Jochen Tholen

Young people's education to work transitions and inter-generational social mobility in post-soviet central Asia

This paper is based on evidence gathered in 20 firms, matched by size and business sector, in each of three Central Asia cities — Almaty in Kazakhstan, Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, and Samarkand in Uzbekistan. In each firm the owner(s) and/or senior managers supplied information about the business, focusing on methods of recruitment, training, and employee career development. Parallel questionnaire surveys gathered information about the family and educational backgrounds, and labour market and employment biographies, of all the young (up to age 30) employees in each of the 20 companies. A total of 1,402 young employees completed questionnaires, and from these, eight per city, with equal numbers of males and females, with and without higher education, were subsequently interviewed in depth. The evidence is used to identify how families that were advantaged under the old (communist) system were continuing to reproduce their advantages inter-generationally. It is shown that this was mainly, though not entirely, via their childrens superior chances of progressing through higher education. The evidence is also used to argue that cultural capital was playing a stronger role than social capital in the inter-generational transmission of advantages, that the critical events in the potentially life-long status attainment process were concentrated within a relatively short time frame, and that the multiple strategies to which families with economic and cultural assets could resort were liable to neutralise all efforts to diminish their ability to pass their advantages down the generations.

Youth leisure careers during post-communist transitions in the South Caucasus.

This paper reports findings from interview surveys with 1215 respondents, split between the capital cities (Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi) and one non‐capital region (Kotayk, Aran‐Mugan and Shida Kartli) in each of the three South Caucasus countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The respondents, who were drawn from households in larger representative household social surveys, were all born between 1970 and 1976 and were aged 31–37 at the time of the fieldwork in 2007. Their life stage transitions from childhood to adulthood had roughly coincided with their countries’ transitions from communism to post‐communism. Data was collected on the samples’ participation in selected leisure activities from age 16 to 30. Similar data was collected on the samples’ careers in education, the labour market, housing and family relationships. This information enables us to identify typical leisure careers and how their development was affected by events in other life domains, all in the context of the macro‐changes that were in process in each of the research locations. The evidence enables both personal leisure careers and aggregate leisure trends in different socio‐demographic groups to be identified This shows that changes in leisure behaviour between age 16 and 30 were neither widening nor narrowing the differences between the leisure of males and females, or those who married and became parents on the one hand, then, on the other, those who were still single and childless at age 30. In contrast, differences by place, and by social class, grew progressively wider, thus raising the social costs of geographical and social mobility. Changes in leisure behaviour between age 16 and 30 were separating young adults into those who participated in little, if any, structured out‐of‐home leisure, whose main leisure spending, if any, was on alcohol and tobacco (typically consumed in homes and neighbourhoods), and those whose leisure was characterised by relatively high and sustained participation in sport, consumption of high culture, and going out to bars, cafes, cinema, discos, etc.

Who Suceeds and Who Flounders? Young People in East Europe's New Market Economies

The main question addressed in this paper is what happens when the usual sociological predictors (family background and educational attainment, for example) fail to predict labour market success and failure The paper presents evidence from surveys conducted in 1999 among 1300 25-26 year olds in Moscow, Vladikavkaz and Dneipropetrovsk which shows that this was indeed the situation in these places, and probably in most other parts of the former Soviet Union also. Our analysis also draws on evidence from focus groups conducted in Moscow and Dneipropetrovsk during 2002 with a total of 25 recent university graduates. All these young people were ‘succeeding’ according to the definition of success adopted in our analysis. It is argued that in the new market economies young peoples prospects really have become unpredictable: that there are no efficacious but so far overlooked social or psychological variables. Young peoples ways of coping with their chaotic conditions are identified: ‘keeping faith’ with customary reliabilities, off-setting risks, and endeavouring to de-couple their personal prospects from macro-realities. The paper concludes by evaluating competing explanations of the new unpredictability. It is argued that specifically post-Soviet economic trends and conditions in the 1990s are wholly responsible, and that, irrespective of whether the economies recover or remain depressed, the unpredictability of success will most likely be a short-term phenomenon.

Two worlds of participation: young people and politics in Germany

Germanys political system is, in large part, based on John Stuart Mills (1958) idea of a representative democracy, which aims to involve people in policy-forming processes. However, the constitution of a parliamentary democracy fosters tendencies towards a professionalization of participation, which leads to a strong cleavage between elites and other citizens. Drawing on original, quantitative and qualitative, empirical data we seek to show that this political culture fosters the existence of two parallel worlds: one is characterized by statutory regulated forms of engagement and qualified members; the other is inhabited by young people who engage rather in self-organized projects and institutions distant from patterns of conventional political engagement. There is, moreover, relatively little mutual exchange between these two worlds, which potentially endangers the essence of democracy. In this article a typology of different forms of political engagement is developed in order to better explain such parallel worlds and their consequences.

Farewell to the intelligentsia: Political transformation and changing forms of leisure consumption in the former communist countries of eastern Europe

This paper refers to evidence from studies of young adults conducted in eight different ex‐communist countries from 1993 onwards, but it is based primarily on data gathered in Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in 2002. The evidence is used to chart the disintegration of the intelligentsia strata that were consolidated under communism. Members were highly educated and were unified by an intelligentsia lifestyle that included the consumption of state‐subsidized high culture and typically involved interest and participation in public affairs. The evidence that is presented shows that under post‐communism higher education graduates continue to be distinguished by their consumption of high culture. However, their occupations are more diverse in terms of work and market situations. Many, especially those in the more intellectual occupations, have been impoverished, state subsidies for their lifestyles having been withdrawn or reduced, making their lifestyles more expensive. The better‐off are now even more exposed to and involved in the new consumer cultures. This paper explains how the cessation of the intelligentsia’s reproduction as a lifestyle group, and the spread of commercial leisure, will have contributed to the post‐1989/91 decline in political interest and activity among young people in the former communist countries of eastern Europe.

