Joanna Depledge

Health and climate change: policy responses to protect public health

The 2015 Lancet Commission on Health and Climate Change has been formed to map out the impacts of climate change, and the necessary policy responses, in order to ensure the highest attainable stand ...

The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures

A solar energy concentrator comprises an array of cylindrical Fresnel lenses, all of which are fixedly aligned in the East-West direction. Each lens concentrates the sun rays and forms a line image which extends in the East-West direction. Located below the lenses are individual fluid channels which extend in the East-West direction and are spaced apart in the South-North direction. Each line image focuses onto preferably not more than two of the channels which absorb heat of the concentrated sun rays. Each channel has a thermostatically controlled valve which controls fluid flow through the channel to take place only when the channels temperature and/or the fluid therein exceed a threshold temperature level.

The Opposite of Learning: Ossification in the Climate Change Regime

Promoting learning among participants is a key function commonly attributed to international regimes. Such learning, however, cannot always be guaranteed, and regimes may sometimes descend into ossification. In contrast to a learning regime, an ossifying regime is one that is unable to process new information, facilitate the free-flow of new ideas, or foster understanding and trust among negotiators. Evidence from the recent history of the climate change regime suggests it is suffering from ossification. Dragging forces contributing to this include the institutionalization of the north/south divide, complexity of the process, fragile conditions for effective communication, onerous decisionmaking rules, activities of obstructionists, absence of the US, and weak implementation. Pockets of learning on climate change are, however, still active, especially outside the regime itself. To reinvigorate the negotiations, meaningful progress is needed on domestic and regional implementation, including ensuring the success of the Protocols market mechanisms.

The organization of global negotiations : constructing the climate change regime

Introduction * The Organization of Global Negotiations * The Challenges of the Climate Change Negotiations * The Presiding Officers, Bureau and Secretariat * Rules for Business and Decision-Making * Negotiating Arenas and Complementary Forums * Texts and Timing * Ministers and NGOS * Twelve Key Insights * Bibliography

Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change Regime

The international relations literature often assumes that negotiators in global regimes are actively seeking a collective agreement to the problem on the table. There are cases, however, where a delegation may instead be striving for no, that is, participating with the aim of obstructing a deal. This article explores the challenges surrounding such cases of obstructionism, using the example of Saudi Arabia in the climate change regime. It examines the evidence for diagnosing Saudi Arabia as an obstructionist in that regime, the delegations negotiating tactics, strategies for addressing obstructionism, and finally the repercussions for both the climate change regime, and Saudi Arabia itself. In conclusion, the article considers whether Saudi Arabia may be moving beyond obstruction.

Against the grain: the United States and the global climate change regime

The uncompromising stance currently taken by the US in the international climate change regime is well known. While remaining a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and still taking the issue of climate change ‘very seriously’, the administration of George W. Bush has decided not to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Since announcing its repudiation of the Protocol in March 2001, the US has repeatedly reconfirmed and reinforced this position through policy actions on the international stage. In doing so, the US has isolated itself from almost all of the rest of the world; 129 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and, with the recent ratification by the Russian Federation, the treaty will enter into force on 16 February 2005. The stance of the Bush administration goes against the grain of most of its allies in the international community in two important ways: first, in denying that climate change is sufficiently serious to warrant meaningful action beyond longterm research and development; and, second, in challenging the view that multilateralism is the tool of choice for managing cross-border problems, a challenge also raised on many other issues. Although much more pronounced in the Bush administration than under previous presidents, going against the grain in this way on international climate change cooperation also reflects broader structural themes in US politics, associated both with deep-seated political, economic and cultural traits and with the hegemonic position of the US in the international arena. Such structural features, which predispose the US to adopt a rather recalcitrant position, help explain why, even under the much more engaged Clinton administration (1993– 2000), the US was unable either to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or to take meaningful domestic action to address the problem. The aim of this paper is to critically describe and analyse US participation in the global climate change regime. It begins with a reminder of the national circumstances of the US with respect to the climate change issue, including structural features of US political culture that help explain the country’s underlying reluctance to take strong mitigation action and engage in multilateral efforts to address the problem. It then explores US (dis)engagement with the global climate change regime, and how this has changed overThe uncompromising stance currently taken by the US in the international climate change regime is well known. While remaining a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and still taking the issue of climate change ‘very seriously’, the administration of George W. Bush has decided not to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Since announcing its repudiation of the Protocol in March 2001, the US has repeatedly reconfirmed and reinforced this position through policy actions on the international stage. In doing so, the US has isolated itself from almost all of the rest of the world; 129 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and, with the recent ratification by the Russian Federation, the treaty will enter into force on 16 February 2005. The stance of the Bush administration goes against the grain of most of its allies in the international community in two important ways: first, in denying that climate change is sufficiently serious to warrant meaningful action beyond longterm research and development; and, second, in challenging the view that multilateralism is the tool of choice for managing cross-border problems, a challenge also raised on many other issues. Although much more pronounced in the Bush administration than under previous presidents, going against the grain in this way on international climate change cooperation also reflects broader structural themes in US politics, associated both with deep-seated political, economic and cultural traits and with the hegemonic position of the US in the international arena. Such structural features, which predispose the US to adopt a rather recalcitrant position, help explain why, even under the much more engaged Clinton administration (1993– 2000), the US was unable either to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or to take meaningful domestic action to address the problem. The aim of this paper is to critically describe and analyse US participation in the global climate change regime. It begins with a reminder of the national circumstances of the US with respect to the climate change issue, including structural features of US political culture that help explain the country’s underlying reluctance to take strong mitigation action and engage in multilateral efforts to address the problem. It then explores US (dis)engagement with the global climate change regime, and how this has changed over

