Jeanne M. Brett

Mediators, moderators, and tests for mediation

Abstract : The following points are developed. First, mediation relations are generally thought of in causal terms. Influences of an antecedent are transmitted to a consequence through an intervening mediator. Second, mediation relations may assume a number of functional forms, including nonadditive, nonlinear, and nonrecursive forms. Special attention is given to nonadditive forms, or moderated mediation, where it is shown that while mediation and moderation are distinguishable processes, a particular variable may be both a mediator and a moderator within a single set of functional relations. Third, current procedures for testing mediation relations in industrial and organizational psychology need to be updated because these procedures often involve a dubious interplay between exploratory (correlational) statistical tests and causal inference. It is suggested that no middle ground exists between exploratory and confirmatory (causal) analysis, and that attempts to explain how mediation processes occur require well-specified causal models. Given such models, confirmatory analytic techniques furnish the more informative tests of mediation. (Author)

A Tale of Two Methods

The structural equation modeling approach to testing for mediation is compared to the Baron and Kenny approach. The approaches are essentially the same when the hypothesis being tested predicts partial mediation. The approaches differ, however, in how each tests for complete mediation. Disparities in both theory and statistical estimators are identified and discussed. A strategy for future tests of mediation is recommended.

Inter- and Intracultural Negotiation: U.S. and Japanese Negotiators

In this study, we propose that culture provides scripts and schemas for negotiation. The implications for negotiation of two cultural values, individualism/collectivism and hierarchy/egalitarianism...

The Negotiation Dance: Time, Culture, and Behavioral Sequences in Negotiation

We propose a normative model of transactional negotiation in which cooperative and competitive behaviors wax and wane across four stages: relational positioning, identifying the problem, generating solutions, and reaching agreement. Based on a classic proposition of communicative flexibility in high-context cultures, we propose culture-specific dyadic movements within and across these stages. Our sample included 102 high-context dyads from Russia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Thailand; 89 low-context dyads from Germany, Israel, Sweden, and the United States; and 45 United States-Hong Kong and United States-Japan mixed-context dyads. Dyads negotiated a complex, 90-minute transaction with integrative potential. We audiotaped, transcribed, and coded their negotiations for sequences of information and influence behaviors. The unit of analysis was the action-response sequence. Results confirmed that the pattern of sequences varied across the four stages and the frequency of particular sequences varied with culture. We suggest that negotiators can use this model to manage the evolution and strategic focus of their negotiation, especially during the first two stages, when the use of influence-information sequences and reciprocal-information sequences generate the groundwork for joint gains.

Negotiation behavior when cultures collide: the United States and Japan.

This study compared the negotiation behaviors of Japanese and U.S. managers in intra- and intercultural settings. Transcripts from an integrative bargaining task were coded and analyzed with logistic and linear regression. U.S. negotiators exchanged information directly and avoided influence when negotiating intra- and interculturally. Japanese negotiators exchanged information indirectly and used influence when negotiating intraculturally but adapted their behaviors when negotiating interculturally. Culturally normative negotiation behaviors partially account for the lower joint gains generated by intercultural, relative to intracultural, dyads. The behavioral data inform motivational and skill-based explanations for elusive joint gains when cultures clash.

Working 61 plus hours a week: Why do managers do it?

The authors investigated why some managers work extreme hours, defined as 61 or more hours per week. The authors tested explanations drawn from theories including the work-leisure tradeoff, work as an emotional respite, social contagion, and work as its own reward. In a demographically homogeneous sample of male managers, the best explanations for why some worked 61 or more hours per week were the financial and psychological rewards they received from doing so. The hypothesis derived from A. Hochschilds (1997) research that managers who work long hours seek relief at work from pressures at home was not supported. Findings in a small sample of managerial women were consistent with the work-leisure trade-off hypothesis, the social contagion hypothesis, and the work as its own reward hypothesis.

Breaking the bonds of reciprocity in negotiations.

We tested hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of three strategies for breaking conflict spirals in negotiations. We also investigated the relationship between outcomes and the relative frequenc...

Culture and Negotiation

This article develops a model of how culture affects negotiation processes and outcomes. It begins with a description of negotiation from a Western perspective: confrontational, focused on transactions or the resolution of disputes, evaluated in terms of integrative and distributive outcomes. It proposes that power and information processes are fundamental to negotiations and that one impact of culture on negotiations is through these processes. The cultural value of individualism versus collectivism is linked to goals in negotiation; the cultural value of egalitarianism versus hierarchy is linked to power in negotiation; and the cultural value for high versus low context communication is linked to information sharing in negotiation. The article describes why inter-cultural negotiations pose significant strategic challenges, but concludes that negotiators who are motivated to search for information, and are flexible about how that search is carried out, can reach high-quality negotiated outcomes. Cet arti...

Can we talk, and should we? Managing Emotional Conflict in Multicultural Teams

We highlight linguistic-related challenges in multicultural teams that increase the likelihood of emotional conflict, and also highlight the difficulty of “finding words” in emotional situations because of the nonlinear, fragmented, image-driven qualities of these circumstances. As a result, we question whether team members embroiled in emotional conflict ought to be advised to talk (discuss their feelings with the goal of repairing frayed relationships), whether this meaning of talk is shared by people from culturally different backgrounds, and what conflict management alternatives may exist when talk is not possible or desirable.

Agency Theory and Variable Pay Compensation Strategies

This study used a sample of middle-level managers to investigate the effects of organization-level agency-theory-based variables on the proportion of variable compensation that managers receive. Le...