Jeffrey H. Keefe

Employee Voice, Human Resource Practices, and Quit Rates: Evidence from the Telecommunications Industry

The authors draw on strategic human resource and industrial relations theories to identify the sets of employee voice mechanisms and human resource practices that are likely to predict firm-level quit rates, then empirically evaluate the predictive power of these variables using data from a 1998 establishment-level survey in the telecommunications industry. With respect to alternative voice mechanisms, they find that union representation predicts lower quit rates, even after they control for compensation and a wide range of other human resource practices that may be affected by collective bargaining. Also predicting lower quit rates is employee participation in offline problem-solving groups and in self-directed teams. No apparent association is found between quit rates and the availability of nonunion dispute resolution procedures. Regarding human resource practices, higher relative wages and internal promotion policies predict lower quit rates, and contingent staffing, electronic monitoring, and variable pay predict higher rates.

The Revitalization of the Cwa: Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing

This case study of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) demonstrates the value of resource dependence and contingency organizational theories—two branches of organization theory, which has most commonly been used to interpret firm behavior—for analyzing union revitalization. Consistent with predictions of those theories, the CWA responded to a changed environment by abandoning strategies that no longer achieved organizational objectives, but retaining and bolstering strategies that continued to be effective. Furthermore, like the organizations analyzed in Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salanciks classic exposition of resource dependency theory, in the face of heightened environmental complexity and uncertainty the CWA used political action, growth strategies, and inter-organizational linkages to gain advantage. The CWA conformed to another prediction of contingency theory by using an integration strategy—specifically, by making simultaneous and interactive use of activities in collective bargaining, politics, and organizing—to spur innovation and respond to environmental complexity and uncertainty.

The Impact of Quality of Work Life Programs and Grievance System Effectiveness on Union Commitment

Based on an analysis of data from a 1987 survey of four different bargaining units within the same local union, the authors conclude that union members who participated in Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs were less likely than nonparticipants to view QWL as a threat to the union, and also more loyal to the union. Another finding, however, is that the perceived effectiveness of the grievance procedure was a much stronger determinant of attitudes toward the union than was participation in QWL programs—leading the authors to speculate that one way for unions to strengthen their ties with their members might be to improve the effectiveness of the grievance procedure.

Numerically controlled machine tools and worker skills

This study investigates the impact of the spread of numerically controlled machine tools on the average skill level of workers in the nonelectrical machinery industry in the United States. Analyzing data from the Industry Wage Surveys of Machinery Manufacturers to trace changes in the skill levels of 57 machining jobs, the author finds that 30 years of the spread of numerically controlled machine tools has resulted in either a very small (1%) reduction in skill levels or no significant change at all, depending on the measure of skill change used. This result supports neither the position of the “post-industrialists,” who have argued that this new technology raises overall machine shop skill levels, nor the position of “labor process” theorists, who have argued that it results in deskilling.

THE NEW GREAT DEBATE ABOUT UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN U.S. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Recently some state and local governments in the United States have sharply reduced or eliminated public employee unionism and bargaining rights in the belief that their fiscal adversity stems mainly from overcompensation of public employees caused by collective bargaining. The authors examine public-private sector pay and benefit relationships, the effects of unions on public employee pay, the effectiveness of employment dispute resolution procedures, and the ability of public sector labor and management to combat fiscal adversity. They provide new evidence showing that: on balance, public employees are undercompensated relative to their private sector counterparts; the effects of unions on compensation are smaller in the public than in the private sector; and public sector dispute resolution procedures and joint labor-management initiatives to reform work function reasonably well.

Are Public Employees Overpaid

The research reported in this article shows that public employees, both state and local government employees, are not overpaid and may be slightly undercompensated. Comparisons with the private-sector employees that control for education, experience, hours of work, organizational size, gender, race, ethnicity, and disability indicate that the public-employment compensation (wages and benefits) penalty is relatively small. On average there is a 3.7 percent penalty in total compensation for full-time state and local employees when compared to similar private-sector employees. The data analysis also reveals substantially different approaches to staffing and compensation between the private and public sectors. On average, state and local public-sector workers are more highly educated than the private-sector workforce; 54 percent of full-time state and local public-sector workers hold at least a four-year college degree compared to 35 percent of full-time private sector workers. For college-educated labor, state and local governments pay salaries on average over 25 percent less than private employers. The public sector appears to set a floor on compensation, particularly improving the compensation of workers with high-school educations, when compared to similarly educated workers in the private sector. Benefits are allocated differently between private- and public-sector full-time workers. State and local government employees receive a higher portion of their compensation in the form of employer-provided benefits. Public employers provide better health insurance and pension benefits. National polling data indicate that the public does not believe public employees are overpaid. They oppose pay and benefit cuts, but believe pay freezes and greater employee contributions to their health and pensions plans may be appropriate. Nevertheless, thirteen states revised their public-sector collective-bargaining laws, mainly weakening employee bargaining power or severely restricting or eliminating collective bargaining, while the majority of the public opposed those changes.

Getting it Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications from Research on Public-Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining

The United States is in the throes of a public-policy debate about public-sector unionism and collective bargaining. The ostensible trigger of this debate is the fiscal crises that state and local governments have been experiencing since 2008. The debate largely centers on the extent to which public employee unions have contributed to this crisis through the pay and benefits they have negotiated for public employees. The role of government as employer is connected in this debate to the role of government as a taxing authority and provider of public services. These roles are often claimed to be in conflict with one another — that is, governments as employers are seen as not exercising the same due diligence in setting pay and benefits as private-sector employers. The research evidence indicates, however, that these claims about public employment are based on incomplete and in some cases inaccurate understanding.

Public Employee Compensation and the Efficacy of Privatization Alternatives in US State and Local Governments

This article investigates the evidence used in the debate over public-sector collective bargaining and privatization as US states attempted to resolve their budget problems. Specifically, the article evaluates the research on whether US state and local government workers are overpaid and whether privatization provides a cost-effective alternative to the provision of public services by public employees. All recent studies find that state and local public employees earn on average lower wages than comparable private-sector workers and on average receive better health benefits and pensions than private-sector employees. Most studies find that the better benefits offset lower wages on average, and there is no state and local public employee compensation premium. The research on privatization in the USA indicates that it has reached something of an equilibrium with approximately one-quarter of municipal public services being provided by private organizations. The major costs of privatization include overhead costs of competitive bidding, monitoring, oversight, and evaluation, which if done properly can often offset any privatization cost advantage, while if privatization is done without adequate controls, it can result in corruption, poor quality services, and then demands for reverse privatization.

When Chickens Devoured Cows: The Collapse of National Bargaining in the Red Meat Industry and Union Rebuilding in the Meat and Poultry Industry

This paper examines the consequences of the collapse of the national bargaining structure in the American meat industry during the 1980s. It argues the driving force behind the collapse was the substitution of chicken for beef in the American diet. The relatively high price of beef was no longer sustainable when it came into competition with poultry products that were less costly, healthier, more convenient, and more malleable to further processing. The substitution of chicken for beef, put wages back into competition as consumers redefined market boundaries. Poultry processors were nonunion, paying low wages, and had developed a high productivity growth production system, known as the broiler complex. They were located in the union hostile rural South and had grown their businesses using African American labor in the Southern Black Belt.