Joachim Israel

Experimental Change of Attitudes Using the Asch-effect:

The objective of this experiment is twofold: 1) to find out if the Asch-effect (1952) of inducing perceptual and judgmental changes by means of group pressures could also be applied to attitude change, and 2) to measure public compliance as well as private acceptance after having experimentally manipulated them. With regard to the first objective, Crutchfield (1955) already used a variety of stimuli in addition to perceptual judgments. He tried to reinforce group pressure by telling the subjects after each trial the &dquo;correct&dquo; answer, which in fact was the

The Principle of Methodological Individualism and Marxian Epistemology

In the following article I am going to defend the thesis, which at first may appear to be strange, that, in order to base sociology (and knowledge) on Marxian epistemology one has to accept on an ontological level the position of methodological individualism, and on a metatheoretical level a position of non-reductionism 1. In order to support my thesis I have to explicate briefly: 1) Marxs basic epistomological position. 2) the principle of methodological individualism, where I try to differentiate between a reified and a nonreified version2, and 3) the position of non-reductionism.

Measurement of Cross-Pressures in Groups by the Unfolding Technique1)

In a previous article (3) we proposed that crosspressures existing in groups could be measured by Coomb’s unfolding technique (1,2). Our reasoning can be SU1nmarized m the following way: Let us assume that we have items a, b, .. n, which can be arranged in a scale according to their importance to a person. Let us further assume that social pressures are induced on a group to establish a group standards concerning the relative importance of the items. If the group member’s preferences are measured by paired comparisons, their individual preference scales (1-scales) can then be used to produce a Thurstone scale according to the law of comparative judgment (7). Such a scale would be a pheuotypic .rcale. By means of the unfolding technique we obtain a genotypic scale. We assume that the genotypic scale values are fixed over time as a consequence of the internalization of a group standard. The actual distribution of the members of the group on the genotypic scale reflects the degree to which they have accepted and internalized the stp.ddard at a given time. Under conditions of cross-pressures, the orginal standards may be dissolved and

Remarks Concerning Some Problem of Marxist Class Theory

As an introduction the scientific status of Marxism is discussed and the Marxian thesis concerning the discrepancy between productive forces and relations of production is interpreted as a cultural lag hypothesis. The discussion of class- theory is based upon a contextual analysis of the way Marx and Mao-Tse-Tung used the class-concept. It is shown that Marx uses several concepts. Finally a two-dimensional class-model is developed, where power and class-consciousness are used as classificatory variables yielding six different classes. Some theoretical problems connected with this model are discussed.

Remarks on the Sociology of Social Scientists

These words were written by Robert S. Lynd (1946) in the late thirties in an attempt to direct social science towards goals which he considered to be of great importance. These goals may today be summarized in a threefold way. Initially, social science ought to engage in the critical analysis of society, which implies that social scientists should engage in discussing unsolved social problems, in analyzing them, and in taking a position on controversial subjects. Secondly, social science ought to be used as a tool for social planning which means that social science ought to put its knowledge at the disposal of politicians and those responsible for planning. Such knowledge may, in turn, facilitate systematic and controlled social change. Thirdly, social science ought to be used in social engineering, which means that social scientists should actively participate in solving social problems. By pursuing these goals social scientists can explore prejudice and counteract sterotyped thinking. This can be accomplished by analyzing concepts, by dissecting argumentation, and by collecting relevant empirical data which can be presented in a way that will facilitate more rational decisions. In addition, as Myrdal ( 1954) pointed out, causal or functional relations between means and goals can be clarified, i.e. it can be shown, given certain goals or values, which alternatives are

Remarks Concerning Generalization in Group-Experimental Research

The central question of this article can be formulated in the following: How general are the results obtained in group-experimental laboratory research? To delimit this question and to make it more precise we can rephrase it: Has the representativeness of the sample of subjects used in a certain experiment to be taken into account when interpreting the results? And furthermore: Are these problems common to other laboratory experimental research e. g. in general psychology or nongroup-experimental research in social psychology? Are these problems common to or different from those encountered in research in social psychology and sociology which is not experimental in a strict sense, e. g. research using sample surveys? In the next section we will try to give a systematic account of different types of propositions from which predictions are made in social psychology and in sociology. We want to show that a distinction can be made between generalizations referring to a &dquo;universe of situations&dquo; and generalizations referring to a &dquo;universe of subjects&dquo;. In section III we will compare experimentation in general psychology and that part of social psychology which uses the individual as unit with groupexperimental research. Then a brief comparison between group-experiments and sample surveys is made. In section IV we will discuss the thesis that the results of group-experiments can be used for generalizations referring to a &dquo;universe of

Comments on Dahiström's Article

In his article Dahlstrom examines some methodological theories as to what is meant by &dquo;causal explanation&dquo; in sociology and social psychology. He discusses some theories concerning the implication of causal explanation as propounded by sociologists, and examines some of the methods used in sociological research in performing causal analyses. What demands can reasonably be made on analyses of causal problems in the methodological debate within sociology? Such a discussion ought to lead up to some sort of a definition or delimitation of the relations or classes of relations which we are prepared to term causal. What type of definition do we want?