Jennifer C. McVay
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
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Publication
Featured researches published by Jennifer C. McVay.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition | 2009
Jennifer C. McVay; Michael J. Kane
On the basis of the executive-attention theory of working memory capacity (WMC; e.g., M. J. Kane, A. R. A. Conway, D. Z. Hambrick, & R. W. Engle, 2007), the authors tested the relations among WMC, mind wandering, and goal neglect in a sustained attention to response task (SART; a go/no-go task). In 3 SART versions, making conceptual versus perceptual processing demands, subjects periodically indicated their thought content when probed following rare no-go targets. SART processing demands did not affect mind-wandering rates, but mind-wandering rates varied with WMC and predicted goal-neglect errors in the task; furthermore, mind-wandering rates partially mediated the WMC-SART relation, indicating that WMC-related differences in goal neglect were due, in part, to variation in the control of conscious thought.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General | 2012
Jennifer C. McVay; Michael J. Kane
Some people are better readers than others, and this variation in comprehension ability is predicted by measures of working memory capacity (WMC). The primary goal of this study was to investigate the mediating role of mind-wandering experiences in the association between WMC and normal individual differences in reading comprehension, as predicted by the executive-attention theory of WMC (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004). We used a latent-variable, structural-equation-model approach, testing skilled adult readers on 3 WMC span tasks, 7 varied reading-comprehension tasks, and 3 attention-control tasks. Mind wandering was assessed using experimenter-scheduled thought probes during 4 different tasks (2 reading, 2 attention-control). The results support the executive-attention theory of WMC. Mind wandering across the 4 tasks loaded onto a single latent factor, reflecting a stable individual difference. Most important, mind wandering was a significant mediator in the relationship between WMC and reading comprehension, suggesting that the WMC-comprehension correlation is driven, in part, by attention control over intruding thoughts. We discuss implications for theories of WMC, attention control, and reading comprehension.
Psychological Bulletin | 2010
Jennifer C. McVay; Michael J. Kane
In this comment, we contrast different conceptions of mind wandering that were presented in 2 recent theoretical reviews: Smallwood and Schooler (2006) and Watkins (2008). We also introduce a new perspective on the role of executive control in mind wandering by integrating empirical evidence presented in Smallwood and Schooler with 2 theoretical frameworks: Watkinss elaborated control theory and Klingers (1971, 2009) current concerns theory. In contrast to the Smallwood-Schooler claim that mind wandering recruits executive resources, we argue that mind wandering represents a failure of executive control and that it is dually determined by the presence of automatically generated thoughts in response to environmental and mental cues and the ability of the executive-control system to deal with this interference. We present empirical support for this view from experimental, neuroimaging, and individual-differences research.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition | 2007
Rebekah E. Smith; R. Reed Hunt; Jennifer C. McVay; Melissa D. McConnell
Evidence has begun to accumulate showing that successful performance of event-based prospective memory (PM) comes at a cost to other ongoing activities. The current study builds on previous work by examining the cost associated with PM when the target event is salient. Target salience is among the criteria for automatic retrieval of intentions according to the multiprocess view of PM. An alternative theory, the preparatory attentional and memory processes theory, argues that PM performance, including retrieval of the intent, is never automatic and successful performance always will come at a cost to other ongoing activity. The 4 experiments reported here used a salient PM target event. In addition, Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to meet the stringent criteria proposed for automatic retrieval of intentions by multiprocess theory, and, yet, in all 4 experiments, delayed intentions interfered with ongoing task performance.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | 2009
Jennifer C. McVay; Michael J. Kane; Thomas R. Kwapil
In an experience-sampling study that bridged laboratory, ecological, and individual-differences approaches to mind-wandering research, 72 subjects completed an executive-control task with periodic thought probes (reported by McVay & Kane, 2009) and then carried PDAs for a week that signaled them eight times daily to report immediately whether their thoughts were off task. Subjects who reported more mind wandering during the laboratory task endorsed more mind-wandering experiences during everyday life (and were more likely to report worries as off-task thought content). We also conceptually replicated laboratory findings that mind wandering predicts task performance: Subjects rated their daily-life performance to be impaired when they reported off-task thoughts, with greatest impairment when subjects’ mind wandering lacked metaconsciousness. The propensity to mind wander appears to be a stable cognitive characteristic and seems to predict performance difficulties in daily life, just as it does in the laboratory
Current Directions in Psychological Science | 2012
Michael J. Kane; Jennifer C. McVay
People’s minds sometimes wander from ongoing activities. Although these experiences can be pleasant and useful, they are often unintentional and precipitate mistakes. In this article, we adopt an individual-differences perspective in considering unwanted mind wandering as an indicator of both momentary failures of and enduring deficiencies in executive-control functions. We describe research that associates normal variation in working memory capacity (WMC)—a cognitive ability that broadly predicts intellectual capabilities and accomplishments—with off-task thinking. In laboratory and daily-life assessments, people with lower WMC mind wander more frequently than do those with higher WMC, at least during demanding tasks. Moreover, the error-proneness of lower-WMC subjects seems to arise partly from their vulnerability to mind wandering. Executive control over one’s thoughts therefore seems to contribute to the effective regulation of behavior.
