Jean Decety

The functional architecture of human empathy

Empathy accounts for the naturally occurring subjective experience of similarity between the feelings expressed by self and others without loosing sight of whose feelings belong to whom. Empathy involves not only the affective experience of the other persons actual or inferred emotional state but also some minimal recognition and understanding of anothers emotional state. In light of multiple levels of analysis ranging from developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical neuropsychology, this article proposes a model of empathy that involves parallel and distributed processing in a number of dissociable computational mechanisms. Shared neural representations, self-awareness, mental flexibility, and emotion regulation constitute the basic macrocomponents of empathy, which are underpinned by specific neural systems. This functional model may be used to make specific predictions about the various empathy deficits that can be encountered in different forms of social and neurological disorders.

Functional anatomy of execution, mental simulation, observation, and verb generation of actions: A meta-analysis.

There is a large body of psychological and neuroimaging experiments that have interpreted their findings in favor of a functional equivalence between action generation, action simulation, action verbalization, and perception of action. On the basis of these data, the concept of shared motor representations has been proposed. Indeed several authors have argued that our capacity to understand other peoples behavior and to attribute intention or beliefs to others is rooted in a neural, most likely distributed, execution/observation mechanism. Recent neuroimaging studies have explored the neural network engaged during motor execution, simulation, verbalization, and observation. The focus of this meta‐analysis is to evaluate in specific detail to what extent the activated foci elicited by these studies overlap. Hum. Brain Mapping 12:1–19, 2001.

Meta-analytic evidence for common and distinct neural networks associated with directly experienced pain and empathy for pain

A growing body of evidence suggests that empathy for pain is underpinned by neural structures that are also involved in the direct experience of pain. In order to assess the consistency of this finding, an image-based meta-analysis of nine independent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations and a coordinate-based meta-analysis of 32 studies that had investigated empathy for pain using fMRI were conducted. The results indicate that a core network consisting of bilateral anterior insular cortex and medial/anterior cingulate cortex is associated with empathy for pain. Activation in these areas overlaps with activation during directly experienced pain, and we link their involvement to representing global feeling states and the guidance of adaptive behavior for both self- and other-related experiences. Moreover, the image-based analysis demonstrates that depending on the type of experimental paradigm this core network was co-activated with distinct brain regions: While viewing pictures of body parts in painful situations recruited areas underpinning action understanding (inferior parietal/ventral premotor cortices) to a stronger extent, eliciting empathy by means of abstract visual information about the others affective state more strongly engaged areas associated with inferring and representing mental states of self and other (precuneus, ventral medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal cortex, and temporo-parietal junction). In addition, only the picture-based paradigms activated somatosensory areas, indicating that previous discrepancies concerning somatosensory activity during empathy for pain might have resulted from differences in experimental paradigms. We conclude that social neuroscience paradigms provide reliable and accurate insights into complex social phenomena such as empathy and that meta-analyses of previous studies are a valuable tool in this endeavor.

Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency

Perspective taking is an essential component in the mechanisms that account for intersubjectivity and agency. Mental simulation of action can be used as a natural protocol to explore the cognitive and neural processing involved in agency. Here we took PET measurements while subjects simulated actions with either a first-person or a third-person perspective. Both conditions were associated with common activation in the SMA, the precentral gyrus, the precuneus and the MT/V5 complex. When compared to the first-person perspective, the third-person perspective recruited right inferior parietal, precuneus, posterior cingulate and frontopolar cortex. The opposite contrast revealed activation in left inferior parietal and somatosensory cortex. We suggest that the right inferior parietal, precuneus and somatosensory cortex are specifically involved in distinguishing self-produced actions from those generated by others.

Neural mechanisms subserving the perception of human actions

Our ability to generate actions and to recognize actions performed by others is the bedrock of our social life. Behavioral evidence suggests that the processes underlying perception and action might share a common representational framework. That is, observers might understand the actions of another individual in terms of the same neural code that they use to produce the same actions themselves. What neurophysiological evidence, if any, supports such a hypothesis? In this article, brain imaging studies addressing this question are reviewed and examined in the light of the functional segregation of the perceptual mechanisms subtending visual recognition and those used for action. We suggest that there are not yet conclusive arguments for a clear neurophysiological substrate supporting a common coding between perception and action.

