Joanna Shepherd

Economics of Crime

This paper starts with a review the economics of criminal behavior. Then, the authors discuss the theory of public enforcement. The economic analysis of criminal behavior and criminal law has been a hugely successful enterprise. As an academic enterprise, it has achieved the goal of research—it has generated a large and growing literature. More important than academic success, however, has been the influence of this branch of learning on actual practice. The understanding of deterrence effects and rational responses by criminals has substantially changed the purpose and functioning of the criminal justice system.

Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital Punishment

I examine two important questions in the capital punishment literature: what kinds of murders are deterred and what effect does the length of the death row wait have on deterrence? I use monthly murder and execution data that measure deterrence more precisely than the annual data of most capital punishment studies. Results from least squares and negative binomial estimations indicate that capital punishment does deter: each execution results in, on average, three fewer murders. In addition, capital punishment deters murders previously believed to be undeterrable: crimes of passion and murders by intimates. Moreover, murders of both African‐American and white victims decrease after executions, which suggests that capital punishment benefits people of all races. However, longer waits on death row before execution lessen the deterrence. Specifically, one less murder is committed for every 2.75‐year reduction in death row waits. Thus, recent legislation to shorten the wait should strengthen capital punishments deterrent effect.

Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two‐ and Three‐Strikes Legislation

Many states have recently enacted three‐strikes laws to increase punishment for frequent offenders. However, only California actively enforces its three‐strikes legislation. Existing studies of the impact on crime in California consider only partial deterrence: the deterrence of offenders committing their last strike. The only study addressing full deterrence, the deterrence of all potential offenders, examines the impact across all states in a model that does not consider the simultaneity of crime and the passage of three‐strikes laws. I offer a theoretical model that shows that strike laws should deter all offenders and that partial deterrence measurements underestimate the laws’ benefits. Theory‐based empirical results indicate that strike sentences generally deter the crimes covered by the laws. During the first 2 years of the legislation, approximately eight murders, 3,952 aggravated assaults, 10,672 robberies, and 384,488 burglaries were deterred in California; however, larcenies increased by 17,700 during this period.

Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths

Theory suggests that tort reform could have two possible impacts on accidents. Reforms could increase accidents as tortfeasors internalize less of the cost of externalities and have less incentive to reduce the risk of accidents. Alternatively, tort reforms could decrease accidents as lower expected liability costs result in lower prices, enabling consumers to buy more risk‐reducing products such as medicines, safety equipment, and medical services, and could result in consumers increasing precautions to avoid accidents. We test these effects by examining the relationship between tort reform and non‐motor‐vehicle accidental death rates using panel data techniques. We find that noneconomic damage caps, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform are associated with fewer accidental deaths, while reforms to the collateral source rule are associated with increased deaths. Overall, the tort reforms in the states between 1981 and 2000 are associated with an estimated 24,000 fewer accidental deaths.

The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting

This study shows that the political preferences of those responsible for retaining judges are strongly associated with judicial voting. The evidence supports the widespread belief that judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected or reappointed. Using a data set of decisions in state supreme courts from 1995–98, I find that state supreme court judges who face retention decisions by Republicans tend to decide cases in accord with standard Republican policy. Judicial behavior is correspondingly liberal for judges facing retention decisions by Democrats. The results are strongest for judges facing partisan reelections. Among judges with conservative fundamental ideologies, those facing Democratic retention agents vote more liberally than those facing Republican retention agents. Similarly, judges’ voting changes when the political preferences of the retention agents change. Judges with permanent tenure and judges in their last term do not respond to the same forms of political pressure.

POLICE, PROSECUTORS, CRIMINALS, AND DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING LAWS

This study explores the impact of truth‐in‐sentencing (TIS) legislation on police, prosecutors, and criminals. Truth‐in‐sentencing laws are determinate‐sentencing laws that require violent offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their prison sentences. The standard economic model of crime suggests that TIS laws will deter violent offenders but also reduce probabilities of arrest and conviction. However, I explain that if states share the goals of TIS legislation, police and prosecutors may increase these probabilities. My theoretical model also predicts that the legislation will cause more trials and impose higher maximum prison sentences. Using a county‐level data set, empirical results confirm that TIS laws deter violent offenders, increase the probability of arrest, and increase maximum imposed prison sentences. Truth‐in‐sentencing laws decrease murders by 16 percent, aggravated assaults by 12 percent, robberies by 24 percent, rapes by 12 percent, and larcenies by 3 percent. However, offenders substitute into property crimes: burglaries increase by 20 percent and auto thefts by 15 percent.

Combating the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescription Drug Reporting Program:

Prescription painkiller abuse is the fastest growing drug problem in the United States. Approximately, 1 out of every 20 twenty Americans reported misuse or abuse of prescription painkillers in the past year. Several factors contribute to the prescription painkiller epidemic. Drug abusers use various methods — such as doctor shopping, paying with cash, and filling prescriptions in different states — to avoid detection and obtain prescription painkillers for illegitimate uses. A few rogue physicians and pharmacists, lured by substantial profits, enable drug abusers by illegally prescribing or supplying controlled substances. Even ethical physicians rarely have adequate training to recognize and address prescription drug abuse, and as a result, prescribe painkillers to patients that are not using them for legitimate medical purposes. Similarly, although the majority of pharmacies have taken steps to combat drug abuse and reduce prescription painkiller dispensing, under current reporting systems, pharmacists lack visibility into several important indicators of drug abuse. As a result, vigilant pharmacists find it extremely difficult to identify and detect drug abuse with certainty. While state governments have established prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) to crack down on prescription drug abuse, these programs have proven to be inadequate. The programs currently suffer from inadequate data collection, ineffective utilization of data, insufficient inter-state data sharing, and constraints on sharing data with law enforcement and state agencies. By contrast, third-party prescription payment systems run by pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) or health insurers have been effective in detecting prescription drug abuse. This paper suggests that a national prescription drug reporting program building on existing PBM networks could be significantly more effective than existing state PDMPs in detecting prescription drug abuse.

Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System

An often overlooked problem with the current medical liability system is the vast number of medical errors that go uncompensated. Although studies indicate that one percent of hospital patients are victims of medical negligence, fewer than two percent of these injured patients file claims. In this Article, I explain that many victims of medical malpractice do not file claims because they are unable to find attorneys willing to take their cases. I conduct the first national survey of attorneys that explores medical malpractice victims’ access to the civil justice system. The results from the survey indicate that the economic reality of litigation forces many contingency fee attorneys to reject legitimate cases. In fact, over 75 percent of the attorneys in my survey indicate that they reject more than 90 percent of the cases that they screen. The attorneys explain that insufficient damages and high litigation expenses are their primary reasons for rejecting cases and that several tort reforms have reduced their willingness to accept cases. Moreover, the majority of the attorneys respond that they have threshold damage values, below which they will not even consider accepting a case. In fact, over half of the attorneys responded that, even for a case they are almost certain to win on the merits, they will not accept the case unless expected damages are at least

Sentencing Guidelines, TIS Legislation, and Bargaining Power

250,000. For a case in which winning is less certain, most attorneys require minimum expected damages of

Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: The Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making

500,000 to accept the case. Because of the high cost of medical malpractice litigation, contingency fee attorneys simply cannot economically justify taking cases with damages below these thresholds. To understand the extent of the access to justice problem I use private industry claims data to show that 95 percent of medical malpractice victims will find it extremely difficult to find legal representation unless their damages are significantly larger than the typical damages for their types of injuries. Thus, the medical liability system silences many legitimate victims of medical malpractice.