Jinlan Ni

China's energy inefficiency: A cross-country comparison

Abstract This paper constructs a total-factor energy technical efficiency index using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method following the total factor productivity framework. We then compare energy technical efficiency across 156 countries from 1980 to 2007. The results show that Chinas energy efficiency considerably trails other countries’ although it has made significant gains within the last 28 years. Further analysis indicates that scale inefficiency rather than pure technical efficiency contributes to Chinas energy inefficiency.

SELECTIVE ASYMMETRIC CAPITAL FINANCING BEHAVIOR: PREFERENCE TOWARDS EQUITY FINANCING

Using data from 1,217 publicly traded Chinese companies from 1994–2006, we show that the capital financing behavior of Chinese firms deviates substantially from the pecking order theory in that equity issues are always the preferred financing source for funding requirements. We further document the existence of a stylized asymmetric financing pattern — equity issues are used much more heavily over debt issues under the condition of a fund flow surplus versus a fund flow deficit, which is the result of Chinese firms selecting the degree of inherent equity-issue preference feasible to pursue given their fund flow condition.

Compensation negotiation and corporate governance: the evidence from China

Abstract This paper examines CEO pay dispersion for the listed companies in China. We apply a two-tier stochastic frontier model to the CEO compensation framework where asymmetric information generates a surplus between the minimum wage that CEOs accept and the maximum payment that firms offer. This surplus leads to CEO pay dispersion coming from the negotiation power between the CEO and the firm. We generate the surplus extracted by each CEO-firm pair and analyze how corporate governance affects them. An empirical analysis finds that: (1) On average, CEOs are paid 23.26% more than the benchmark; (2) additionally, we examine the bargaining power in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that CEOs in SOEs have less bargaining power due to compensation regulations. We then examine compensation for new CEOs hired externally and find that CEOs hired externally have less bargaining power on average; and (3) corporate governance has a significant effect on the salary bargaining power of each agent. More specifically, the CEO-Chairman dummy has a significant positive effect on the bargaining power of firms and CEOs, but the latter is larger. Board size has a negative effect on both. Independent directors help improve the bargaining power of the firms and board meeting times help enhance the bargaining power of the CEOs. Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on both sides.

Land Acquisition, Labor Allocation, and Income Growth of Farm Households

ABSTRACT This article investigates how land acquisition during urbanization affects labor allocation decisions of farm households in China. We develop an agricultural household model by including land acquisition to examine its impacts on nonfarm labor participation and income. Two data sets (self-designed household surveys at Xingwen County in 2012 and the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data covering 29 provinces in 2013) are adopted for empirical analysis. The results find that land reduction has significantly positive effects on the probability and the share of family nonfarm labor allocation from both data sets. We also find that land acquisition increases the household income of the land acquisition group in CHFS data.