Jelle Groenendaal

A Critical Examination of the Assumptions Regarding Centralized Coordination in Large-Scale Emergency Situations

Abstract Scientists have extensively debated the effectiveness of different emergency response management models, with a particular focus on the “command and control” versus “coordination” models. This debate, which focuses on centralized coordination at the tactical and strategic levels, assumes that the activity of frontline units within and between response organizations must be aligned and that it is possible to exercise control over frontline units. In this article, we discuss these assumptions and argue that researchers overestimate the degree to which frontline units can and should be centrally coordinated during the acute phase of emergency situations. Instead, we provide a mechanism in which coordination naturally emerges from the task at hand when frontline units follow a few simple decision rules. In addition, two managerial intervention strategies are presented that only may work in specific situations when frontline units are likely to misinterpret the environment in which they operate.

A Preliminary Examination of Command and Control by Incident Commanders of Dutch Fire Services during Real Incidents

In this paper, we attempt to get a better understanding of command and control practices of incident commanders from Dutch fire services (battalion chiefs, BCs) by examining the recordings made by helmet‐mounted cameras during 55 real incidents. The aim is to examine the degree to which the BCs issued orders to front‐line workers and the degree to which these orders were carried out appropriately. The results indicate that incident commanders were able to influence the work at the front line, but were generally not in control of what happened at the front line.

Toward more insight into the tension between policy and practice regarding the police network function of community police officers in The Netherlands

According to formal police policy in the Netherlands, the police should focus on their core business, i.e. criminal investigation and maintaining public order. According to the same policy community police officers should thus participate in local security networks with two tasks: first, gathering relevant information from the network for the core police tasks, and second, making sure that tasks deemed to be non-core policing tasks are left to other network actors. In this article we examine how community police officers implement this policy and the extent to which their network function actually contributes to the core police tasks. Based on five weeks of participative research conducted in the Netherlands, we observed that the network function did not contribute demonstrably to core police tasks, although it did contribute to quality of life and the local security in the neighbourhood. This can be partly explained by network theories that suggest that community police officers also have to ‘give’ in order to ‘get’ information and support. We conclude that neighbourhoods benefit from community police officers with a broad networking remit, at the same time moving away from the illusion that perceived non-primary policing tasks can thus be left to other parties.

Tunnel vision on tunnel vision? A preliminary examination of the tension between precaution and efficacy in major criminal investigations in the Netherlands

In scholarly debate on the gravity and prevalence of tunnel vision in criminal investigation procedures, one relevant issue has, thus far, been insufficiently explored; specifically, how have police forces responded to the apparent increased focus on the phenomenon of tunnel vision in criminal investigations? The present article examines this question through providing a narrative history of the effects of administrative oversight policies developed in response to a certain serious crime in the Netherlands and which was designed to better prevent the assumed problem of tunnel vision in major criminal investigations. In addition, we conducted group interviews with major criminal investigation teams so as to bring into focus their perception of the effectiveness of this policy. We concluded that the adopted policy had failed to give balanced consideration to the polarity between efficacy (raising the number of solved crimes) and precaution (prevention of errors in criminal investigations). Additionally, based on the interviews, we concluded that the policy did not significantly improve efficiency or eliminate tunnel vision from working its way into the investigation process.