Jiangnan Zhu

When Grapevine News Meets Mass Media: Different Information Sources and Popular Perceptions of Government Corruption in Mainland China

This article examines factors that shape people’s perceptions of government corruption in mainland China. We are particularly interested in how people acquire information on local corruption, given the general lack of pertinent firsthand experience. We combine data from a national survey in mainland China with a compiled data set on the number of local corruption cases reported in Chinese local newspapers. The results of both probit and Heckman selection models show that indirect formal and indirect informal information sources have diverging effects. Although coverage of corruption by newspapers controlled by the authoritarian regime reduces people’s perceptions of corruption, exposure to grapevine news significantly increases perceived corruption. Moreover, access to government-controlled media can significantly dilute the negative impact of grapevine news on popular perceptions of corruption.

The Shadow of the Skyscrapers: real estate corruption in China

Corruption in the Chinese real estate (RE) industry is a very serious and prevalent issue. This article focuses on variations in Chinese RE corruption. It argues that due to an expansion of the official players at each step in the RE development process, corruption is an unintended consequence of the reform to regulate the industry. Despite the empowerment of local governments and bureaucracies, corruption has emerged in these entities, spreading from local peoples governments to functional units, creating a chain of corrupt practices which includes groups of officials and large sums of money.

Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legislatures

Extant literature on authoritarian legislatures argues that dictators set up quasi-democratic institutions to co-opt opposition and attract investors. This study argues that dictators also nurture clientelistic ties with social groups useful to their rule, a previously overlooked function of authoritarian legislatures. Drawing on the case of Chinese local legislatures — namely, the local People’s Congress and the local People’s Political Consultative Conference — we find that Chinese local governments use these institutions to channel patronage to and gain political support from the private sector. Field Interviews and an analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey show that private firms owned by local legislative members, while obtaining more bank loans, provide more support to the local government in various forms than those owned by nonmembers. This finding suggests that authoritarian legislatures, even those with weak policymaking efficacy, can help authoritarian states build stable alliances with social groups, thereby contributing to regime resilience.

The Evolution of China’s City Size Distribution: Empirical Evidence from 1949 to 2008

This paper studies the evolution of China’s city size distribution, measured by non-agricultural population, from 1949 to 2008. We employ time series Gini coefficients, panel unit root test of Gibrat’s law, and analysis of distribution dynamics, to check the robustness of our findings. We find that although China’s city size distribution presented different patterns of growth in the short run, it has shown an approximately parallel growth model in the long run. This indicates that the parallel growth rule of city size distribution also applies to developing countries, though it might work differently there. In countries with relatively mature and complete urban systems, the parallel growth results from similar growth rates in all the cities. In developing countries experiencing rapid urbanization, the parallel growth mainly results from the emergence and rise of a large number of new cities, which offsets the fast growth rate of large cities. This also demonstrates that government policy aiming at affecting city size may be misleading.

Evolution of China's City-Size Distribution

This article studies the evolution of Chinas city-size distribution, as measured by its nonagricultural population, from 1949 to 2008. The robustness of the findings was checked by means of time-series Gini coefficients, panel unit root tests for Gibrats law, and analysis of distribution dynamics. Although Chinas city-size distribution presented different patterns of growth in the short run, it has shown an approximately parallel-growth model in the long run. This indicates that the parallel growth rule of city-size distribution also applies to developing countries, though it might work differently there. In countries with relatively mature and complete urban systems, parallel growth results from similar growth rates in all the cities. In developing countries experiencing rapid urbanization, parallel growth mainly results from the emergence and rise of a large number of new cities, offseting the fast growth rate of large cities. This demonstrates that government policy intended to affect city size may be misleading.

Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized Anticorruption in China:

What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rivals’ power networks during internal power struggles for consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically accountable institutions, although these drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.

Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism: China’s Antiwaste Campaign Since 2012

Abstract Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general, he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political risk for the party secretary general. Why did Xi choose this politically risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, this article argues that, amongst all possible objectives, an authoritarian leader such as Xi can use this type of policy campaign to demonstrate his power. In particular, the inherent importance of informal politics, the recent developments in Chinese politics, and Xi’s personal background have increased his incentive and capacity to signal power by implementing such a campaign. A comparison with Xi’s two predecessors, interviews, and statistical analyses support this argument. The theoretical framework of this article also sheds light on the literature on the power sharing of authoritarian political elites.

Social Impetus, Economic Roots, and Political Logic: China's Transformation Through the Lens of American History

China is facing a crucial turning point in its sociopolitical development with the recent turnover of the leadership and the potential of further reform carried out by the new administration. To shed light on the future of China, this research compares the United States between 1789 and 1917 with China between 1949 and 2012. We examine the social impetus, economic roots, and political logic of the great transformations of the two countries. Through the lens of American history, we argue, first, that social discontent in the short run may push structural reform forward. Second, to transform the passive, piecemeal, and unpredictable reform into a proactive, systematic, and integral reform, we propose that China must build social consensus and a strong middle class.