Jerzy Kosiewicz

Social and Biological Context of Physical Culture and Sport

Social and Biological Context of Physical Culture and Sport Author underlines that biological sciences connected with the human being are traditionally - after MacFadden, among others - counted among physical culture sciences. Because of the bodily foundations of human physical activity, they perform - shortly speaking - a significant cognitive function: they describe natural foundations of particular forms of movement. In spite of the fact that knowledge in that respect is extremely important for multiform human activity in the field of physical culture, it is not knowledge of cultural character. From the formal (that is, institutional) viewpoint it is strictly connected with culture studies, but it has separate methodological and theoretical assumptions. Knowledge of that type is focused on the human organism and not on effects of mental, axiocreative, symbolic activity of the human being entangled in social relations. It includes auxiliary data which support practical - that is, in that case, physical, bodily - activity. Its reception of axiological (ethical and aesthetical), social (philosophical, sociological, pedagogical, historical {universal or strictly defined - referring e.g. to art and literature with the connected theories} or political) character is dealt with by the humanities (in other words: social sciences) constituting an immanent and the fundamental - and hence the most important - part of culture studies. Putting stress on alleged superiority and the dominating role of natural (biological in that case) sciences within physical culture sciences and the connected marginalization of the humanities - which constitute, after all, a necessary and hence an unquestionable foundation for culture studies, their essence and objectivisation - is, euphemistically speaking, a clear shortcoming in the field of science studies. The abovementioned exaltation and aspirations for superiority, as well as deepening and more and more aggressive marginalization of the humanities (understood in that paper as a synonym for social sciences) in the field of physical culture sciences may lead to the separation of biological sciences.

Sport beyond moral good and evil.

Abstract Sport is - and should be - an amoral phenomenon (what should not be confused with an immoral one); that is, a phenomenon which is completely independent from ethics, except of, possibly, deontological ethics which concerns professionals who have professional obligations towards their employers and other persons who are provided with and influenced by their services. Conduct according to rules of a given sport has no moral character. It has only pragmatic character, similarly as conduct in compliance with principles of the administrative code, the civil code or the penal code. Of course, when you act in accordance with rules of sports rivalry you can additionally realize also other aims - like, for example, aesthetic, spectacular or moral ones. However, in each case rules of the game and legal norms have priority, because they are the most important regulative determinant of conduct in various societies, including variously defined human teams. The abovementioned legal and sports regulations are not moral norms. They can, however, influence moral behaviours if they are in conflict with the law or rules of the game. From that viewpoint moral norms are exterritorial in their relation to assumptions and rules of a particular sport. Contestants and people responsible for them - like, for example, coaches or sports officials - as well as their employers are neither required to account for their moral beliefs, nor for their moral behaviours, if only they act in compliance with rules of sports rivalry.

Philosophy of Sport from the Institutional, Content Related and Methodological Viewpoint

