Jeffrey E. Kline

A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attackers and/or defenders access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDERs mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide unique insight into the value of secrecy and deception to either side. We demonstrate with two hypothetical North Korean scenarios.

Steaming on Convex Hulls

This is a sea story about using a simple classroom example to save a great deal of money, as well as to convince beginning Postgraduate Naval School operations research students---experienced, skeptical military officers---that mathematical analysis can yield immediate results. The application is planning a ships transit from one point to another in a fixed amount of time, given that the ship can operate with one or more of its propulsion plants idled to save fuel. Simple analysis yields nonintuitive results that US Navy shipboard energy-conservation guides overlook. One of the authors (Kline) solved this homework problem as a student and subsequently applied this example when he took command of USS AQUILA, a patrol hydrofoil missile ship. AQUILA achieved results so striking in comparison to her sister ships that the squadron material officer inspected her engineering plant to ensure that no safety settings were being overridden to achieve this record. Klines spreadsheet decision-support tool was provided to other hydrofoil commanders. A more general version has been conveyed to the US Navy. Considering that our navy spends about a billion dollars per year on fuel for surface-combatant ships alone, this development promises substantial, long-term returns. “But thou, contracted to thine own bright eyes, Feedst thy lightst flame with self-substantial fuel.” Shakespeare, Sonnet I

A Game-Theoretic Model for Defense of an Oceanic Bastion Against Submarines

Abstract : We develop a game-theoretic model called BASTION to guide the employment of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platforms such as ships and aircraft that are defending a stationary oceanic bastion from attack by hostile submarines. The model is an example of a two-person zero-sum game with some additional variables (ship locations) that are under the control of the maximizing defender, but known to the minimizing attacker. The attacker knowing the ship locations, but not the locations of other platforms such as aircraft, must select a path to the bastion. The probability of detecting the attacker as it follows this path is the objective shared by the opponents.

A Defender-Attacker Optimization of Port Radar Surveillance

Abstract : The U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, Marine Corps, and Navy have deployed several hundred port patrol vessels to protect waterways, U.S. Navy ships and other high-value assets in ports world-wide. Each vessel has an armed crew of four, is relatively fast, and features a surface search radar, radios, and a machine gun. These vessels coordinate surveillance patrols in groups of two or four. We developed a mathematical model for advantageously positioning these vessels, and possibly shore-based radar too, to minimize the probability that an intelligent adversary in one or more speedboats will evade detection while mounting an attack. Attackers can use elevated obstructions to evade radar detection in their attack paths, and ports feature many such restrictions to navigation and observation. A key, but realistic assumption complicates planning: the attackers will be aware of defensive positions and capabilities in advance of mounting their attack. The defender-attacker optimization suggests plans here for a fictitious port, the port of Hong Kong, and the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain. In these cases, the defender can almost certainly detect any attack, even though the attacker, observing defender prepositioning, plans clever, and evasive attack tracks.

Optimizing Schedules for Maritime Humanitarian Cooperative Engagements from a United States Navy Sea Base

This paper introduces Global Fleet Station Mission Planner (GFSMP), an optimization tool to aid in mission planning and the scheduling of humanitarian assistance missions for the US Navy. GFSMP helps fleet staffs to examine how one naval ship, which was deployed for an extended period (e.g., six months), with embarked teams can best provide humanitarian assistance. We illustrate the application of GFSMP using notional data from the fall 2007 Gulf of Guinea African Partnership Station demonstration, which the Commander, US Naval Forces Europe--Commander, Sixth Fleet developed, and by its use in the Trident Warrior 2009 exercise, which the Commander of the US Second Fleet conducted. In contrast to manual planning GFSMPs solutions significantly improve total mission value achieved and reduce costs. Equally important, GFSMP quickly provides decision makers with courses of action, including partial rescheduling of existing plans, in response to exigent changes. “Do good with what thou hast, or it will do thee no good.” William Penn, American colonial leader (1644--1718)