The Role of the Right Temporoparietal Junction in Social Interaction: How Low-Level Computational Processes Contribute to Meta-Cognition

Accumulating evidence from cognitive neuroscience indicates that the right inferior parietal cortex, at the junction with the posterior temporal cortex, plays a critical role in various aspects of social cognition such as theory of mind and empathy. With a quantitative meta-analysis of 70 functional neuroimaging studies, the authors demonstrate that this area is also engaged in lower-level (bottom-up) computational processes associated with the sense of agency and reorienting attention to salient stimuli. It is argued that this domain-general computational mechanism is crucial for higher level social cognitive processing. NEUROSCIENTIST 13(6): 580—593, 2007. DOI: 10.1177/1073858407304654

Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view

The abilities to identify with others and to distinguish between self and other play a pivotal role in intersubjective transactions. Here, we marshall evidence from developmental science, social psychology and neuroscience (including clinical neuropsychology) that support the view of a common representation network (both at the computational and neural levels) between self and other. However, sharedness does not mean identicality, otherwise representations of self and others would completely overlap, and lead to confusion. We argue that self-awareness and agency are integral components for navigating within these shared representations. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in interpersonal awareness.

The timing of mentally represented actions

The performance of subjects walking blindly to previously inspected visual targets (located at 5, 10 or 15 m from the subjects) was studied in 2 experiments. In Expt. 1, subjects selected as good visual imagers were instructed to build up a mental representation of the target. Then they had to either actually walk or imagine themselves walking to the target. Walking time was measured in both the actual and the mental performance. It was found that subjects took almost exactly the same time in the two conditions. Accuracy of these subjects was also measured in the actual walking task. They were found to make no direction errors and to slightly overshoot target location. Subjects from another, control, group, who received no instructions about visual imagery made much larger errors. In Expt. 2, actual and mental walking times were measured in the same subjects as in Expt. 1, while they carried a 25-kg weight on their shoulders. In this condition, actual walking time was the same as in Expt. 1, although mental walking time was found to increase systematically by about 30%. These results are discussed in terms of the neural parameters encoded in the motor program for actually executing or mentally performing an action.

Modulating the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study.

This study investigated agency, the feeling of being causally involved in an action. This is the feeling that leads us to attribute an action to ourselves rather than to another person. We were interested in the effects of experimentally modulating this experience on brain areas known to be involved in action recognition and self-recognition. We used a device that allowed us to modify the subjects degree of control of the movements of a virtual hand presented on a screen. Four main conditions were used: (1) a condition where the subject had a full control of the movements of the virtual hand, (2) a condition where the movements of the virtual hand appeared rotated by 25 degrees with respect to the movements made by the subject, (3) a condition where the movements of the virtual hand appeared rotated by 50 degrees, and (4) a condition where the movements of the virtual hand were produced by another person and did not correspond to the subjects movements. The activity of two main brain areas appeared to be modulated by the degree of discrepancy between the movement executed and the movement seen on the screen. In the inferior part of the parietal lobe, specifically on the right side, the less the subject felt in control of the movements of the virtual hand, the higher the level of activation. A reverse covariation was observed in the insula. These results demonstrate that the level of activity of specific brain areas maps onto the experience of causing or controlling an action. The implication of these results for understanding pathological conditions is discussed.

The power of simulation : Imagining one's own and other's behavior

A large number of cognitive neuroscience studies point to the similarities in the neural circuits activated during the generation, imagination, as well as observation of ones own and others behavior. Such findings support the shared representations account of social cognition, which is suggested to provide the basic mechanism for social interaction. Mental simulation may also be a representational tool to understand the self and others. However, successfully navigating these shared representations--both within oneself and between individuals--constitutes an essential functional property of any autonomous agent. It will be argued that self-awareness and agency, mediated by the temporoparietal (TPJ) area and the prefrontal cortex, are critical aspects of the social mind. Thus, differences as well as similarities between self and other representations at the neural level may be related to the degrees of self-awareness and agency. Overall, these data support the view that social cognition draws on both domain-general mechanisms and domain-specific embodied representations.