Jean-Paul Azam

Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?

This article analyses the motives of violence against civilians during internal wars. It is suggested that soldiers may terrorize civilians because they need the loot to augment their resources while the rest of the time is engaged in fighting proper. An alternative hypothesis suggests that terrorizing the civilian population plays a direct military role. The displacement of large fractions of the civilian population reduces the fighting efficiency of the enemy, as they cannot hide as easily and obtain less support. These two alternative hypotheses are investigated in a simple two-stage game-theoretic model. At stage 1, the government and the rebels simultaneously decide on the level of forces engaged in violence against civilians before they choose the level of forces that they engage in the fighting proper at stage 2. There are two types of sub-game perfect equilibria in this model: there is a pure fighting equilibrium in which no violence against civilians takes place and a pure terror equilibrium. In the latter equilibrium, it is shown that terror substitutes for fighting if the government can afford it. Predictions of the model are tested using African refugee data. In accordance with the theoretical model, the refugee population displays strong positive serial correlation, and after controlling for war, overseas development assistance has a positive impact on the outflow of refugees. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that violence against civilians is motivated by military objectives and suggest that donor funding to governments at war should be cut if the protection of civilians is regarded as more important than the fate of the fighters.

Contracting for aid

Abstract Foreign aid is analyzed as a contract where the North gives a transfer to the South in return for poverty reduction, regarded as an international public good. The issue of conditionality is first discussed in a moral hazard framework, and then under asymmetric information about the degree of altruism of the government of the South. Additional actors like local NGOs and multilateral aid institutions are then added to the model. The optimal contracts to avoid free-riding or collusion are then presented.

The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa

This article argues that ethnic problems are only one aspect of political violence in Africa, while violent conflicts must be considered a failure of the state to perform some of its fundamental tasks. State formation in Africa is a transition process starting from an institutional endowment of ethnic division. Ethnic capital in Africa ensures the provision of many of the services that a modern state has taken over in rich countries, e.g. security, education, norms of behaviour. Few African states can deliver all these services adequately, and must go through an initial phase of federation of ethnic groups before they can provide a credible substitute for ethnic capital. The system of redistribution within and among groups is the key to creating the solidarity links between them, and its breakdown is liable to trigger political violence. A formal game-theoretic model is presented which brings out the impact of redistribution on rebellious activity, as well as the crucial role of the ability of the government to commit credibly to its expenditure policy. Without this, there is no redistribution taking place in equilibrium, and large amounts of resources are invested in warring. Civil wars, or other forms of political violence, are thus an integral part of the political economy of Africa.

How to pay for the peace? A theoretical framework with references to African countries*

This paper analyses a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some “gifts” to his opponents, as a means to defend his position in power. If the government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium, and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defence expenditures. However, if the government is a Stackelberg-leader, then he will use the “gift” as a tool in his policy for staying in power.

Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups

A game-theoretic model is analyzed for discussing the determination of looting and fighting activity during a civil war between two ethnoregional groups. The Nash equilibrium of this game emphasizes population size, production capacity and productivity, and access to external funding as the main determinants of the size of the armies and the intensity of looting activity. The Nash equilibrium of the game between the two warlords involves an excessive level of looting. Some lessons are drawn from this framework to bring out the minimum redistribution of resources between groups that must take place in a peaceful equilibrium.

Civil War and the Social Contract

In this contract-theoretic modelthe government promises a transfer to itspotential opponent in return for notengaging in a civil war. Two causes ofcivil war are identified: (i) imperfectcredibility increases the cost of therequired transfer, and may make itunfeasible; (ii) asymmetric informationfaces the government with the classicefficiency/rent-extraction trade off, andcivil war is used as a screening device.This problem can be solved by creating amixed army. The model determines whether amilitary regime or a redistributive stateprevails in a peaceful equilibrium. Astatistical illustration is presented,using African data.

Aid and the Delegated Fight against Terrorism

A positive empirical relationship is found between the level of foreign aid received by a country and the number of terrorist attacks originating from it. A simple model is used to explain it, where the donor delegates some actions against terrorism to the aid-recipient government. Aid is endogenous in an econometric equation explaining participation in terrorist events, as expected from the model, and an attacks-supply curve in which aid has a negative impact is presented at the end.

Explaining Slow Growth in Africa

This paper critically reviews the empirical literature on growth, with a view to drawing some lessons for Africa. It illustrates the diversity of the results found by different authors, and calls for a more rigorous approach, paying attention to the identification of structural parameters and to simultaneity biases. It emphasizes the part played by openness and export orientation as the main policy variables affecting growth. Then, the choice of bad policies, which seems to be the main proximate cause of slow growth in Africa, is traced to the lack of social capital and deficient political institutions. Cet article est une critique de la litterature empirique sur le developpement dont le but est d’en tirer quelques lecons sur l’Afrique. L’article demontre la diversite des conclusions tirees par plusieurs auteurs et fait appel a une demarche plus rigoureuse, prenant en compte l’identification des parametres structurels et des penchants simultanes qui existent. L’importance du marche et son orientation vers l’export sont soulignees comme etant les deux variables principales qui touchent directement la croissance. Les auteurs demontrent ensuite que le choix de mauvaises politiques, qui semble Atre la cause principale de la faible croissance africaine, est due en effet a un manque de capital social ainsi qu’aux institutions politiques defectueuses.

Efficiency Wage and the Family: An Explanation for the Impact of the Agricultural Minimum Wage in Morocco

This paper shows two points: (1) there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the real value of the agricultural minimum wage and the level of agricultural output in Morocco, for eight important crops; and (2) the latter may be explained using a theoretical model where the productivity of the laborers depends on their consumption level and where wage incomes are shared among family members to fund consumption. The Nash equilibrium is then inefficient. Copyright 1997 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Political Predation and Economic Development

We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sector, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence.