Jennifer Murtazashvili

The origins of private property rights: states or customary organizations?

Political theories of property rights are less optimistic than self-governance perspectives regarding the ability of non-state organizations to supply private property institutions. Despite offering different answers to the question of where property rights come from, these diverse perspectives share a concern with organizational capacity, constraints, and legitimacy as explanations why organizations are able to supply private property rights. We use these shared concerns as a point of departure to investigate formal and informal private property rights in rural Afghanistan. We find that informal private property rights are more effective than formal private property rights because customary organizations fare better than the state on the dimensions of capacity, constraints, and legitimacy. More generally, these ‘political’ features of formal and informal organizations explain why self-governance works, as well as provide insight into the challenges confronting efforts in fragile states to establish formal private property institutions.

Coloured by revolution: the political economy of autocratic stability in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan contains all the ingredients that observers have long argued would lead to not only regime change but civil war: economic, political and religious repression. Despite the presence of these factors, the autocratic regime in Uzbekistan has remained remarkably stable in the face of revolutions in neighbouring countries. This article suggests three complementary reasons why the regime has remained firm as others crumbled around it, including relatively strong economic performance, state capacity to repress revolutionary aspirations and government co-optation of local institutions. Understanding autocratic stability requires that we move beyond the ‘agency-structure’ debates that pervade the literature on post-communist institutional development toward a more encompassing explanation that recognizes how institutional and structural factors both liberate and constrain individual choices.

Does the sequence of land reform and political reform matter? Evidence from state-building in Afghanistan

Abstract Property insecurity is associated with terrorism, insurgency and economic underdevelopment. For this reason, land reform is often implemented alongside political reform in post-conflict settings. In contrast, this article argues that political reform should be sequenced prior to land reform during state-building. Evidence from Afghanistan shows how land redistribution, legal titling, decentralisation of state-owned land and provision of legal services to resolve land disputes are unlikely to alleviate political violence or facilitate economic development without establishing or substantially improving political capacity, political constraints and inclusive political institutions at the local level. These findings suggest the importance of sequence in the process of land reform and political reform. More generally, political reform is a prerequisite for land reform to reduce violence and improve development prospects in post-conflict settings.

When does the emergence of a stationary bandit lead to property insecurity

The economic theory of the state is often illustrated using examples in which the emergence of a stationary bandit—a ruler who is able to centralize military and fiscal capacity—improves property security. This article argues that the economic theory of the state also provides insight into the conditions when the emergence of a stationary bandit leads to property insecurity. In our reading of the economic theory of the state, the rise of a stationary bandit is only expected to improve property security writ large when coercive power is unquestioned, political institutions constrain rulers, powerful groups do not dominate the political process, and de facto property institutions are inefficient. The framework clarifies why Afghanistan’s first stationary bandit, Abdur Rahman, maintained state ownership over all land, waged violent repopulation campaigns, and drastically increased taxation before, during, and after centralizing state power from 1880 to 1901, while basic land use rights emerged from 1747 to 1880, a period when the state fell short of a monopoly on coercion.

Social Identity and Voting in Afghanistan: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

The basis of social identity in Afghanistan is the concept of qawm. As qawm refers to an individual’s solidarity group, such as village, tribe, subtribe, or even ethnic group, it captures broad in-group/out-group distinctions. We analyze a survey experiment to explore how qawm affiliation affects individual perceptions of politicians running for a fictitious local election. Contrary to expectations derived from the literatures on Afghanistan and on identity politics, we find qawm affiliation does not influence voter choice or perceived importance that a fellow qawm member should be elected. Moreover, qawm affiliation actually undermines individual perceptions a candidate will work on behalf of voters if elected. We explore two general mechanisms that may explain these findings, including weakening social ties and salience of the qawm.

Gaming the state: consequences of contracting out state building in Afghanistan

The operation of a vibrant illicit economy and government corruption are widely acknowledged as obstacles to the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, massive influxes of money tied to the international efforts have led to ‘legal’ corruption that similarly obstructs state consolidation and peace. This paper considers the various ways in which Afghan entrepreneurs have learned to ‘game the state’ by taking advantage of donor and especially US procurement systems since 2001. The conceptual framework and evidence suggests that designing ways to limit corruption arising from the state-building process is key to improving the long-run prospects for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and similar states where rapid and steep increases in foreign aid and associated contracts create fertile ground for malfeasance.

Can a Shale Gas Revolution Save Central and South Asia

This chapter explores how the potential for shale gas might affect the energy landscape in the countries of Central and South Asia. Although three countries in the region—India, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan—feature significant unconventional gas reserves, none of these countries has supported drilling for these resources in any significant way. This chapter explores the reasons for the lack of active drilling, including economic and security constraints as well as the absence of a coherent policy framework in these countries that would encourage foreign investors to actively engage in the development of shale gas. Furthermore, many countries in the region—especially Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and to some extent Uzbekistan—maintain abundant conventional oil and gas supplies that reduce the urgency to develop shale gas resources. Finally, the US government has actively promoted a “Silk Road” strategy to link the economies of Central and South Asia. Part of this strategy involves the encouraging countries of Central Asia to export gas and excess hydroelectric power via Afghanistan to the countries of South Asia.

Coercive capacity, land reform and political order in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT This article compares four historical periods in Afghanistan to better understand whether land reform in the post-2001 context will improve prospects for political order. Its central finding is that political order can be established without land reform provided that the state is able to establish and maintain coercive capacity. However, the cost of establishing political order mainly through coercion is very low levels of economic development. We also find that when land reform was implemented in periods of weak or declining coercive capacity, political disorder resulted from grievances unrelated to land issues. In addition, land reforms implemented in the context of highly centralized political institutions increased property insecurity. This suggests the importance of investing in coercive capacity alongside land reform in the current context but also that establishing inclusive political institutions prior to land reform will increase its chances of success.