Joel Oren

Threshold models for competitive influence in social networks

The problem of influence maximization deals with choosing the optimal set of nodes in a social network so as to maximize the resulting spread of a technology (opinion, product-ownership, etc.), given a model of diffusion of influence in a network. A natural extension is a competitive setting, in which the goal is to maximize the spread of our technology in the presence of one or more competitors. We suggest several natural extensions to the well-studied linearthreshold model, showing that the original greedy approach cannot be used. Furthermore, we show that for a broad family of competitive influence models, it is NP-hard to achieve an approximation that is better than a square root of the optimal solution; the same proof can also be applied to give a negative result for a conjecture in [2] about a general cascade model for competitive diffusion. Finally, we suggest a natural model that is amenable to the greedy approach.

Influence at Scale: Distributed Computation of Complex Contagion in Networks

We consider the task of evaluating the spread of influence in large networks in the well-studied independent cascade model. We describe a novel sampling approach that can be used to design scalable algorithms with provable performance guarantees. These algorithms can be implemented in distributed computation frameworks such as MapReduce. We complement these results with a lower bound on the query complexity of influence estimation in this model. We validate the performance of these algorithms through experiments that demonstrate the efficacy of our methods and related heuristics.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks

Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of influence, modeled by a general network diffusion process. However, competition between products may adversely impact the rate of adoption for any given firm. The resulting framework gives rise to complex preferences that depend on the specifics of the stochastic diffusion model and the network topology. We study this model from the perspective of a central mechanism, such as a social networking platform, that can optimize seed placement as a service for the advertisers. We ask: given the reported budgets of the competing firms, how should a mechanism choose seeds to maximize overall efficiency? Beyond the algorithmic problem, competition raises issues of strategic behaviour: rational agents should be incentivized to truthfully report their advertising budget. For a general class of influence spread models, we show that when there are two players, the social welfare can be

Online (budgeted) social choice

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Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in networks

ee-1-approximated by a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism. Our mechanism uses a dynamic programming procedure to randomize the order in which advertisers are allocated seeds according to a greedy method. For three or more players, we demonstrate that under an additional assumption (satisfied by many existing models of influence spread) there exists a simpler strategyproof

Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approach

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