral mechanisms that seek to limit party system fragmentation under proportional representation - low district magnitudes and high electoral thresholds - and shows that the mechanisms have spread across many European countries during the post-1945 period.Analyses reveal that national legislators are more likely to adopt one of these electoral mechanisms when a large number of peer countries have made similar choices within the last two or three years.This effect is robust to various model specifications and to the inclusion of multiple controls. The article also offers some qualitative evidence from case studies and parliamentary debates.

The selection of party leaders in Belgium

1. The Selection of Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary Democracies William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet 2. The Selection of Party Leaders in the UK Tim Bale and Paul Webb 3. The Selection of Party Leaders in Belgium Jean-Benoit Pilet and Bram Wauters 4. Unanimous, By Acclamation? Party Leadership Selection in Norway Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen 5. The Selection of Party Leaders in Austria: Channeling Ambition Effectively Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik and Wolfgang C. Muller 6. Party Leader Selection in Germany Klaus Detterbeck and Ingo Rohlfing 7. The Selection of Party Leaders in Italy Giulia Sandri, Antonella Seddone and Fulvio Venturino 8. The Selection of Party Leaders in Spain Oscar Barbera, Juan Rodriguez-Teruel, Astrid Barrio, and Montse Baras 9. The Selection of Party Leaders in Portugal Marco Lisi and Andre Freire 10. Lets Not Risk Too Much: The Selection of Party Leaders in Romania Mihail Chiru and Sergiu Gherghina 11. Stable Leadership in the Context of Party Change: The Hungarian Case Gabriella Ilonszki and Reka Varnagy 12. Selecting Party Leaders in Israel Ofer Kenig and Gideon Rahat 13. Party Leadership in Canada William P. Cross 14. Leadership Selection in Australia Anika Gauja 15. The Selection of Party Leaders in Comparative Perspective Jean-Benoit Pilet and William P. Cross

Electoral volatility and the dynamics of electoral reform

Abstract Recent elections in Europe have shown that a context of increasing citizen distrust towards democratic institutions may lead to very high levels of electoral volatility and to the emergence of new parties. On the other hand, institutional reforms are sometimes presented as a solution to citizens’ discontent with political institutions. Focusing on a specific type of political institution ‒ electoral systems ‒ the question addressed in this study is whether high levels of electoral volatility may trigger electoral reforms. The article investigates the conditions under which reforms affecting the electoral system’s degree of openness to new parties were enacted in 25 European countries between 1945 and 2012. The findings demonstrate that volatility due to the emergence of new parties is the most powerful explanation to account for the introduction of electoral reforms, particularly those that hinder the entry of new parties into the system.

Voting correctly in lab elections with monetary incentives: The impact of district magnitude

Whether people make the right choice when they vote for a given candidate or party and what factors affect the capacity to vote correctly have been recurrent questions in the political science literature. This paper contributes to this debate by looking at how the complexity of the electoral context affects voters’ capacity to vote correctly. Correct voting is defined as a vote that maximizes one’s payoffs in lab elections with monetary incentives. We examine two aspects of the electoral context: district magnitude and the distribution of preferences within the electorate. The main finding is that the frequency of correct voting is much higher in single-member than in multi-member district elections. As soon as there is more than one single seat to be allocated, voters have more difficulty figuring out whether they should vote sincerely for their preferred party or opt strategically for another party in order to maximize their payoffs. By contrast, the distribution of preferences within the electorate has no significant effect.