Jochen R. Andritzky

Macroeconomic fundamentals, price discovery, and volatility dynamics in emerging bond markets.

This study characterizes volatility dynamics in external emerging bond markets and examines how prices and volatility respond to news about macroeconomic fundamentals. As in mature bond markets, macroeconomic surprises in external emerging bond markets are found to a¤ect both conditional returns and volatility, with the effects on volatility being more pronounced and longer lasting than those on prices. Yet the process of information absorption tends to be more drawn out than in mature bond markets. International and regional macroeconomic news is at least as important as local news for both asset valuations and volatility dynamics in external emerging bond markets.

The impact of macroeconomic announcements on emerging market bonds

Abstract This paper examines how emerging market bonds react to macroeconomic announcements. Global bond spreads respond to rating actions and changes in U.S. interest rates rather than domestic data and policy announcements. All announcements affect market volatility. Macroeconomic data and policy announcements reduce uncertainty and stabilize spreads, while rating actions cause greater volatility. Results are robust to country-specific and panel analyses, assuming conditional variance and controlling for the surprise content of news. In subsamples, announcements matter less for countries with more transparent policies and higher credit ratings. In a crisis, rating actions become less important, and investors focus on simple and timely indicators.

The Impact of Macroeconomic Announcementson Emerging Market Bonds

This paper examines how emerging bond markets react to macroeconomic announcements. Global bond spreads respond to rating actions and changes in global interest rates rather than domestic data and policy announcements. All announcements affect market volatility. Data and policy announcements reduce uncertainty and stabilize the trading environment, while rating actions cause greater volatility. Results are broadly robust to country-specific and panel analyses, assuming conditional variance and controlling for the surprise content of news. In subsamples, announcements are found to matter less for countries with more transparent policies and higher credit ratings. In a crisis, rating actions become less important, and investors focus more on simple and timely indicators, like CPI.

A Mechanism to Regulate Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the EURO Area

To make the no-bailout clause credible and enhance the effectiveness of crisis assistance, a consistent institutional and legal framework is needed to ensure that private creditors contribute to crisis resolution. Getting activated as part of ESM crisis assistance, we propose a two-stage mechanism that allows to postpone the fateful distinction between liquidity and solvency crises: At the onset of a ESM programme, the framework demands an immediate maturity extension if the debt burden is high, followed by deeper debt restructuring if post-crises debt proves unsustainable. The mechanism is easily implemented by amending ESM guidelines and compelling countries to issue debt with Creditor Participation Clauses (CPCs). As debt is rolled over, the mechanism gradually phases in, leaving countries time to reduce debt. Given that private sector involvement reduces financing needs, the ESM could provide longer programmes and more time for reforms.