Jeffrey Z. Rubin

Factors affecting withdrawal from an escalating conflict: Quitting before it's too late

Abstract In an experimental study of “entrapping” conflicts —situations in which a decisionmaker may continue to expend resources in part to justify previous expenditures—subjects were given an initial stake of

Factors affecting entrapment in escalating conflicts: The importance of timing

4.00 and had the opportunity to win an additional

The role of modeling processes in the "Knee Deep in the Big Muddy" phenomenon.

2.00 jackpot. Two independent variables (Process of Resource Allocation and Prior Limit-Setting) were combined in a 2 × 3 design. Once the subjects had started to invest, half of them had to make an “active” decision to continue. Unless they actively decided to continue, their investments automatically ceased and they were no longer eligible for the jackpot (Selfterminating condition). The other half only had to make a “passive” decision to continue. Unless they actively decided to dis continue, their investments for the jackpot automatically increased (Self-sustaining condition). In addition, before investments began, some subjects were asked to inform the experimenter of the nonbinding limit they had set on the amount they planned to invest (Public condition), some were asked to set a limit which they kept to themselves (Private condition), while a third group was not asked to set a limit (Control condition). Subjects invested significantly more money in the Self-sustaining condition. Also, investments were somewhat greater in the Control than the Public condition. Although the mean investments in the Public and Private conditions did not differ, those in the Public condition deviated significantly less from their earlier set limits, suggesting greater commitment to these limits. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps

Abstract Entrapping conflicts are those in which individuals continue to invest their resources—even in seemingly losing propositions-in large part to justify previous unfilled expenditures. It has been demonstrated that individuals define their motivation for investing very differently at the various stages of an entrapping conflict. One implication of this motivational dynamic is that various factors may differentially affect degree of entrapment (i.e., amount invested), depending upon the point in time at which they are introduced. The present studies were designed to test this notion. All subjects were given an initial monetary stake and had the opportunity to win more by taking part in an entrapping investment situation. In Experiment 1, half the subjects were provided with a payoff chart that made salient the costs associated with investing (Highcost salience condition) whereas half were not (Low-cost salience condition). Moreover, for half of the subjects the payoff chart was introduced before they were asked to invest (Early condition) whereas for the other half it was introduced after they had invested a considerable portion of their resources (Late condition). Entrapment was lower in the High salience-Early than in the Low salience-Early condition. However, there was no difference between groups in the Late condition. In Experiment 2, the perceived presence of an audience interacted with personality variables related to face-saving to effect entrapment. When the audience was described as “experts in decision making,” subjects high in public self-consciousness (or social anxiety) became less entrapped than those low on these dimensions. When the audience consisted of individuals who “wished simply to observe the experimental procedure,” however, high public self-consciousness (or social anxiety) individuals were significantly more entrapped than lows. Moreover, these interaction effects occurred when the audience was introduced late, but not early, into the entrapment situation. Taken together, these (and other) findings suggest that economic factors are more influential determinants of behavior in the earlier stages of an entrapping conflict, whereas face-saving variables are more potent in the later phases. Alternative explanations are discussed.

Negotiation An Introduction to Some Issues and Themes

Abstract Entrapping conflicts are characterized by the tendency for individuals to make increasing commitments to some failing course of action, in large part to justify the appropriateness of previous investments made in that situation. It has been suggested that (1) these dilemmas frequently arise in organizational settings, and (2) whether decision makers escalate their commitment or withdraw from a failing course of action can be affected by a variety of factors. The present four experiments were designed to determine if an individuals degree of entrapment (i.e., tendency to escalate) may be affected by the behavior of a model in a similar situation. In Experiments 1–3, considerable generality was obtained for the proposition that decision makers in entrapping conflicts can be directly influenced by a model. Individuals who witnessed an entrapped model became significantly more entrapped than those who did not. This effect was obtained (1) for subjects and models of both sexes, (2) on measures of both process and outcome, (3) across two different experimental procedures, and (4) when the model was viewed either during or before the time that subjects were called upon to make their decisions. Experiments 3 and 4 delineated several limiting conditions of the modeling-entrapment relationship. Participants did not invest more of their resources in the presence than in the absence of an entrapped model if the model expressed regret rather than pleasure about his behavior. In fact, under such conditions a significant “reverse modeling” effect was obtained, in which subjects became less entrapped in the presence of the entrapped model. The modeling-entrapment relationship was also significantly reduced when the model was unlikable and unintelligent, and thus not an appropriate person for comparison. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed, including the possibility that models may be skillfully employed to help decision makers stop “throwing good money after bad.”

The effects of six bases of power upon compliance, identification, and internalization

Two experiments were conducted to evaluate the effects of two variables on psychological entrapment. Experiment 1 was an incrementing counter paradigm in which subjects could quit at any time. Subjects paid for each tick of their counter hoping that cash might eventually be awarded—either because a computer-generated number was reached or because a presumed adversary chose to quit first. At each of a series of decision points, subjects were to indicate their wish to continue, either by signalling the experimenter or doing nothing. In Experiment 2, subjects solved a crossword puzzle in the presumed presence of a person with whom they were either independent or in competition. Subjects were either stopped periodically and asked if they wished to continue or were not interrupted. In Experiment 1 it was found that entrapment was greater under Social than Nonsocial conditions; in both experiments this difference was more striking for men than women. In addition, in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1, entrapment was greater under Passive than Active conditions. Reasons for the similarity and divergence of results across the two studies are discussed and related to prior research.

HOW TO OBTAIN THE RIGHT OF WAY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR AT INTERSECTIONS

Social scientists have begun to understand when negotiation is likely to facilitate the settlement of disputes and when it is instead apt to render a bad situation even worse. Based on a growing bo...Social scientists have begun to understand when negotiation is likely to facilitate the settlement of disputes and when it is instead apt to render a bad situation even worse. Based on a growing body of psychological research, it is possible to identify several major themes and issues that bear upon effective negotiation.

Conflict, Negotiation, and Change

The links between Raven ’s (1965) and Kelman ’s (1958) models of influence were assessed in a questionnaire study. Coercive, informational, and reward power were rated as especially likely to elicit compliance; coercive power was most likely to elicit negative identification with the influence transmitter; finally, informational and coercive power were rated as most likely to elicit internalization.

The Psychological Process of Entrapment

Conflicts of interest over who shall assume the right of way at unmarked intersections may be viewed as a subset of a more general class of conflicts whose resolution is shaped by various strategies of deterrence. In order to examine the effects of five variables upon the determination of right of way, a simulated driving situation was developed in the laboratory, involving the presentation of a series of slide photographs of two vehicles, A and B, approaching an unmarked intersection. Male and female Ss were asked to act either as the driver of one of the two vehicles (A) or as the observer of both vehicles; in addition, the size of the second vehicle (B), the sex of its driver, as well as driver Bs maintenance or avoidance of eye contact with A were varied. Ss predicted, with greater confidence, that Vehicle B would cross the intersection first (that driver A would be deterred from seizing the right of way) when B was the same size as A, rather than a vehicle either larger or smaller; when driver B was female, rather than male; and when driver B avoided, rather than maintained, eye contact with A. In addition to these three main effects, a number of interactions emerged between the eye contact variable and one or more of the other four. Several of these findings were interpreted as lending support to Schellings description of the strategic efficacy of “binding oneself” to a course of action.

Experimental Research Methods

Although the history of social conflict is as old as humanity itself, the history of social psychological interest in the area is far more recent. The first experimental social psychologist was probably Kurt Lewin, and it was Lewin who first engaged in the social psychological study of conflict (compare Lewin, 1935, 1947, 1951).