Jennifer E. Dysart

Eyewitness Identification Reforms Are Suggestiveness-Induced Hits and Guesses True Hits?

Research-based reforms for collecting eyewitness identification evidence (e.g., unbiased pre-lineup instructions, double-blind administration) have been proposed by psychologists and adopted in increasing numbers of jurisdictions across the United States. It is well known that reducing rates of mistaken identifications can also reduce accurate identification rates (hits). But the reforms are largely designed to reduce the suggestiveness of the procedures they are meant to replace. Accordingly, we argue that it is misleading to label any hits obtained because of suggestive procedures as “hits” and then saddle reforms with the charge that they reduce the rate of these illegitimate hits. Eyewitness identification evidence should be based solely on the independent memory of the witness, not aided by biased instructions, cues from lineup administrators, or the use of lineup fillers who make the suspect stand out. Failure to call out these hits as being illegitimate can give solace to those who are motivated to preserve the status quo.

Blind Lineup Administration as a Prophylactic Against the Postidentification Feedback Effect

Confidence and other testimony-relevant judgments may be distorted when witnesses are given confirming postidentification feedback, and double-blind procedures-wherein the lineup administrator does not know the identity of the suspect-are a commonly proposed, but untested, remedy for this effect. In the current study, mock witnesses viewed a staged crime video followed by a target-present or target-absent lineup where the administrator was or was not presumed to know the identity of the suspect. After making an identification decision, witnesses were or were not given realistic, but nonidentification-specific, feedback, and then confidence and other judgments were assessed. A significant interaction was found between blind condition and feedback such that feedback inflated confidence and other judgments in presumed nonblind conditions only; feedback had no effect on participants in presumed blind conditions. As predicted by the selective cue integration framework-a theoretical model suggested to explain the interaction between presumed blind administration and feedback-this interaction was significant only for inaccurate participants. These results suggest that blind administration may serve as a prophylactic against the negative effects of postidentification feedback. In addition, the effectiveness of our subtle feedback in influencing judgments suggests that lineup administrators should take care not to provide any feedback to eyewitnesses.