Great-power politics, order transition, and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion. Policy relevance Despite the achievements of the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference, the climate negotiations are not on course to limit warming to 2 °C, and thereby avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Several factors have been invoked to account for such slow progress: notably, the nature of the climate change problem itself, the institutional structure of the climate regime, and lack of political will among key players. An alternative explanation is proposed such that the failure to seriously address climate change – as well as other global problems – reflects a resurgent meta-struggle between the ‘great powers’ of China and the US over the nature of the global order. Without such a broader understanding of the deeper dynamics underlying the stalemates of the climate change negotiations, there is little chance of turning those negotiations around.

A Special Relationship: Chairpersons and the Secretariat in the Climate Change Negotiations

There is growing recognition in the literature of the important roles played by Chairpersons and secretariats in global environmental negotiations. Less frequently recognized, however, is the interdependence of those roles. Using the example of the climate change negotiations, this paper argues that Chairpersons and the secretariat are locked into a mutually-dependent relationship. Whereas the Chairperson has the political authority needed to exert leadership in the negotiations, the secretariat possesses intellectual resources that can maximize the effectiveness of that leadership. The secretariats input to the negotiations, however, must be shielded by a veil of legitimacy, whereby the Chairperson takes responsibility for that input. The paper explores how Chairpersons and the secretariat work together, along with the dysfunctionalities that can emerge in this very personal relationship. In doing so, the paper expands our understanding of exactly how these two actors exert influence in global environmental negotiations.

The road less travelled: difficulties in moving between annexes in the climate change regime.

The categorization of parties as either Annex I (including a subset of Annex II parties) or non-Annex I constitutes the political and procedural cornerstone of the climate change regime. Annex I parties have quantitative commitments, notably emissions targets inscribed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. Non-Annex I parties, for now, have only qualitative obligations. In principle, the regime allows parties to move voluntarily to a different annex. In practice, however, the experience of doing so has been mixed, due to a combination of onerous procedures, contentious politics, and concerns over environmental integrity. This article examines the categorization of parties in the climate change regime, and the procedures in place for moving between the annexes. It details the experience of those parties that have attempted to move to a different annex, focusing on the experiences of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkey. The article explores the lessons to be learnt from these pioneers, and considers how procedures for moving between the annexes might be improved. The article argues that, notwithstanding environmental concerns, the procedures for amending Annex B should be relaxed, in order to embrace new participants and help bridge the existing political and ideological gulf between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.

Special Supplement on Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Sustainable development has emerged as the key challenge for the 21 st Century. The Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 highlighted both the opportunities and the lack of progress since the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, a decade previously. Decision-makers are looking to sustainable development to provide practical approaches that could address traditional issues (such as poverty, economic stagnation, hunger and illness), as well as the newer challenges (like environmental degradation and globalisation). Although no universally accepted practical definition of sustainable development exists as yet, the concept has evolved to integrate economic, social and environmental aims. Meanwhile, global climate change poses an unprecedented threat to all human beings. While this problem is important in the long-run, most decision-makers recognise (especially in the developing countries), that there are many other critical sustainable development issues that affect human welfare more immediately. However, even in the short term, climate is an essential resource for development. For example, in many countries (especially the poorest ones), existing levels of climatic variability and extreme events pose significant risks for agriculture, economic infrastructure, and vulnerable households. Climatic hazards continue to take their human and economic toll even in wealthy countries. Such climate threats, which undermine development prospects today, need to be better addressed in the context of the long-run evolution of local and regional climates. More generally, climate change and sustainable development interact in a circular fashion. Climate change vulnerability, impacts and adaptation will influence prospects for sustainable development, and in turn, alternative development paths will not only determine greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels that affect future climate change, but also influence future capacity to adapt to and mitigate climate change. Impacts of climate change are exacerbated by development status, adversely affecting especially the poor and vulnerable socio-economic groups. The capacity to adapt to climate change goes beyond wealth, to other key pre-requisites of good development planning, including institutions, governance, economic management and technology. The key to an effective climate change response strategy is a better understanding of relevant policy linkages. Development planners, naturally, place development first, and therefore, climate policies need to be integrated within national sustainable development strategies. In particular, they would like to know whether specific climate change impacts and response measures will make existing development efforts