Jesse Richman

Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test

Identifying policy status quo locations is a precondition for testing key predictions of many spatial models of legislative politics, but such measures have proved to be extremely difficult to construct. This study applies a novel technique that measures policy locations in relation to legislators’ preferences. The resulting status quo estimates allow for a direct test of the policy consequences predicted by pivotal politics and party cartel theories of legislative politics. The empirical tests indicate that parties interact with pivotal politics to contribute to policy gridlock and shape policy change. By bringing pressure to bear on pivotal politics “pivots” and by blocking policy changes that would “roll” the party, parties increase the range of policies subject to gridlock in the American political system.

Uncertainty and the prevalence of committee outliers

its committees. Data limitations have largely prevented testing this uncertainty-outlier prediction, until now. For this article, I investigated whether or not the informational model correctly predicts under what scenarios outliers will be more frequent. As predicted, more uncertainty is associated with more committee outliers in U.S. state legislatures. Legislatures in which the floor is less informed than the committees are more likely to have committee outliers.

Common-Space Ideal Points, Committee Assignments, and Financial Interests in the State Legislatures:

We present a new unified dataset of common-space ideal points, committee assignments, and financial interests for all state legislators in 1999. We describe the compilation of the dataset and offer a few possible applications.

The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting: Why the Hastert Rule Leads to Defeat

This study demonstrates that unconditional blocking of bills opposed by a majority of the majority party—as implied by the party cartel model and advocated by former Speaker Dennis Hastert—can produce conditions in which the majority party loses popular support and loses elections. The theoretical analysis and empirical results imply that the use of negative agenda power to block bills is circumscribed by this risk of electoral defeat. As a result, the opportunity for effective negative agenda control is conditional on majority party issue advantage, party polarization, and the distribution of status quo locations. In particular, majority party roll rates should sometimes be nonzero, blocking increases the odds of majority party defeat in House of Representatives elections, and policy change is most likely on issues with status quo that the model suggests are the riskiest to block.

The Political Economy of Congressional Patent Policymaking in the Late 20th Century

Beginning in the early 1980s, the U.S. Government reformed the patent law in ways that made patents easier to acquire and defend, but further efforts to expand the rights of patent owners had stalled by the mid-1990s. I use a political economy model to explain these changes in terms of the shifting constituency interests represented by members of the U.S. Congress. As the distribution of patenting became less skewed in the 1980s, more members represented constituencies likely to benefit from inefficient patent policy. But as the distribution of patent holding became more skewed once again in the later 1990s, support for expansions of patent rights decreased.

Can the College Vote Turn Out?: Evidence from the U.S. States, 2000–08

College students in the U.S. have long faced barriers to college town registration and voting. Arguably, these barriers raise the costs associated with electoral participation for students living away from home. Despite ongoing debate about where students should vote, the extent to which college town restrictions limit participation by students has never been estimated. This article is the first to demonstrate that college town registration barriers implemented by the U.S. states reduce participation in national elections.