Jeroen Hinloopen

On the empirical distribution of the Balassa index

On the Empirical Distribution of the Balassa Index. — The concept of revealed comparative advantage as measured by the Balassa index is widely used in practice to determine a country’s weak and strong sectors. Interpreting the Balassa index is difficult, however, in view of the limited knowledge to date on the distribution of this index. We analyze theempirical distribution of the Balassa index and its stability and properties over time, using Japan-European Union trade data. It appears that the distribution is relatively stable over time and that the widely used rule that “a Balassa index above one” identifies a strong sector, selects about one-third of all industries. On the other hand, the distribution appears to differ markedly across countries.

Preference hierarchies for internal finance, bank loans, bond, and share issues: evidence for Dutch firms

We estimate the incremental financing decision for a sample of some 150 Dutch companies for the years 1984 through 1997, thereby distinguishing internal finance and three types of external finance: bank borrowing, bond issues, and share issues. First, we estimate a multinomial logit model, which confirms several predictions of both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory as to the determinants of financing choices. Next, we estimate all possible ordered probit models to determine which financing hierarchy fits the data best. The results suggest that Dutch firms have a unique most preferred financing hierarchy: (i) internal finance, (ii) bank loans, (iii) share issues, and (iv) bond issues.

Empirical relevance of the Hillman condition for revealed comparative advantage: 10 stylized facts

The theoretically necessary and sufficient condition for the correspondence between ‘revealed’ comparative advantage and pre-trade relative prices derived by Hillman (1980) is analysed empirically for virtually all countries of the world over an extended period of time. This yields 10 stylized facts, including that (i) violations of the Hillman condition are small as a share of the number of observations, but substantial as a share of the value of world exports, (ii) violations occur relatively frequently in the period 1970–1984 and more rarely in the period 1985–1997 and (iii) violations occur foremost in primary product and natural resource intensive sectors and for countries in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. An additional bonus of verifying the Hillman condition in empirical research is its ability to identify erroneously classified trade flows.

More on subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers

Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D with that of providing R&D subsidies reveals that in general the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously reveals that subsidizing cooperative and noncooperative R&D leads to the same market outcome. The preferred R&D-stimulating policy is to subsidize optimally an agreement according to which firms only share the outcomes of their independent research.

Subsidizing R&D cooperatives

A framework is developed with which the implementation of two commonly used R&D-stimulating policies can be evaluated: providing R&D subsidies and sustaining the formation of R&D cooperatives. Subsidized R&D cooperatives can also be analyzed. The analysis shows that providing R&D subsidies is more effective in raising private R&D investments than sustaining R&D cooperatives. Moreover, optimally subsidizing cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of R&D activity. Sustaining R&D cooperatives thus appears to be a redundant industrial policy, all else equal.

Dynamics of Chinese comparative advantage

We analyze the dynamics of Chinese comparative advantage as measured by export shares and the Balassa index using 3-digit and 4-digit sectors for the period 1970 – 1997. We use novel tools to identify periods of rapid structural change and the persistence of comparative advantage, such as Galtonian regressions, probability-probability (p-p) plots, and the Harmonic Mass index, to supplement the usual descriptive statistical methods and mobility indicators associated with Markov transition matrices.

Comparative Advantage, the Rank-Size Rule, and Zipf's Law

Using a comprehensive international trade data set we investigate empirical regularities (known as Zipf’s Law or the rank-size rule) for the distribution of the interaction between countries as measured by revealed comparative advantage. Using the recently developed estimator by Gabaix and Ibragimov (2006) we find strong evidence in favor of the rank-size rule along the time, country, and sector dimension for three different levels of data aggregation. The estimated power exponents that characterize the distribution of revealed comparative advantage are stable over time but differ between countries and sectors. These differences are related empirically to country and sector characteristics, including population size, GDP, and factor intensities.

Experiments and Competition Policy

Economists have begun to make much greater use of experimental methods in their research. The award of the Nobel Prize in 2002 to Vernon Smith confirmed that the use of such methods is now seen as an important and credible part of the economists toolkit. In Experiments and Competition Policy, leading scholars in the field of experimental economics survey the use of experimental methods and show how they can help us to understand firm behaviour in relation to various forms of competition policy. Chapters are organized in terms of the main fields of competition policy - collusion, abusive practices and mergers - and there is also a separate section dealing with auctions and procurement. Written in a clear and non-technical style, this volume is an excellent introduction to what the increasingly important field of experimental economics can bring to the theory and practice of competition policy.

The Market for Knowledge Brokers

A widely-used policy to diminish the market failure on the market for innovations is the provision of R&D subsidies. However, the absence of competition at several stages of the procurement process could lead to inefficient use of these subsidies. To introduce more competition, a market for knowledge brokers could be created. The role of these knowledge brokers would be at four stages of the procurement process: (i) placing the call for tender; (ii) obtaining research proposals; (iii) monitoring the research efforts; and (iv) disseminating the research results. It can be expected that creation of such a market yields a better match between demand and supply on the market for R&D, yields a higher quality research product for a given price and that it increases the dissemination of research results.

Subsidizing Cooperative And Noncooperative R&D: An Equivalence Result?

We show for a widely-used class of models for strategic R&D that optimally subsidizing cooperative R&D or noncooperative R&D leads to the same level of private R&D investments. We then highlight the limitations of the framework that are responsible for this finding and conclude that policy recommendations based on the type of model used here should be treated as highly tentative.