Jesús Pedro Zamora Bonilla

Scientific inference and the pursuit of fame: A contractarian approach

Methodological norms are seen as rules defining a competitive game, and it is argued that rational recognition‐seeking scientists can reach a collective agreement about which specific norms serve better their individual interests, especially if the choice is made ‘under a veil of ignorance’, i.e. , before knowing what theory will be proposed by each scientist. Norms for theory assessment are distinguished from norms for theory choice (or inference rules), and it is argued that pursuit of recognition only affects this second type of rule. An inference rule similar to ‘eliminative induction’ is defended on the basis of such a possible agreement. According to this contractarian approach, both the explanation and the justification of scientific norms only need to refer to the preferences of individual scientists, without assuming the existence of ‘collective’ points of view.

Credibility, Idealisation, and Model Building: An Inferential Approach

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.

Verisimilitude, structuralism and scientific progress

An epistemic notion of verisimilitude (as the ‘degree in which a theory seems closer to the full truth to a scientific community’) is defined in several ways. Application to the structuralist description of theories is carried out by introducing a notion of ‘empirical regularity’ in structuralist terms. It is argued that these definitions of verisimilitude can be used to give formal reconstructions of scientific methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism and normal science.An epistemic notion of verisimilitude (as the ‘degree in which a theory seems closer to the full truth to a scientific community’) is defined in several ways. Application to the structuralist description of theories is carried out by introducing a notion of ‘empirical regularity’ in structuralist terms. It is argued that these definitions of verisimilitude can be used to give formal reconstructions of scientific methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism and normal science.

TRUTHLIKENESS, RATIONALITY AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD

I. A. Kieseppas criticism of the methodological use of the theory of verisimilitude, and D. B. Resniks arguments against the explanation of scientific method by appeal to scientific aims are critically considered. Since the notion of verisimilitude was introduced as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, defenders of the verisimilitude programme need to show that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories. This possibility is explored for several approaches to the problem of verisimilitude.I. A. Kieseppäs criticism of the methodological use of the theory of verisimilitude, and D. B. Resniks arguments against the explanation of scientific method by appeal to scientific aims are critically considered. Since the notion of verisimilitude was introduced as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, defenders of the verisimilitude programme need to show that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories. This possibility is explored for several approaches to the problem of verisimilitude.I. A. Kieseppäs criticism of the methodological use of the theory of verisimilitude, and D. B. Resniks arguments against the explanation of scientific method by appeal to scientific aims are critically considered. Since the notion of verisimilitude was introduced as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, defenders of the verisimilitude programme need to show that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories. This possibility is explored for several approaches to the problem of verisimilitude.

Truthlikeness without truth: A methodological approach

AbstractIn this paper, an attempt is made to solve various problems posed to current theories of verisimilitude: (1) the (Millers) problem of linguistic variance; (2) the problem of which are the best scientific methods for getting the most verisimilar theories; and (3) the question of the ontological commitment in scientific theories. As a result of my solution ot these problems, and with the help of other considerations of epistemological character, I conclude that the notion of ‘Tarskian truth’ is dispensable in a rational (and ‘realist’) interpretation of the scientific enterprise. As a logical result, however, falsificationism will be vindicated. ... and in brief, a speaker must always aim at verisimilitude, and send the truth packing. Plato,Phaedrus, 272 E

Rhetoric, Induction, and the Free Speech Dilemma*

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists’ interests. A rational choice, game‐theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that ‘social’ interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with ‘cognitive’ ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors of scientific papers, as in an ‘ideal free speech situation’. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process.Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists’ interests. A rational choice, game‐theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that ‘social’ interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with ‘cognitive’ ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors of scientific papers, as in an ‘ideal free speech situation’. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process.

The Economics of Scientific Knowledge

The economics of scientific knowledge (ESK) is one of the youngest members in the heterogeneous field of ‘Science Studies’. Being itself an example of the ‘crossing of boundaries’ movement that characterises a big part of recent academic activity, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide a comprehensive definition of ESK. However, for practical purposes we need in this survey some criteria which help to keep its content under reasonable limits, both in terms of extension and of coherence. So, one prima facie plausible definition of ESK, as including any piece of research having to do with ‘the economic study of the production and diffusion of scientific knowledge’, would force us to include in this paper such an enormous body of literature that at least a full book would be necessary to revise it. 1 On the other hand, the fact that this survey is part of a book on the philosophy of economics, belonging itself into a bigger Handbook of Philosophy of Science , suggests that we may select, from this immense literature, just those works dealing with questions more or less related to the traditional topics in the philosophical study of science, i.e., mainly topics of epistemological or methodological character. Hence, my working definition of ESK will be the application of concepts and methods of economic analysis to the study of the epistemic nature and value of scientific knowledge .

Optimal Judgment Aggregation

The constitution of a collective judgment is analyzed from a contractarian point of view. The optimal collective judgment is defined as the one that maximizes the sum of the utility each member gets from the collective adoption of that judgment. It is argued that judgment aggregation is a different process from the aggregation of information and public deliberation. This entails that the adoption of a collective judgment should not make any rational member of the group change her individual opinion, and so the collective judgment can not have any kind of epistemic superiority over the individual ones.

The nature of co-authorship: a note on recognition sharing and scientific argumentation

Co-authorship of papers is very common in most areas of science, and it has increased as the complexity of research has strengthened the need for scientific collaboration. But the fact that papers have more than an author tends to complicate the attribution of merit to individual scientists. I argue that collaboration does not necessarily entail co-authorship, but that in many cases the latter is an option that individual authors might not choose, at least in principle: each author might publish in a separate way her own contribution to the collaborative project in which she has taken part, or papers could explicitly state what the contribution of each individual author has been. I ask, hence, why it is that scientists prefer to ‘pool’ their contributions instead of keeping them separate, if what they pursue in their professional careers (besides epistemic goals) is individual recognition. My answer is based on the view of the scientific paper as a piece of argumentation, following an inferentialist approach to scientific knowledge. A few empirical predictions from the model presented here are suggested in the conclusions.Co-authorship of papers is very common in most areas of science, and it has increased as the complexity of research has strengthened the need for scientific collaboration. But the fact that papers have more than an author tends to complicate the attribution of merit to individual scientists. I argue that collaboration does not necessarily entail co-authorship, but that in many cases the latter is an option that individual authors might not choose, at least in principle: each author might publish in a separate way her own contribution to the collaborative project in which she has taken part, or papers could explicitly state what the contribution of each individual author has been. I ask, hence, why it is that scientists prefer to ‘pool’ their contributions instead of keeping them separate, if what they pursue in their professional careers (besides epistemic goals) is individual recognition. My answer is based on the view of the scientific paper as a piece of argumentation, following an inferentialist approach to scientific knowledge. A few empirical predictions from the model presented here are suggested in the conclusions.

The surprise exam paradox, rationality, and pragmatics: a simple game‐theoretic analysis

The surprise exam paradox has attracted the attention of prominent logicians, mathematicians and philosophers for decades. Although the paradox itself has been resolved at least since Quine (1953), some aspects of it are still being discussed. In this paper we propose, following Sober (1998), to translate the paradox into the language of game theory to clarify these aspects. Our main conclusions are that a much simpler game‐theoretic analysis of the paradox is possible, which solves most of the puzzles related to it, and that this way of analysing the paradox can also throw light on our comprehension of the pragmatics of linguistic communication.