Philosophy of Sport from the Institutional, Content Related and Methodological Viewpoint In this article Author presents the dispute on the philosophy of sport. He points out four standpoints concerning the existence of the philosophy of sport: a) a commonsense one, b) a content related/methodological one, c) a reductionist one, d) a nihilistic one. The first points out that the discussed branch of science exists, that its final stabilization took place in the years 1967-1979. That opinion is proclaimed by Wojciech Lipoński (an English philologist), who is supported by Zbigniew Krawczyk (a sociologist of culture, an outstanding sociologist of sport, he dealt also with philosophical aspects of sport, 1995, 1997a, 1997b), Stanisław Kowalczyk (an outstanding catholic philosopher, he expressed his opinions also on the philosophy and theology of sport 2002, 2007). That viewpoint, according to my exploratory talks, is shared by a majority of members of the British Philosophy of Sport Association, the European Association for the Philosophy of Sport and the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, mainly because of lack of proper preparation - that is, philosophical education. The discussed standpoint has a commonsense character, since it does not tale into account the real level of contents of the philosophy of sport and relations taking place between it and general philosophy. It emphasizes only the first of the abovementioned requirements (the structural-functional one). Nobody of the abovementioned proponents of the first standpoint is aware of the need of meeting the two others of the abovementioned requirements - the content related one and the methodological one. An exception in that respect is Rev. Stanisław Kowalczyk, who admittedly raises issues connected with those two others requirements, but the contexts of justification he has formulated have - especially in the content related respect - a commonsense character. Nota bene, statements of a similar character on fundamental issues happened even to the greatest philosophers, among others to Hegel. Moreover Kowalczyk considers also (although in a disputable way) methodological issues concerning methodological foundations of the philosophy of sport. Because of the fact that I do not agree with both content related and methodological argumentation of the great Catholic philosophers, I devote more space to a polemic against him - that is, justification of my standpoint - in the subsequent part of the text. The second standpoint is expressed by Jerzy Kosiewicz. It is shared by, among others, Ivo Jirasek, Scott R. Kretchmar, Jim S. Perry, Arno Muller (it refers to arguments comprised in that text in part III and presented also in presence of the abovementioned persons during the conference of the IAPS in Olomouc in 2005). It assumes that the philosophy of sport exists, but solely in the institutional-organisational (structural-functional) sense. However, because of content related and methodological reasons, it is still in an early phase of development and hence we more have to do in that respect with philosophical reflection on sport - that is, in that case, with application of assumptions and issues from the field of general philosophy and specialized philosophies to ideography, explaining, understanding and evaluating phenomena as well as theoretical and practical activity connected with sport - than with the philosophy of sport in the strict sense of the word. The third viewpoint suggests that the philosophy of sport has not come into existence yet. McFee in one part of his text entitled Do we need a philosophy of sport? (in: Are There Philosophical Issues Respect to Sport (Other Than Ethical Ones), 1998, pp. 3-18) undermines the sense of its existence. He wonders if it is needed at all and he proclaims, after a long argument, that it is not. He proclaims, not without a reason, that if in the process of creating the philosophy of sport we have to do solely with application of philosophy for reflection on sport, so, as a matter of fact, the philosophy of sport as such is not needed at all. The general philosophy will suffice as a theoretical foundation for reflection on sport, for explaining and understanding its sense, meaning, essence, cultural and biological background, social and psychological mechanisms, needs, motives, etc. I suppose that working on that assumption we have to do rather with philosophical reflection on sport than with any form of the philosophy of sport. Nevertheless, the precondition of existence of the philosophy of sport in the strict sense of the word is referring to achievements of the whole philosophy. And philosophical reflection on sport is the first step on the road to creation of a fully autonomous and mature philosophy of sport. Hence, I do not share the final McFees conclusion included in the discussed text and proclaiming that the philosophy of sport as such is not needed, since each newly born philosophical branch goes through the application period, but, sooner or later, it breaks free from that initial content related and methodological dependence. It has also a right for its own academic name since the very beginning. The fourth standpoint has a radical character. It proclaims categorically that any philosophical reflection on sport is unnecessary - similarly as neither the philosophy of railroading, nor the philosophy of transport as such, nor the philosophy of mining or carpentry are needed. It is proclaimed that there are such fields which may do without philosophy and which do not need philosophy for anything. They allegedly include physical activity, activity in the field of physical culture. That view is proclaimed and supported by, among others. Henning Eichberg and Ejgil Jespersen. Author is not a proponent of that viewpoint, because physical culture and sport, among others because of their significance and range of social, cultural, health-related or axiological influences, implicate indubitably the need of cognitive studies of a philosophical character which should be continuously deepened and widened. Defining organizational-institutional, content related and methodological deficiencies characteristic for the philosophy of sport Authors points out to barriers which must be overcome to enable its further development. It is facilitated by defining its identity. Author thinks at the first about institutional-organisational difficulties: 1. The philosophy of sport has not appeared in structures of many scientific and didactic institutions closely connected with sport. 2. Neither she is present in syllabuses and didactic of many of the abovementioned institutions. 3. About 85% of members the international, the British and the European association of philosophy of sport - as well as participants of conferences on the subject and research projects and teams - have no philosophical education. 4. Many former chairpersons of scientific associations in Europe and outside had no philosophical education. A majority of them played a remarkable organizational and institutional role connected with promoting and strengthening the status of the philosophy of sport. However, their activity only indirectly and insufficiently facilitated development of that philosophy in the content related and methodological sense. 5. The strictly philosophical milieu manifests poor interest in the philosophy of sport. A percentage of persons from that milieu who carry out studies connected with it or express their opinions about it are too low. He thinks also that it is possible to distinguish the following content related and methodological deficiencies characteristic for the philosophy of sport: 1. Shortage of original assumptions and issues, which have been worked out solely on the ground of the philosophy of sport and are characteristic only for that discipline. 2. The discussed philosophy uses only languages of general philosophy and other specialised philosophies, referring to their terms, notions, categories, branches, circles, schools, currents, periods, ages, assumptions, issues, etc. 3. There is no feedback influence on general philosophy and specialised philosophies. 4. Literature on the philosophy of sport has introductory (initial) and applicative qualities. 5. Because of the abovementioned reasons, the philosophy of sport does not meet the fifth, the sixth and the seventh methodological condition concerning becoming independent from the abovementioned application and working out its own, specific assumptions and issues, as well as feedback influence. That is because such a situation makes it impossible to confirm not only its autonomy, but also its maturity. 6. Sports sciences (which, treated in a broader or different way, can be called physical culture sciences) have no common and coherent content related and methodological basis. They are very varied in that respect. It makes impossible coherent sublimation of that science in the form of the philosophy of sport. In that case, the first methodological criterion (according to S. Kamińskis interpretation), concerning its autonomy, is not fulfilled, because the subject of its interest connected with sports sciences has not been defined. 7. The fact that the philosophy of sport is not cognitively advanced (that is, there are no significant results of practising it), and that there are no means connected with the discussed activity (that is, a specialised methodology) and facilitating its development, causes that it is neither autonomous, nor mature from the viewpoint of the second methodological criterion according to Kamińskis interpretation. 8. A low level of meta-scientific self-definition of the philosophy of sport causes that the third methodological criterion according to Kamińskis interpretation, concerning self-reliance, is not fulfilled. One of reasons of the abovementioned immaturity and lack of autonomy of the philosophy of sport is also lack of necessary

