Jeffrey Evans Stake

Economics, Behavioral Biology, and Law

This article compares the relevance to law of two unexpectedly similar fields: economics and behavioral biology. It first examines the assumptions, core concepts, methodological tenets, and emphases of the two fields. It then compares the interdisciplinary fields of law and economics, on one hand, with law and behavioral biology, on the other—highlighting not only important similarities but also important differences. The article subsequently explores ways that biological perspectives on human behavior may, among other things, improve economic models and the behavioral insights they generate. The article concludes that although there are important differences between the two fields, the overlaps between economics and biology warrant even greater congress between these two disciplines, and expanded exchange between the legal thinkers interested in each of them.

On Game Theory and the Law

Preface Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior Bibliographic Notes Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game The Normal Form Game Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes The Nash Equilibrium Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria Summary Bibliographic Notes Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment Subgame Perfection Summary Bibliographic Notes Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate Summary Bibliographic Notes Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information Signaling and Screening Modeling Nonverifiable Information Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules Screening and the Role of Legal Rules Summary Bibliographic Notes Reputation and Repeated Games Backwards Induction and Its Limits Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation Summary Bibliographic Notes Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models Collective Action and the Role of Law Embedded Games Understanding the Structure of Large Games Collective Action and Private Information Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking Herd Behavior Summary Bibliographic Notes Noncooperative Bargaining Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade Legal Rules as Exit Options Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations Collective Bargaining and Exit Options Summary Bibliographic Notes Bargaining and Information Basic Models of the Litigation Process Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages Information and Selection Bias Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information Summary Bibliographic Notes Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law Notes References Glossary Index

Property Law Reflections of a Sense of Right and Wrong

An evolutionary perspective on human morality may help us understand and critique the law. This chapter examines three areas of American property law. In two of the three areas, title by first possession and title by adverse possession, the pieces of legal doctrine fit together when seen through an evolutionary lens. In the third area of law, compensation for eminent domain, the inconsistency between the legal doctrine and biologically predictable human attitudes suggests why governmental takings of property raise public ire and suggests what can be done to make the law less offensive to normal sensibilities.

Determining 'Just Compensation'

The US Constitution requires the government to pay just compensation for taking private property. Justice, in this context, will be achieved only if compensation meets two tests, a reality test and a perception test. The reality test asks whether is it more likely than not that the owner deprived of her property would be made whole by the amount of compensation provided. In determining this likelihood, economics, biology, and psychology ought all to be considered. These disciplines indicate that possession, duration of possession, and multiple occupancy call for compensation bonuses. The perception test asks whether it is more likely than not that the average person would think that the owner would be made whole by the amount of compensation provided. In determining this likelihood, surveys of lay persons should play a key role. Participants surveyed provide more compensation when owners are in possession, when possession lengthens, when there are multiple occupants, and when the land is taken for a project involving substantial private ownership. Participants surveyed did not, however, consider justice to require that owners be awarded full compensation for subjective losses or that compensation be increased proportionately when property appreciates in value.