Jesse Bull

Hard evidence and mechanism design

This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of evidentiary normality and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms.

Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost

This paper addresses how a moderate evidence disclosure cost can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. The paper shows that in public-action settings with transferable utility one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms. Under complete information with two or more players, a version of this type of mechanism can be used to eliminate evidence production in equilibrium. The paper also provides conditions on the evidence environment under which the class of mechanisms studied in Bull and Watson (2004) is equivalent to those considered here.

Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact-Finding

This paper compares the relative merits of adversarial and inquisitorial systems of civil procedure in the presence of evidence suppression. Each party has the incentive to suppress evidence that may damage her case, and to reveal any evidence that strengthens her case. I model the decision of a litigant to suppress evidence. The court conditions its action (transfers between the parties) upon the evidence which is revealed. Enforcement costs, which are the cost of suppression and the cost of requesting evidence, are a loss to the relationship and form the basis for my evaluation of the relative merits of each system. I find that neither system always outperforms the other. The strength of the inquisitorial system is that it allows for randomization over evidence requests, which leads to lower expected enforcement cost. Litigants cannot commit to randomize as they are motivated by the expected award in litigation. The strength of the adversarial system is that it sometimes allows litigants to utilize their information about the level of suppression.