The anthropological background of the philosophical reflection on nature and tourism

Abstract The first part of this paper deals with the question whether there actually is a “philosophy of tourism”, and, in connection with this, with the criteria that constitute a certain field in philosophy. After this methodological reflection, the relationship of philosophical reflections on tourism and nature on one hand and anthropology on the other are analysed, stating that philosophical reflection on nature has a strictly anthropological character, since nature is recognized and characterized by man. Furthermore, the role of tourist activities as a means to regain mental and physical wellbeing particularly for workers in the process of civilization and industrialization is reflected upon. To conclude, the focus is put on the role of ethical principles in connection with tourist activities, since some of these activities (e.g. mountain climbing) are characterized by the risk of facing extreme or dangerous situations that require difficult decisions which themselves can depend on different ethical principles.

Why pluralism, relativism, and panthareism: an ethical landscape with sport in the background.

Abstract In reference to the monograph entitled “Sports and Ethics: Philosophical Studies”, published in the “Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research” quarterly (2014, vol. 62), and in particular in reference to the paper entitled “The Normative Ethics and Sport” (Kosiewicz, 2014, pp. 5-22), the article presents new and at the same time supplementary views on the relationships between sports and normative ethics. The main objective of the paper is to provide a rationale as to why these relationships may be viewed in the context of the assumptions of ethical pluralism, ethical relativism, ethical panthareism, and axionormative negationism. The text is of a strictly cognitive and extra-ideological nature and it attempts to avoid moral valuation, moralism, and moralizing. The view it postulates is also labeled as ethical negationism, which rejects the necessity for external support and enhancement of sports rivalry rules with moral principles. It assumes that regulations, book rules, and game rules as well as the principles of sports rivalry ought to be of an entirely amoral character, independent of ethics. The article suggests minimizing the impact of moral postulates on sport. It postulates a need for widespread propagation of this point of view in competitive, professional, spectator, and Olympic sport disciplines, as well as in top-level sports or elite sports. The views presented in the paper point to the need to separate normative ethics from sports as far as it is at all possible in contemporary sports indoctrinated with obligations or attitudes of a moral tenor. This is because normative ethics – according to the author - is relative ethics, depending on an unlimited number of variables, e.g., various social contexts or individual points of view. The text engages in a polemic with colloquial and evaluative opinions of those sports fans who by all means strive to bolster its formal, functional, and axiological status. A significant part of them erroneously attributes sports to an extraordinary moral mission related to promoting an intuitively understood good with a religious and extra-confessional tenor.

