Jeffrey Michaels

Bandwagonistas: rhetorical re-description, strategic choice and the politics of counter-insurgency

This paper seeks to explore how a particular narrative focused on population-centric counterinsurgency shaped American strategy during the Autumn 2009 Presidential review on Afghanistan, examine the narratives genealogy and suggest weaknesses and inconsistencies that exist within it. More precisely our ambition is to show how through a process of ‘rhetorical re-description’ this narrative has come to dominate contemporary American strategic discourse. We argue that in order to promote and legitimate their case, a contemporary ‘COIN Lobby’ of influential warrior scholars, academics and commentators utilizes select historical interpretations of counterinsurgency and limits discussion of COIN to what they consider to be failures in implementation. As a result, it has become very difficult for other ways of conceptualizing the counterinsurgency problem to emerge into the policy debate.

NATO After Libya

At the May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the ‘success’ of the Alliances Libya operation will no doubt be a cause for celebration. However, despite the positive outcome, Libya will have a very limited impact on the future direction of the Alliance. Undue focus on recent operations deflects attention from the more important drivers of NATOs future course – ones which will likely ensure that the Alliance remains an active global security actor, even if many of its members do not always want to take an active part militarily.

Managing Global Counterinsurgency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966

Abstract The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of ‘grand strategy.’ Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood ‘counterinsurgency’ as involving ‘indirect’ assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking ‘direct’ military action with American ground forces.

America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress

Benedikt Franke, visiting research fellow at Oxford, offers a unique analysis of indigenous African efforts to achieve collaborative solutions to the problems of African insecurity, focusing his attention particularly on the emerging ‘security institutions’ of the African Union. Franke sets out to provide ‘a detailed description of the historical evolution and contemporary pattern of inter-state security cooperation [in Africa]’ while at the same time making a serious theoretical contribution in his international relations (IR) discipline. For the latter, he offers a ‘constructivist interpretation of the dynamics of [African] security cooperation’ and teases out of the African initiatives a generalizable framework for understanding ‘international cooperation in general’. In doing all of this, he compiles a detailed description of contemporary African security ‘architecture’ unavailable from any other single source. The book is divided into 12 chapters. In Chapters 2 and 12, the author lays out his general theoretical line. In Chapters 3–5 he summarizes a history of security cooperation in Africa since the colonial era, broken down by distinct eras, from the late 19th century to present. In Chapter 6 he provides case studies of African Union peace operations in Burundi, the Comoros, Somalia and Sudan. In Chapters 7–9 he gets to the heart of the issue, describing the contemporary African security architecture in the security institutions of the African Union, the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System. In Chapter 10 Franke offers his analysis of the characteristics of security cooperation in contemporary Africa and in Chapter 11 he details the continuing obstacles and challenges to effective security cooperation amongst African countries. There is much to like about this work. Franke does not ignore continuing African security connections with external organizations such as the European Union, United State or United Nations. But he is highly commended here for emphasizing the distinctively African complexion of the emerging African security architecture and for arguing – correctly in the view of the reviewer – that Africans are constructing institutions worthy of careful study for what they can teach about human responses to world-wide problems of regional insecurity. He deserves praise for capturing the dynamism in the ongoing African activities and for refusal to resort to sterile generalization and stereotype. He aptly captures the weaknesses and problems that continue to bedevil African security-related initiatives. This book will be useful in different ways to several distinct audiences. A scholar of international relations, Franke follows a familiar formula: he is driven to emphasize a conceptual framework, offering a passionate introductory apologia for constructivist analysis (and managing to cite sociological icons Max Weber and Emile Durkheim in the process). The theoretical treatment may stimulate debate amongst

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

ABSTRACT During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Democrats and Republicans alike repeatedly raised concerns at the prospect of Donald Trump being in charge of America’s nuclear arsenal based on his seemingly unstable personality. Unfortunately, this emphasis on Trump’s character distracted attention from any in-depth investigation into his long-standing interest in nuclear issues. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by highlighting the nuclear legacy Trump will inherit from Obama, surveying his statements on nuclear issues over more than three decades, and providing an analysis of constraining factors on his administration’s nuclear agenda, particularly domestic institutions. It finds that most of Trump’s views on nuclear issues are relatively consistent with past Republican presidents. Where he is unique, however, is in his use of social media, which has potential implications on nuclear signaling.

