Joan T. Schmit
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by Joan T. Schmit.
Risk management and insurance review | 2007
Martin Eling; Hato Schmeiser; Joan T. Schmit
As early as the 1970s, European Union (EU) member countries implemented rules to coordinate insurance markets and regulation. However, with the more recent movement toward a general single EU market, financial services regulation has taken on new meaning and priority. Solvency I regulations went into effect for member nations by January 2004. The creation of risk-based capital standards, the main focus of Solvency II, now appears likely sometime after 2007. The purpose of the discussion presented here is to outline the specifics of Solvency II as they currently stand and provide input to evaluation process that, ultimately, will determine the exact form of capital regulation. Our analysis leads us to conclude that caution is warranted.
Journal of Risk and Insurance | 1990
Joan T. Schmit; Kendall Roth
Despite the increasing importance of risk management in a successful business organization, virtually no research has been undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of various risk management practices. Through analysis of data obtained from a survey of risk management professionals, such an evaluation has been made and is reported here. Results include the expected effects of lower costs associated with higher levels of retention, increased size, and less risky industries. The relationship of higher costs with the use of a captive, and the ineffectiveness of centralization or use of analytical tools were unexpected.
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-issues and Practice | 2014
Martin Eling; Shailee Pradhan; Joan T. Schmit
The purpose of this article is to structure the extant knowledge on the determinants of microinsurance demand and to discuss unresolved questions that deserve future research. To achieve this outcome, we review the academic literature on microinsurance demand published between 2000 and early 2013. The review identifies 12 key factors affecting microinsurance demand: price, wealth, risk aversion, non-performance risk, trust and peer effects, religion, financial literacy, informal risk sharing, quality of service, risk exposure, age, and gender. We discuss the evidence of how each of these 12 factors influences demand, both within the microinsurance and the traditional insurance markets. A comparison with traditional markets shows an unexpected (negative) effect of risk aversion on microinsurance demand, with trust perhaps being the intervening factor. Other relevant results include the importance of liquidity (and/or access to credit), informal risk sharing, and peer effects on the decision to buy microinsurance. The influence of trust on insurance take-up and the unanticipated results for risk aversion are fertile areas for future research.
Journal of Risk and Insurance | 2000
Yu-Luen Ma; Joan T. Schmit
Estimates of uninsured drivers in the United States hover around 15 percent (NAII, 1998). With extensive concern about insurance affordability and its effect on economic advancement (Joint Economic Committee, 1998) and with expansion of U.S. compensation systems to other nations, consideration of factors that affect the extent to which drivers choose to insure or not is valuable. This article addresses the effect of enforcement mechanisms for purchase of required insurance on the degree to which drivers choose not to insure. Results indicate that higher levels of enforcement stringency relate to lower levels of uninsured drivers. Lower levels of poverty and populations living in metropolitan areas are also related to lower levels of uninsured drivers, while no-fault states are associated with higher levels of uninsured motorists.
Journal of Risk and Insurance | 2003
Helen I. Doerpinghaus; Joan T. Schmit; Jason Yeh
Despite the importance of claims handling practices to consumers and insurers, relatively little research has been done in this area. Our purpose here is to consider one aspect of automobile bodily injury liability claims management: the assignment of fault across parties as judged by the insured defendants claims adjuster. Because legal fault assessment directly affects whether a defendant is held liable, and if so, for how much, this aspect of claims management is significant. We use accident data from the 1997 Insurance Research Council Closed Claim Survey to test for relationships between fault assessment and gender, age, and state comparative negligence rules. Controlling for actual fault, we find a greater assessment of fault against female, young, and elderly drivers. The results of the study are of interest to insurers seeking to provide better customer service, to consumer advocacy groups interested in claims settlement practices, and to insurance regulators.
The Journal of Risk Finance | 2016
Nadine Gatzert; Joan T. Schmit
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a coherent and effective enterprise risk management (ERM) framework that includes necessary steps and processes for integrating reputation risk management into an organization’s overall ERM approach which is intended to support corporate strategic success. In particular, reputation creation, enhancement, and protection are critical to an organization’s success, yet highly challenging given the wide ranging and somewhat opaque nature of the concept. These qualities call for a strong ERM approach to reputation that is holistic and integrative, yet existing knowledge of how to do so is limited. Design/methodology/approach – The paper evaluates and synthesizes existing reputation literature in developing an enterprise-wide reputation risk management framework incorporating necessary steps, processes, and considerations. We address risk strategy, risk assessment, risk governance, and risk culture as key elements of ERM and conclude with suggestions for future r...
World Development | 2014
Christian Biener; Martin Eling; Joan T. Schmit
Regulation of any market can either promote or impede its development, thus affecting social welfare. In this paper, we are concerned with the impact of regulation in microinsurance markets. We evaluate existing and potential regulatory mechanisms with regard to its underlying economic rationale, and offer recommendations intended to enhance support and minimize barriers for microinsurance market development. Specifically, we recommend avoiding incentives for regulatory arbitrage; responding to the characteristics of the microinsurance market, including licensing, capital, reinsurance, and distribution systems; enhancing the market through financial literacy initiatives; and providing support in the form of data collection and management training.
Archive | 2012
Shinichi Kamiya; Joan T. Schmit; Marjorie A. Rosenberg
Reputational risk has become a critical concern for most organizations. Insurers, who rely on trust to generate business, are particularly vulnerable. Maintaining a positive reputation, however, is costly, leading to the potential for moral hazard in the form of choosing a lowercost strategy that ultimately will underperform relative to consumer expectations. The insurer’s optimal strategy depends on factors affecting the relative costs and benefits of fulfilling consumer expectations, which we test using a rich data set on operational loss risk events. Results indicate that passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act had a significant effect on firm behavior. We also observe that leverage, firm age, and executive shareholdings are significantly related to reputational risk. In some samples, Tobin’s Q, the level of competition, and the discount rate also were related to instances of reputational loss.
Journal of Risk and Insurance | 2009
Dana A. Kerr; Yu-Luen Ma; Joan T. Schmit
Litigation rates in the United States have long been considered out of proportion with the remainder of the world, leading to a good deal of economic research trying to understand the causes. Much of that literature has focused on lawyer compensation rules and availability of general damage awards. Another possible reason for differences in national litigation rates is the relative generosity of government social programs. Using a sample of 24 countries over a 12-year period, we test the relationship between the size of government social program payments and liability costs as measured by liability insurance premiums, and find a strong negative relationship, controlling for income, accident rates, and a variety of other factors.
Archive | 2016
Yu Huang; Shinichi Kamiya; Joan T. Schmit
In this article, we establish a model of competitive insurance markets based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) where insurers can perform risk classification tests either before insurance contracts are issued (underwriting) or when coverage claims are filed (post-loss test). However, insurers cannot pre-commit to performing either test in the insurance application period since the tests are costly type-verifications. We derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of four cases: no test is used; only one kind of the two types of test is performed; and both tests are performed. The space of parameters where the equilibrium exists in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Picard (2009) models is extended in our model. The key tradeoff determining which test is utilized lies in the relative magnitude of testing costs. Furthermore, we characterize the contracts provided in the market. Different from the overinsurance counterpart in Picard (2009), the contract for low-risk type with only underwriting test may be either overinsurance, full insurance, or underinsurance in our model.