Consciousness and Cognition | 2014
Rebekah E. Smith; Melissa McConnell Rogers; Jennifer C. McVay; Joshua A. Lopez; Shayne Loft
Implementation intentions are a self-regulatory strategy broadly studied in the area of social cognition that can improve realization of ones goals and improve performance on prospective memory tasks. Three experiments, using a non-focal task for which the prospective memory targets were specified at the time of intention formation, investigated whether (and how) implementation intentions can improve non-focal prospective memory performance. An improvement in prospective memory performance was accompanied by an increase in the allocation of conscious resources to the prospective memory task, but not by an increase in perceived importance of the prospective memory task. The third experiment also investigated the effects of implementation intentions on recall of the appropriate action and found that accurate action recall was improved by implementation intentions. Finally, the effect of implementation intention instructions on cognitive processes that underlie non-focal prospective memory performance was investigated using a multinomial model.
Archive | 2010
Jennifer C. McVay; Michael J. Kane
Our minds wander. Sometimes, that’s good – we can ponder scientific questions, practice important conversations, or just plan daily events while we engage in routine or dull tasks. Sometimes, thought, that’s bad – we may worry excessively, reexperience traumatic events repeatedly, or (most relevant to present purposes) simply become distracted by thoughts, images, or fantasies that interfere with our ongoing activities. Such interference is especially likely to become problematic during tasks that are cognitively demanding.
Archive | 2010
Mary L. Courage; Mark L. Howe; Małgorzata Ilkowska; Randall W. Engle; Małgorzata Kossowska; Edward Orehek; Arie W. Kruglanski; Jennifer C. McVay; Michael J. Kane; Magdalena Marszał-Wiśniewska; Dominika Zajusz; Jarosław Orzechowski; Grzegorz Sedek; Aneta Brzezicka
Executive functions (EF) are those higher-level cognitive activities that include the monitoring and self-regulation of attention, thought, and action, and the ability to plan behavior and to inhibit inappropriate responses. These cognitive control processes are voluntary and effortful and have been described as providing a system for overriding routine or reflexive behavior in favor of more situationally appropriate and adaptive behavior (Shallice, 1988). As such, these processes are integrally tied to the functioning and development of working memory (WM) (see Cowan & Alloway, 2009). The significance of EF is evident in developmental conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism, and fetal alcoholism spectrum disorder that are characterized by poor executive functioning across a variety of behavioral domains. Executive functioning activities are immature in infancy and toddlerhood but develop slowly over the preschool years and continue to be fine-tuned into adolescence. For example, research shows that 2-, 3-, and most 4-year-olds consistently perform poorly on a variety of tasks that require the ability to inhibit a prepotent but inappropriate response in a conflict task (e.g., dimensional switching), to demonstrate the theory of mind reasoning (e.g., false belief task), to mentally represent an object in two different ways simultaneously (e.g., the appearance-reality distinction task), or to execute a plan (e.g., motor sequencing tasks). In contrast, 5- and 6-year-olds succeed on these tasks, although some of the more sophisticated iterations of these will not be successfully performed until later childhood or adolescence (for a discussion see Goswami, 2007).
Psychological Science | 2007
Michael J. Kane; Leslie H. Brown; Jennifer C. McVay; Paul J. Silvia; Inez Myin-Germeys; Thomas R. Kwapil