Normative Ethics and Sport: A Moral Manifesto

Abstract This article constitutes a strictly cognitive and completely non-ideological moral (or rather, amoral) manifesto that makes no value judgments. The article concerns relationships that, according to sport enthusiasts with varying levels of competence, occur between sport and normative ethics. The author of this article supports a standpoint he terms ethical negationism that rejects the need for moral rules to externally support and bolster the rules of sport competition. The author assumes that the rules of sport play and competition are, and should be, completely amoral and independent from ethics. While this article is a fully autonomous ethical manifesto, it also constitutes an introduction to other articles in this issue of the journal arguing that sport competition takes place beyond the scope of moral good and evil. The author debates value judgments commonly held by sport enthusiasts who, albeit presumably driven by noble intentions, take great effort to bolster the formal, functional, and axiological status of sport. Most sport enthusiasts claim that sport has a unique moral and normative mission to propagate intuitively understood religious and non-religious good. They argue that sport constitutes something more than sport play and competition. The author rejects this point of view and assumes that normative ethics is unnecessary because what only matters is strictly following the rules of competition (referred to as pure play) and skillfully and praxeologically (i.e., effectively) using them during play, thus working towards the assumptions and aims of a given sport activity.

Foul play in sport as a phenomenon inconsistent with the rules, yet acceptable and desirable: ethical conditions.

Abstract The article has strictly a theoretical and non-empirical character. The author presents examples resulting from various observations. The aim of the paper is to present the causes, functions, and results of fouls, fouling, and foul play. Although fouls do not comply with the rules of games, the paper demonstrates that fouls are often used; they enjoy a quiet acceptance of the sporting world; they are tolerated and accepted; even more, they are often - more or less explicitly - desirable. The author employed the idiographic method (descriptive), that is, an approach typical for the general methodology applied in the nonempirical humanities and social sciences; the analytical method (referring to the British analytical philosophy);the nomothetic method (explanatory), the approach based on exegesis and hermeneutics of cultural texts utilized in order to create a closer understanding of the phenomenon of foul; the axiological method (evaluating of the use of foul);and the synthetic method, which was mainly used in the summary and the abstract. Author also applied a specific methodology typical for sociology, which refers to interpretationism based, in this case, on a genetic approach (referring to the sources and causes of phenomenon of foul), as well as on a realistic and empathetic approach

