Jiehua Chen

A characterization of the single-crossing domain

We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of which contains three voters and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives, and one of which contains four voters and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives. We also provide an efficient way to decide whether a preference profile is single-crossing.

Parameterized Algorithmics for Computational Social Choice: Nine Research Challenges

Computational Social Choice is an interdisciplinary research area involving Economics, Political Science, and Social Science on the one side, and Mathematics and Computer Science (including Artificial Intelligence and Multiagent Systems) on the other side. Typical computational problems studied in this field include the vulnerability of voting procedures against attacks, or preference aggregation in multi-agent systems. Parameterized Algorithmics is a subfield of Theoretical Computer Science seeking to exploit meaningful problem-specific parameters in order to identify tractable special cases of in general computationally hard problems. In this paper, we propose nine of our favorite research challenges concerning the parameterized complexity of problems appearing in this context. This work is dedicated to Jianer Chen, one of the strongest problem solvers in the history of parameterized algorithmics, on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

A multivariate complexity analysis of lobbying in multiple referenda

We extend work by Christian et al. [Review of Economic Design 2007] on lobbying in multiple referenda by first providing a more fine-grained analysis of the computational complexity of the NP-complete LOBBYING problem. Herein, given a binary matrix, the columns represent issues to vote on and the rows correspond to voters making a binary vote on each issue. An issue is approved if a majority of votes has a 1 in the corresponding column. The goal is to get all issues approved by modifying a minimum number of rows to all-1-rows. In our multivariate complexity analysis, we present a more holistic view on the nature of the computational complexity of LOBBYING, providing both (parameterized) tractability and intractability results, depending on various problem parameterizations to be adopted. Moreover, we show non-existence results concerning efficient and effective preprocessing for LOBBYING and introduce natural variants such as RESTRICTED LOBBYING and PARTIAL LOBBYING.

Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle κ(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.

Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting

We review NP-hard voting problems together with their status in terms of parameterized complexity results. In addition, we survey standard techniques for achieving fixed-parameter (in)tractability results in voting.

The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: finitely many obstructions are not enough

We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles, for which such finite characterizations have been derived in the literature.

Star Partitions of Perfect Graphs

The partition of graphs into nice subgraphs is a central algorithmic problem with strong ties to matching theory. We study the partitioning of undirected graphs into stars, a problem known to be NP-complete even for the case of stars on three vertices. We perform a thorough computational complexity study of the problem on subclasses of perfect graphs and identify several polynomial-time solvable cases, for example, on interval graphs and bipartite permutation graphs, and also NP-hard cases, for example, on grid graphs and chordal graphs.

Partitioning Perfect Graphs into Stars

The partition of graphs into “nice” subgraphs is a central algorithmic problem with strong ties to matching theory. We study the partitioning of undirected graphs into same-size stars, a problem known to be NP-complete even for the case of stars on three vertices. We perform a thorough computational complexity study of the problem on subclasses of perfect graphs and identify several polynomial-time solvable cases, for example, on interval graphs and bipartite permutation graphs, and also NP-complete cases, for example, on grid graphs and chordal graphs.

Network-based vertex dissolution

We introduce a graph-theoretic vertex dissolution model that applies to a number of redistribution scenarios, such as gerrymandering in political districting or work balancing in an online situation. The central aspect of our model is the deletion of certain vertices and the redistribution of their load to neighboring vertices in a completely balanced way. We investigate how the underlying graph structure, the knowledge of which vertices should be deleted, and the relation between old and new vertex loads influence the computational complexity of the underlying graph problems. Our results establish a clear borderline between tractable and intractable cases.

How to Put Through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions

We consider the following decision-making scenario: a society of voters has to find an agreement on a set of proposals, and every single proposal is to be accepted or rejected. Each voter supports a certain subset of the proposals—the favorite ballot of this voter—and opposes the remaining ones. He accepts a ballot if he supports more than half of the proposals in this ballot. The task is to decide whether there exists a ballot approving a specified number of selected proposals (agenda) such that all voters (or a strict majority of them) accept this ballot. We show that, on the negative side, both problems are NP-complete, and on the positive side, they are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the total number of proposals or with respect to the total number of voters. We look into further natural parameters and study their influence on the computational complexity of both problems, thereby providing both tractability and intractability results. Furthermore, we provide tight combinatorial bounds on the worst-case size of an accepted ballot in terms of the number of voters.