Jens Großer

The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study

We study majority voting over two alternatives in small groups. Individuals have identical preferences but are uncertain about which alternative can better achieve their common interest. Before voting, each individual can obtain information by buying a valuable but imperfect signal about the better alternative. Voting is either voluntary or compulsory. In the compulsory mode, each individual must vote between the two alternatives, while in the voluntary mode they can also abstain. An uninformed, random vote generates a negative externality since it may override an informative group decision in pivotal events. In our experiments, participants in randomly re-matched groups obtain information more often with compulsory than voluntary voting, and the average number of signals is greater in larger than smaller groups. Surprisingly, uninformed voting is common even in the voluntary mode! Finally, group performance is poor in all treatments, indicating the need to reconsider current practice of jury and committee voting.

Redistributive Politics and Market Efficiency: An Experimental Study

We study the interaction between competitive markets that produce large but unequally distributed welfare gains and elections through which the poor majority can redistribute income away from the rich minority. In our simple laboratory democracy, subjects first earn their income by trading in a double auction market and thereafter vote on redistributive policies in two-candidate elections. In addition, in one of the treatments subjects can attempt to influence the candidates’ policy choices by transferring money to them. We observe very high levels of redistribution – even when transfers to candidates are possible – with little effect on market efficiency. Overall, the experimental results are explained by our equilibrium predictions.

Voting Mechanism Design: Modeling Institutions in Experiments

In this chapter, I argue why laboratory experiments have the potential to become an indispensable tool of political engineering. Political engineers are concerned with the design of mechanisms, or political institutions and procedures (for example, electoral systems), that support desirable behavior and outcomes. Of course, what is desirable depends on the perspective of the decision maker (for example, a government, party or dictator). My focus is on the design of voting mechanisms for small groups which are concerned with the welfare and equality of income among their members. Other possible applications of mechanism design in political science include, but are not limited to, constitutions, fighting terrorism, conflict bargaining and environmental agreements. Although still relatively neglected in political engineering, laboratory experiments have become an established mechanism design tool in other areas, most notably auction and market design (for example, FCC combinatorial spectrum auctions, Brunner et al., 2010; Goeree and Holt, 2010; and CO2 emissions markets, Burtraw et al., 2011). Experts in laboratory experimentation and game theory are often consulted to design these institutions, or to develop bidding strategies for firms that participate in trading. There is no reason why this could not happen in political engineering!

Experimental Game Theory and Its Application in Sociology and Political Science

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