Considerations on General Methodological Assumptions of the Sciences of Sport

Abstract The considerations included in the article are the result of several years of teaching general methodology for doctoral studies at Josef Pilsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw. The presented text consists of two basic parts. The first includes reminiscences and associated methodological resentment. The second presents a wide panorama of standpoints concerning functions and kinds of hypotheses, their role and significance in contemporary research programs of formal, empirical (connected with natural sciences and biology), and humanities nature. Sketchy and encyclopaedic interpretations, presented in the context of commentaries by the author of this paper, thereby dominate. The aim of the first part is to draw attention to some methodological mistakes which often appear and which have become common in some academic milieus to such a degree that some intervention and postulatory correction, referring to Polish and Western methodological literature, is advisable. These shortcomings are connected, among other things, with the structure of the scientific work, with the formulation and application of hypotheses, with relations taking place between the general methodology and specialized methodologies, kinds and types of research work, with reliability of information on sources of creative information, as well with the category of verification in its relation, on the one hand, to confirmation and corroboration, and on the other hand, to testing, checking, falsification, and terms close in meaning to the last one. The abovementioned resentment results, first of all, from the fact that the authors discussed in the first part usually insist on erroneous solutions, negating a priori, without becoming acquainted with the literature on the subject or making attempts to explain or initiate a methodological argument referring to sources and studies. That resentment is significant, among other things, in the causal sense - that is, because of the fact that, firstly, it justifies and substantiates the need for a statement presenting controversial questions in a content-related and formal way. Secondly, because thanks to such (that is, cognitive-emotional) introduction, the whole argument - not only in the first, but also in the second part - is much more interesting. It is saturated with authenticity. Many readers know the figures mentioned and are familiar with their - sometimes too insouciant (sometimes not very reliable) - attitudes to important issues from the field of research methods. It is also interesting why the people cited make mistakes. Hence, it is also advisable to look at a wider methodological context of justification (included in the much longer second part) dedicated to perhaps the most thorough characteristics of the hypothesis in the literature on the subject, which is available to the author. Without presentation of the controversial issues in the first part, the second part, more important from the methodological viewpoint, might be omitted by a considerable proportion of readers. In that part attention is paid mainly to issues concerning working, initial, zero, primary, introductory, directing, gradual, auxiliary, ad hoc auxiliary, bridge, futile and true, dangerous and safe, quite natural and neutral, individual and general, complete and incomplete, deep, strong, probabilistic and non-probabilistic (that is, deterministic), related, falsifying, basic, psychological, metaphysical and materialist hypotheses, as well as those concluding ones - that is, those constituting the final effect of definite (concluded here and now) research; hence, those which have undergone verification, confirmation, corroboration or modification as those which predict and explain a given research problem in the best possible way.

Tourism and sacrum

Abstract The author points out – using as an example the views of Mariusz Zaruski, Polish mariner and mountaineer from the turn of the nineteenth century – that reflexive and philosophizing wanderers, roaming around various outdoor tracks, perceive nature in its threefold connections with sacrum, namely in its religious, para-religious and non-religious relations with it. They come to such a viewpoint by axiologization, which consists in ascribing various values to cognized nature. The above-mentioned values originate from spontaneous and thought-out actions from the areas of aestheticization and sacralization, including the properties of pantheism, panentheism, theopanthism, transcendentality and transcendence, hylozoism and animism of panpsychic and panorganic character. The presented view of tourism-related issues, which were implicitly and explicitly touched on by Zaruski, may give the impression that his humanist reflections on nature – and especially regarding mountains and the sea – are, although non-professional, relatively sophisticated and modern. However, the reality is quite different. Zaruski refers to the simplest assumptions that are characteristic of the Hellenistic philosophy of nature, for instance Pythagorean harmony and the Heraclitean view of the world, as well as the hylozoism or animism of the Ionic philosophers of nature. From the contemporary point of view, Zaruski’s philosophy obviously stems from superficial empirical cognition – perceptions and observations of nature – from the simplest explanations of inductive and intuitive character.

The Ethical and Legal Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes

Abstract The reflections presented in the paper are not normative (in general, it can be said, that they do not create moral values and demands). The presented reflections particularly stress the sense, essence, meaning, and identity of sport in the context of moral demands. A disquisition pointing out that sports and sport-related doping can be situated beyond the moral good and evil must be considered precisely as metaethical, and leads in a consciously controversial way to fully defining the identity of sport in general, as well as the identity of particular sports disciplines. These reflections also refer to the issue concerning the identity of sports philosophy, i.e. general deliberations and specific issues concerning, for example, the factual and cognitive status of normative ethics in sport. It is impossible to overestimate the role and meaning of metaethical reflection in the context of substantiating moral demands in sports as well as in the context of practical results of expectations. This metaethical reflection not only extends self-knowledge, but also contributes to the metaphilosophy of sports. The degree of the development of self-knowledge - both the metaethics of sports and the metaphilosophy of sports - is also a very important declaration, and a sign of general maturity of the philosophy of sports (Kosiewicz 2008/2009, pp. 5-38)