Jean-François Lalande
University of Orléans
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Publication
Featured researches published by Jean-François Lalande.
Future Generation Computer Systems | 2014
Waleed W. Smari; Patrice Clemente; Jean-François Lalande
Many efforts in the area of computer security have been drawn to attribute-based access control (ABAC). Compared to other adopted models, ABAC provides more granularity, scalability, and flexibility. This makes it a valuable access control system candidate for securing platforms and environments used for coordination and cooperation among organizations and communities, especially over open networks such as the Internet. On the other hand, the basic ABAC model lacks provisions for context, trust and privacy issues, all of which are becoming increasingly critical, particularly in high performance distributed collaboration environments. This paper presents an extended access control model based on attributes associated with objects and subjects. It incorporates trust and privacy issues in order to make access control decisions sensitive to the cross-organizational collaboration context. Several aspects of the proposed model are implemented and illustrated by a case study that shows realistic ABAC policies in the domain of distributed multiple organizations crisis management systems. Furthermore, the paper shows a collaborative graphical tool that enables the actors in the emergency management system to make better decisions. The prototype shows how it guarantees the privacy of objects attributes, taking into account the trust of the subjects. This tool incorporates a decision engine that relies on attribute based policies and dynamic trust and privacy evaluation. The resulting platform demonstrates the integration of the ABAC model, the evolving context, and the attributes of actors and resources.
availability, reliability and security | 2013
Jean-François Lalande; Steffen Wendzel
Covert channels enable a policy-breaking communication not foreseen by a systems design. Recently, covert channels in Android were presented and it was shown that these channels can be used by malware to leak confidential information (e.g., contacts) between applications and to the Internet. Performance aspects as well as means to counter these covert channels were evaluated. In this paper, we present novel covert channel techniques linked to a minimized footprint to achieve a high covertness. Therefore, we developed a malware that slowly leaks collected private information and sends it synchronously based on four covert channel techniques. We show that some of our covert channels do not require any extra permission and escape well know detection techniques like TaintDroid. Experimental results confirm that the obtained throughput is correlated to the user interaction and show that these new covert channels have a low energy consumption - both aspects contribute to the stealthiness of the channels. Finally, we discuss concepts for novel means capable to counter our covert channels and we also discuss the adaption of network covert channel features to Android-based covert channels.
availability, reliability and security | 2012
Pascal Berthomé; Thomas Fecherolle; Nicolas Guilloteau; Jean-François Lalande
One of the most important threats for Android users is the collection of private data by malware put on the market. Most of the proposed approaches that help to guarantee the users privacy rely on modified versions of the Android operating system. In this paper, we propose to automatically detect when an application accesses private data and to log this access in a third-party application. This detection should be performed without any modification to the operating system. The proposed methodology relies on the repackaging of a compiled application and the injection of a reporter at bytecode level. Thus, such a methodology enables the user to audit suspicious applications that ask permissions to access private data and to know if such an access has occurred. We show that the proposed methodology can also be implemented as an IPS, in order to prevent such accesses. Experimental results show the efficiency of the methodology on a set of 18 regular applications of the Android market that deal with contacts. Our prototype detected 66% of the accesses to the users contacts. We also experimented the detection of privacy violations with 5 known malware that send premium-rate SMS.
international conference on computer communications | 2005
Sara Alouf; Eitan Altman; Jérôme Galtier; Jean-François Lalande; Corinne Touati
This paper presents an algorithm for resource allocation in satellite networks. It deals with planning a time/frequency plan for a set of terminals with a known geometric configuration under interference constraints. Our objective is to maximize the system throughput while guaranteeing that the different types of demands are satisfied, each type using a different amount of bandwidth. The proposed algorithm relies on two main techniques. The first generates admissible configurations for the interference constraints, whereas the second uses linear and integer programming with column generation. The obtained solution estimates a possible allocation plan with optimality guarantees, and highlights the frequency interferences which degrade the construction of good solutions.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security | 2016
Luca Caviglione; Mauro Gaggero; Jean-François Lalande; Wojciech Mazurczyk; Marcin Urbanski
Modern malware uses advanced techniques to hide from static and dynamic analysis tools. To achieve stealthiness when attacking a mobile device, an effective approach is the use of a covert channel built by two colluding applications to exchange data locally. Since this process is tightly coupled with the used hiding method, its detection is a challenging task, also worsened by the very low transmission rates. As a consequence, it is important to investigate how to reveal the presence of malicious software using general indicators, such as the energy consumed by the device. In this perspective, this paper aims to spot malware covertly exchanging data using two detection methods based on artificial intelligence tools, such as neural networks and decision trees. To verify their effectiveness, seven covert channels have been implemented and tested over a measurement framework using Android devices. Experimental results show the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed approach to detect the hidden data exchange between colluding applications.
