Jérôme Barthélemy

Complexity of Outsourcing Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation

In this article, we use Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm to study outsourcing agreements. We develop an original approach of contract complexity and analyse the links among exchange hazards (i.e. specificity and environmental uncertainty), the contractual aspects of outsourcing (control, incentives, penalties, price and flexibility clauses) and the level of ex post transaction costs. Both contract complexity and ex post transaction costs are operationalized and measured. Our empirical research analyses 82 outsourcing contracts. This article uses three different dimensions (proximity to the core business, switching costs and adaptation costs) to assess the strategic importance of an outsourced activity. Our findings extend TCEs validity for the outsourcing of activities with a strategic value. Finally, this study offers an indirect measurement of ex post transaction costs. In short, to restrict vendor opportunism, contracts must contain incentives and penalties, as well as pricing and monitoring clauses

The Hard and Soft Sides of IT Outsourcing Management

In this paper, I contend that IT outsourcing management has two sides. While the hard side refers to the contract, the soft side refers to trust. My analysis of 50 IT outsourcing efforts shows that both the hard side and the soft side are key to success. The hard side and the soft side are often used separately. The greater the contractual hazards that characterize an IT outsourcing operation, the more likely the soft side will be preferred over the hard side. However, the hard side and the soft side can also be simultaneously used. In that case, the interplay between these two techniques can lead to a virtuous circle. Finally, IT outsourcing that are managed neither through the hard side nor through the soft side are doomed to fail.

An empirical investigation of IT outsourcing versus quasi-outsourcing in France and Germany

An increasingly large number of firms outsource their information technology (IT). Firms that contemplate such outsourcing have two alternatives: (1) a contract with a vendor (i.e., outsourcing) or (2) setting up their own IT subsidiary (i.e., quasi-outsourcing). This study examines some of the determinants of the outsourcing versus quasi-outsourcing decision. Using primary data collected in France and Germany, we show that the decision is strongly influenced by both internal (i.e., asset-specificity, size, and internal organization of IT) and external (i.e., institutional environment) determinants.

IT outsourcing:: Evidence from France and Germany

In this article, we study IT outsourcing in two European countries. A survey carried out on 160 large French and German firms highlights the main differences between French and German IT outsourcing practices. First, German firms tend to outsource less critical activities than French ones. Second, IT outsourcing joint-decisions (i.e. top and IT management) are more frequent in Germany than in France. Third, IT outsourcing operations more frequently entail personnel transfers and layoffs in France than in Germany. Fourth, the proportion of quasi-outsourcing operations is larger in Germany than in France. The differences between French and German IT outsourcing practices are explained through cultural and economic differences. French and German findings are also compared to existing empirical evidence in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Knowledge in economics and economic reform: An analysis of French survey data

The coexistence of a predominantly poor opinion of free markets and lack of education in economics are two documented features of France. In this paper, we use data collected through an Internet-based survey conducted in December 2009 in order to test whether this situation is more than a mere coincidence. A first regression model allows us to study how personal characteristics, general and economics education, occupation and personal interest in economics affect knowledge in economics. We then apply factor analysis in order to build an aggregate indicator of opinion on promarket reforms. This opinion indicator becomes the dependent variable in a second multiple regression model; it turns out that knowledge in economics contributes by 3.5% to explain the favorable opinion on pro-market reforms.

Knowledge in Economics and Economic Reform. An Analysis of Survey Data from a French Business School

The coexistence of a predominantly poor opinion on free markets and lack of education in economics are two documented features of France. In this paper, we use data collected in December 2009 through an Internet-based survey within the network of a major French Business School to test whether this situation is more than a mere coincidence. An instrumental variable model of opinion on pro-market reforms was estimated, taking into account the endogenous nature of knowledge in economics, while controlling for the characteristics of the respondents. Empirical results indicate that knowledge in economics contributes significantly to explain favorable opinion on pro-market reforms.