Jens-Uwe Schröder-Hinrichs

Accident investigation reporting deficiencies related to organizational factors in machinery space fires and explosions

Careful accident investigation provides opportunities to review safety arrangements in socio-technical systems. There is consensus that human intervention is involved in the majority of accidents. Ever cautious of the consequences attributed to such a claim vis-à-vis the apportionment of blame, several authors have highlighted the importance of investigating organizational factors in this respect. Specific regulations to limit what were perceived as unsuitable organizational influences in shipping operations were adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Guidance is provided for the investigation of human and organizational factors involved in maritime accidents. This paper presents a review of 41 accident investigation reports related to machinery space fires and explosions. The objective was to find out if organizational factors are identified during maritime accident investigations. An adapted version of the Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) with minor modifications related to machinery space features was used for this review. The results of the review show that organizational factors were not identified by maritime accident investigators to the extent expected had the IMO guidelines been observed. Instead, contributing factors at the lower end of organizational echelons are over-represented.

Maritime human factors and IMO policy

The development of human factor- (HF) related regulations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has often been the result of responses to maritime accidents. The typical reaction to an accident has been a combination of (mainly technical) regulations, changing of procedures and training. Systemic evaluations and changes have rarely been done. Statements made by IMO in recent years claim a shift towards a proactive approach in maritime safety. Key documents, like the IMO Human Element vision, would confirm such statements. This article reviews documents submitted to IMOs Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in order to evaluate the ‘mechanisms’ of decision-making and the priorities for setting the agenda in MSC regarding maritime human factors. The review confirms that the IMO work related to HF was reactive in the 1990s. There are a number of examples of more recent regulations that can be considered proactive. However, it is too early to fully confirm a proactive policy in the IMO rule-making process.

Multidimensional simulation in team training for safety and security in maritime transportation

ABSTRACT Emergency response, crew resource, and crisis management are important aspects of maritime education and training (MET). The authors of this article approach these aspects, utilizing enhanced simulation-based team training. The authors argue that an effective way to gain experience and achieve corresponding skills are practice runs on specially designed simulators that realistically represent complex conditions on-board vessels, following emergency alerts. The article introduces the concept of a safety and security training simulator and describes the research work related to the implementation of a learning objective-oriented development of simulation training scenarios and the pedagogic value added by simulation to MET. Results of a simulation case study are presented.

FRAM in FSA - Introducing a Function-Based Approach to the Formal Safety Assessment Framework

Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a structured methodology in maritime safety rule making processes. FSA takes organizational, technical and human-related factors into concern. While the method allows for the use of expert input during the identification of hazards and risk control options, the FSA guidelines give preference to assessment methods grounded in quantitative risk assessment. No specific guidance is given on how expert input should be obtained. This article therefore presents the findings of a pilot study with the objective to introduce the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) as a method to enrich FSA studies through structured expert input. Two focus groups (n = 6) were conducted to compare hazards and risk control options identified in one scenario with the help of fault tree analysis and FRAM. The results of the study show that FRAM has the potential to enrich hazard identification as a complementary tool.

A Theoretical Risk Management Framework for Vessels Operating Near Offshore Wind Farms

The design of an offshore wind farm (OWF) can have a major impact on the safety of maritime operations in the vicinity. Factors such as the number of turbines, turbine spacing, and tower design can all have an effect the probability and consequences of various maritime accidents. The current chapter describes the potential effects of offshore wind farms on maritime traffic—particularly in a safety, reliability and risk context. The chapter also reviews existing methods, models and frameworks that can be used to assess the risk to maritime operations. Lastly, the authors propose an improved theoretical risk management framework that addresses some present concerns.

Exploring Bridge-Engine Control Room Collaborative Team Communication

The EC funded CyClaDes research project is designed to promote the increased impact of the human element in shipping across the design and operational lifecycle of ships. It addresses the design an ...

A Framework to Improve the Coexistence of Maritime Activities & Offshore Wind Farms

The increasing number and size of offshore wind farms (OWFs), combined with the ambitious plans for future developments in the sector, portray a bleak outlook for ‘traditional’ maritime and marine players. The sustained growth of OWFs can cause conflict with other marine users, and thus certain risk control options (RCOs) may need to be adapted in order to maintain navigational safety and reduce the environmental impact of such installations; introducing such measures, however, may be counter-productive in terms of energy efficiency or financial sustainability. This leads to questions such as ‘is there a point when implementing certain RCOs actually makes an OWF project unfeasible’?

Command of Vessels in the Era of Digitalization

Recent discussions on digitalization, and autonomous ships provide a disruptive picture of how the maritime industry may be transformed in this process. The magnitude of this digitalization trend is very different from the one of implementing e-Navigation initiated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2006 to harmonize, integrate, exchange, present and analyze marine information on board and ashore by electronic means. A rapid speed of digitalization of ship operation is causing controversy. For example, the maritime industry has not yet come to a consensus about agreed definitions of “autonomous ship”, “unmanned ship” and a “remote-controlled vessel”. Some pioneering industry developers, invest in the digitalization of ship operation to make the maritime transport more reliable, safe and efficient. Whilst such technological developments promise safe and efficient business models to a greater extent, it has not been much discussed how people on board will be affected by digitalization with a particular attention to the notion of leadership. Command of vessels has been traditionally considered as a human domain. The ways in which leadership is displayed on board and how each task is dedicated to the members of a shipboard organization will be radically different in the era of digitalization. Based on the qualitative data obtained from semi-structured interviews, group interviews and participant observation with maritime experts in Norway, the paper discusses the impact of digitalization on organized work in ship operation, implications of digitalization for leadership, and leadership required in the era of digitalization. It concludes that human-automation coordination as well as human-human coordination are the key to support the future operation of ships.