Waiting for the Market: Young Adults in Telavi and Vanadzor.

This paper uses two cases studies to analyse what has happened to young people and their life-stage transitions in those parts of the former communist bloc where all the main industries stopped when communism ended and remained shut-down over 10 years later. Our evidence is from two such places—Telavi in eastern Georgia and Vanadzor in north-central Armenia. Interview surveys gathered information from samples of 200 25–29 year olds in each of the cities, focusing on their experiences while in transition to adulthood. The respondents’ life-stage transitions had been roughly co-terminous with their countries’ transformation into independent states, market economies and multi-party democracies. Information was also obtained from documentary sources and interviews with key informants—regional and city council officers, and education and labour office personnel. The paper describes how approximately two-thirds of the young adults who were surveyed were unemployed when interviewed and had never held proper jobs. As a result, cash incomes in both cities were extremely low, as were rates of participation in most forms of out-of-home leisure that cost money. Family transitions—into marriage and parenthood—were occurring at older ages than in the 1980s but these were still happening. This leads into to an examination of the young adults’ typical responses to their circumstances. There were two main responses; patience and migration away. In conclusion, it is argued that, all other things remaining equal, the most probable future trends in places such as Telavi and Vanadzor are gradual population decline until the numbers of residents are compatible with the shrunken economies, and socio-cultural regression to quasi-traditional ways of life.

Labour relations in Central Europe : the impact of multinationals' money

Study concept, hypotheses and approach Analytical reference points Investments by West European companies and industrial relations in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia as underlying conditions The views of the actors on the supra-company levels - results of the expert interviews in the countries of origin and host countries of investment and on the EU level The 9 West European multinationals - different patterns of the impact on the industrial relations in their CEE subsidiaries Conclusions Bibliography Index.

Planned transitions from education into employment in a managed post‐communist market economy: a case study in Samarkand

This article arises from case studies in 2006 of 20 businesses in Samarkand (Uzbekistan), surveys of their up to 30‐year‐old employees (r = 419), follow‐up interviews with eight of these employees, and matched samples in Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). The main difference between education in Samarkand (and Uzbekistan in general) and the comparator locations was that the former was maintaining government‐regulated academic and vocational tracks through upper secondary and higher education which were intended to prepare young people for employment at different levels in different industries. In contrast, in Almaty and Bishkek, since 1991 there had been unregulated expansion of general upper secondary and higher education. The evidence suggests that Samarkand was deriving no clear benefits from its particular educational provisions in terms of the smoothness of young people’s education‐to‐work transitions, the satisfaction of young workers with their jobs or employers’ satisfaction with their recruits, and only a minority of the Samarkand businesses appeared to be saving on initial training costs. Furthermore, none of the cities’ educational provisions appeared to be stimulating the development of training cultures within firms, and Samarkand’s institutions appeared distinctly less successful in motivating young people to invest in and plan their own career development. However, preventing the unregulated expansion of academic secondary and higher education in Samarkand was resulting in cost savings for young people and their families. Meanwhile, maintaining fully state‐funded vocational routes in upper secondary education was increasing the costs of education to the government. It is argued that, although in itself not a sufficient explanation, a necessary condition for the maintenance of employment‐related tracks in education is likely to be not just state regulation, but also a willingness and ability on the part of governments to bear a higher proportion of the costs of education and training than in unregulated systems where more of the costs can be borne by young people and their families.

The frustrated generation youth exclusion in Arab Mediterranean societies

ABSTRACT In Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs), insecurities and a lack of opportunities have continuously kept young people from becoming independent and being full, active, and integrated members of society; a process commonly referred to as social exclusion. This paper explores the driving factors of youth exclusion in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. It is argued that not only the extent but also the structure of social exclusion varies across countries. Based on the social exclusion framework developed by the UNDP [2011. Beyond Transition – Towards Inclusive Societies. Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme], we construct a social exclusion index that takes economic, social, and political factors into account. The results obtained indicate that the share of young people suffering from social exclusion is highest in Tunisia (46.7%), followed by Algeria (43.4%), Egypt (42.1%), and Lebanon (33.2%). In contrast to the prevailing assumptions on social exclusion, we find that economic exclusion does in fact play a minor role. The strongest driver of youth exclusion in all Arab Mediterranean countries is the exclusion from social and political life.

Junge Unternehmer in den neuen Marktgesellschaften Mittel- und Osteuropas (Bulgarien, Polen, Slowakei, Ungarn) und der früheren Sowjetunion (Armenien, Georgien, Ukraine)

Dieser Aufsatz beruht auf Interviews, die 1996/97 mit 550 jungen (d.h. unter 30jahrigen) Unternehmern in sieben fruheren kommunistischen Landern gefuhrt wurden: in drei GUS-Landern (Armenien, Georgien und der Ukraine) und in 4 MOE-Landern (Bulgarien, Polen, der Slovakei und Ungarn). Einige herausragende Merkmale dieser mehr kleingewerblich orientierten Okonomien, die fur alle exkommunistischen Lander gilt, seien hier benannt: die bisherige kurze Lebensdauer der Unternehmen/Geschafte, die Unerfahrenheit ihrer Besitzer, die Abwesenheit von formalisierten/institutionalisierten Hilfestellungen, die kompromislos optimistische Einstellung der jungen Unternehmer und ihr positives Verhaltnis zu Marktreformen und Demokratie, ihr arbeitszentrierter Lebensstil sowie die Moglichkeit zu extrem schnellem Fortschritt und Wachstum ihrer Geschafte.