Journal of Computers | 2009
Jérémy Briffaut; Jean-François Lalande; Christian Toinard
This paper presents the design and discusses the results of a secured high-interaction honeypot. The challenge is to have a honeypot that welcomes attackers, allows userland malicious activities but prevents system corruption. The honeypot must authorize real malicious activities. It must ease the analysis of those activities. A clustered honeypot is proposed for two kinds of hosts. The first class prevents a system corruption and never has to be reinstalled. The second class assumes a system corruption but an easy reinstallation is available. Various off-the-shelf security tools are deployed to detect a corruption and to ease analysis. Moreover, host and network information enable a full analysis for complex scenario of attacks. The solution is totally based on open source software and has been validated over two years. A complete analysis is provided using the collected events and alarms. First, different types of malicious activities are easily reconstructed. Second, correlation of alarms enables us to compare the efficiency of various off-the-shelf security tools. Third, a correlation eases a complete analysis for the host and network activities. Finally, complete examples of attacks are explained. Ongoing works focus on recognition of complex malicious activities using a correlation grid and on distributed analysis.
ieee international workshop on policies for distributed systems and networks | 2006
M. Blanc; J. Briffaur; Jean-François Lalande; Christian Toinard
This paper presents a new framework based on a meta-policy linked to a new intrusion detection approach. It deploys a MAC kernel within a distributed system while guaranteeing the consistency of the security policy, preventing any accidental or malicious update of the local policies of each host. Access control decisions are resolved locally in accordance with a meta-policy. At the same time, the framework allows the evolution of the distributed policy without any network communication, and also guarantees that it satisfies the global security properties defined in the meta-policy. The combined policy and IDS approach relies on trusted operating systems integrating MAC and RBAC. The proposed architecture controls a wider set of attacks and provides increased fault-tolerance, compared to other existing distributed access control approaches and policy-based IDS techniques. Details are given about languages used for the meta-policy, and implementation of the framework
Archive | 2006
Sara Alouf; Eitan Altman; Jérôme Galtier; Jean-François Lalande; Corinne Touati
This chapter presents an algorithm for resource allocation in satellite networks. It deals with planning a time/frequency plan for a set of terminals with a known geometric configuration under interference constraints. Our objective is to maximize the system throughput while guaranteeing that the different types of demands are satisfied, each type using a different amount of bandwidth. The proposed algorithm relies on two main techniques. The first generates admissible configurations for the interference constraints, whereas the second uses linear and integer programming with column generation. The obtained solution estimates a possible allocation plan with optimality guarantees, and highlights the frequency interferences which degrade the construction of good solutions.
european symposium on research in computer security | 2014
Jean-François Lalande; Karine Heydemann; Pascal Berthomé
Fault attacks can target smart card programs in order to disrupt an execution and gain an advantage over the data or the embedded functionalities. Among all possible attacks, control flow attacks aim at disrupting the normal execution flow. Identifying harmful control flow attacks as well as designing countermeasures at software level are tedious and tricky for developers. In this paper, we propose a methodology to detect harmful intra-procedural jump attacks at source code level and to automatically inject formally-proven countermeasures. The proposed software countermeasures defeat 100% of attacks that jump over at least two C source code statements or beyond. Experiments show that the resulting code is also hardened against unexpected function calls and jump attacks at assembly level.
availability, reliability and security | 2012
Pascal Berthomé; Karine Heydemann; Xavier Kauffmann-Tourkestansky; Jean-François Lalande
Smart card software has to implement software countermeasures to face attacks. Some of these attacks are physical disruptions of chip components that cause a misbehavior in the code execution. A successful functional attack may reveal a secret or grant an undesired authorization. In this paper, we propose to model fault attacks at source level and then simulate these attacks to find out which ones are harmful. After discussing the effects of physical attacks at assembly level and going back to their consequences at source code level, the paper focuses on control flow attacks. Such attacks are good candidates for the proposed model that can be used to exhaustively test the robustness of the attacked program. On the bzip2 software, the papers results show that up to 21% of the assembly simulated control flow attacks are covered by the C model with 30 times less test cases.