Helpless or Deliberate Bystander: American Policy towards South Vietnam's Military Coups, 1954–1975

The USAs role in fomenting and responding to military coups remains an understudied and politically contentious subject despite it being a recurring foreign policy problem exemplified most recently in both Egypt and Mali. To the extent this topic has been addressed in any depth by scholars, it is mainly limited to an examination of a small number of coups that occurred during the Cold War that the CIA was accused of sponsoring. However, this emphasis on well-known cases to the exclusion of lesser-known cases has resulted in a biased view of omnipotent US power. This limitation is reflected in the case of South Vietnam, in which the focus has been placed on the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, whereas the numerous other coups that occurred have received little or no attention. In this article, a more inclusive approach will be taken in which US policy will be examined with respect to all of the main coups and coup attempts that occurred during the period 1954–1975.

Breaking the Rules: The CIA and Counterinsurgency in the Congo 1964–1965

A good deal of recent scholarship and official discourse on the role of United States intelligence in the area of counterinsurgency has focused on the finer points of intelligence analysis in support of large-scale military operations. The assumption underlying this perspective is the idea that intelligence services will play a subordinate role to the military in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This assumption is understandable, given the level of attention devoted to the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which itself is due in large part to the amount of national resources devoted to these two conflicts. One chief consequence of this focus is to marginalize the study of cases in which the U.S. government wanted to assist a friendly government’s counterinsurgency efforts but has been unwilling to consider a significant military intervention. In such

Agents for Stability or Chaos: Conceptualizing Intelligence “Relevance” in Counterinsurgency

Recent discussions among U.S. officials about how the intelligence community can demonstrate its “relevance” to counterinsurgency have been dominated by an ideology that presupposes large-scale military intervention, and in which the role of intelligence is limited to improving analysis in support of current military activities, with little debate of future requirements. This article will highlight a number of alternative conceptions of intelligence “relevance” to counterinsurgency, based on a study of several historical and contemporary U.S. and non-U.S. cases, and by applying a wider definition of counterinsurgency that includes cases where the military plays a subordinate role relative to the intelligence services.

‘You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore’: Anglo-American Security Relations in the Era of Brexit and Trump

Ahead of the Brexit vote, numerous commentators speculated about the negative impact this would have on the US–UK ‘special relationship’, projecting a decline in influence if Britain left the EU. In the aftermath of the vote, and particularly with the election of Donald Trump, the context for discussing security relations between the two countries has shifted considerably due to the fallout both events have had for the two governments, both internally and externally. This chapter will examine this shift in perspective by focusing on three topics. Firstly, the pre-Brexit assumptions of commentators on the ‘special relationship’ and US and UK foreign policy experts more generally will be discussed. Secondly, the views of President Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May with respect to the relationship will be examined, as well as their personal interactions and relevant policy priorities since each took office. Investigation of this topic will also seek to shed light on the commentary of ‘special relationship watchers’ during this period. Finally, the current state of the more long-standing bureaucratic relationships, especially in the defence and intelligence fields, will be highlighted and contrasted with the day-to-day priorities of the leadership.

Waging “Protracted Conflict” Behind the Scenes: The Cold War Activism of Frank R. Barnett

From the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Frank R. Barnett, a private U.S. citizen, became a central player among the Wests ‘Cold Warriors’ by developing and applying a unique methodology for organizing anti-Communist “political warfare” both in the United States and around the world. Recognizing the limits of government-sponsored activities in prosecuting a more aggressive strategy to counter the Soviet Union, Barnett sidestepped U.S. officialdom and created a parallel and less-constrained private network to engage in “protracted conflict” for the purpose of “rolling back the Soviet empire.” A key aspect of his activism involved developing educational gatherings for policymakers, lawmakers, industrialists, military reserve officers, and scholars. Arguably the most notable achievement of this network was that it kept the ideology of hardline anti-Communism on the “back burner” during a period when the mainstream discourse of “peaceful coexistence” and détente prevailed.