Jeff Horn

Power to the People: Energy in Europe over the Last Five Centuries

how do human beings distinguish just regimes from unjust ones? What is the point of a politics of resistance if there is no higher ground of justice from which to justify resistance? One unintended irony that predictably emanates from the pages of this book is that Derrida, not Strauss, keeps us firmly within the abyss. A politics that abjures any notion of foundations, even if the latter rest upon prudence rather than self-evident truth, leads to the relativistic deadend against which Strauss always warned. Readers who want a more thoughtful and effective critique of wars for democracy in our time would do well to avoid the contradictory aporias that characterize this self-defeating critique of Leo Strauss.

Machine-Breaking and the ‘Threat from Below’ in Great Britain and France during the Early Industrial Revolution

‘Luddite’. ‘Wrecker’. At once descriptive and accusatory, these terms have acquired a deeply pejorative connotation in the English-speaking world. They suggest a rejection of technological change by unruly and undisciplined workers who take a riotous approach to threats of unemployment. The implication is that such behaviour constitutes sabotage and is disruptive of the regular course of economic development. By weaving the Luddites into a narrative of progress, machine-breaking has acquired a certain romance along with a certain pathos that has obscured the ineffectiveness of the movement and thereby tarred the broader practice of machine-breaking during the Industrial Revolution with a tragic label for resisting the inevitable victory of the machine. Because the Luddites and their English compatriots did not achieve their goals, they deserve their tragic reputation; but, on the other flank of the channel, machine-breaking had a powerful effect on the course of the Industrial Revolution in France.

Visions of the Social: Society as a Political Project in France, 1750–1950

ment of a Lamarckian role in this matter—is still pretty much a terra incognita. Not all biological systems exhibit all four levels of learning, but the learning of primates does to some extent, and the learning of humans definitely does so: we can observe a geneculture coevolution. Because of this coevolution, humans exhibit traits that are deeply embedded in their nature (physiology and psychology), and relevant psychological features are simply negated in the construct of Homo economicus. Furthermore, because learning is costly, it is instructive to look at the level and the time frame where learning takes place. Clearly, genetic learning requires a time frame that is several orders of magnitude more extended than the learning at subsequent levels, and economics proper need not look at genetic or epigenetic learning as such. On the other hand, economic analyses have fruitfully entered the discourse of sciences such as biology and anthropology where genetic or epigenetic learning do have an impact. Indeed, in the words of Gintis, “there are strong parallels between genetic and cultural modeling” (225). Because learning is costly, signaling is practiced as a cost-effective measure in both biological and human systems. In other words, instead of investigating or assessing something directly, which would require effort, a “signal,” an evolved inexpensive substitute, is accepted (e.g., the plumage of the male bird); instead of engaging in a learning process to assess a proposition or position, easily available status symbols or credentials of those propagating a position are used as substitutes (e.g., the credentials of a scientist). This cost-reducing strategy is effective as long as one can trust the signal to convey the proper meaning of the signified. However, learning is also responsible for adaptation strategies such as cheating, deception, fraud and masquerade, and biological as well as human systems will have to find equilibria positions balancing cost-reductions due to signaling against costs associated with being duped. Human learning, be it at the individual or social level, is tied to norms or moral values “that specif[y] the duties, privileges, and normal behavior” associated with various social roles of individuals or groups (232). These roles have to be socialized and intrinsically lived, through a personal commitment of individuals or through a strong cultural attachment in the case of groups, or they might have to be extrinsically fostered or enforced to combat violations. The design and enforcement of norms in the form of legal systems or official rules and regulations is costly, and the interplay of such man-machine systems is often complex and difficult to foresee. Much of what this entails is addressed in discourses on “free” societies or markets, on democracy, on investor or state capitalism, on stock market cultures, et cetera, but we lack a ready science or framework by which to analyze these very complex human concoctions. Perhaps a unified base of the behavioral sciences would help.

Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi

Mukerji’s book is important for a series of reasons. First, it has all the qualities to be a reference text in English about the Canal du Midi, possibly the most important since From Sea to Sea by L.T.C. Rolt.(1) The famous British historian launched the rediscovery of this vitally important development in canal history and hydraulic territorial management. In parallel, various academic studies emerged in France dealing with a range of issues related to the history of canal in different fields: territorial policy, technical description of works, the genius of Riquet, financial dimensions, history of uses, etc. The synthesis overview of what we can call the classical history of the canal culminated in its addition to UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 1996.

Revolving around Léon Foucault

William Tobin has written a biography of Leon Foucault, whom time and science forgot. The fact that Foucault has been overlooked is obvious from the books subtitle and the defensive preface. Clearly Tobin thought it necessary to inform the reader of Foucaults major scientific accomplishment, namely his proof that the Earth rotates. He also makes a convincing case that Foucault and the scientific world in which he worked mattered. However, the book is far less satisfactory or convincing as a biography.