Joep Sonnemans

Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods

An experimental analysis of voluntary, binary contributions for step-level public goods is presented. Independent information is obtained on individual value orientation and expectations about the behavior of other subjects using incentive compatible mechanisms. The effects of increasing payoffs for the public good and of decreasing groupsize are investigated. Attention is focused on the determination of expectations, the use of expectations when deciding on behavior, and differences in expectations and behavior between individuals with different value orientations. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments

An information display device wherein there is a base plate with information bearing face plates detachably mounted thereon by one or more spline elements that press-fit with formations on each of the opposing faces of the base and face plate. End caps are optional as are also separator strips between panels where there are a number of panels mounted on one base plate. Splines press-fit into grooves in each of the base plate and face plate. In one embodiment the spline is U-shaped receiving therein a rib on one member and projecting into a groove formed between two ribs on the other of the two plates.

Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment

In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on theirincentive effects. Payment based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels. In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others. Finally, attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions. This discussion paper has led to a publication in the European Economic Review 2001, 45(2), 187-214.

Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing.

Abstract An experimental analysis of voluntary, binary contributions for step-level public goods/bads is presented. Alternatively, the situation is presented as the provision of a public good or the prevention of a public bad. From a strategic point of view these presentations are equivalent. In early periods of the 20 round experiments, behavior is indeed observed to be similar in both cases, but after about 5 periods differences start to occur, that grow larger. A simple learning model is developed that replicates the patterns in the experiments. Extrapolation beyond 20 periods show that the pattern observed reflects an equilibrium selection.

The structure of subjective emotional intensity

Abstract Emotions vary in intensity. But what is it that vanes? There are many parameters that can be considered parameters of emotional intensity, and it is unclear how these parameters are related. The main question of this study is: Is the subjective intensity of emotion one dimensional, and, if not, what are its dimensions? We sampled 222 instances of emotions, and for each instance subjects completed a questionnaire. The subjects also drew a diagram of the course of their emotion over time. A factor analysis of the intensity questions and the diagram variables yielded six factors: (1) duration of the emotion and delay of its onset and peak; (2) perceived bodily changes and strength of felt passivity; (3) recollection and re-experience of the emotion; (4) strength and drasticness of action tendency, and drasticness of actual behaviour; (5) belief changes and influence upon long-term behaviour; and (6) overall felt intensity. Most specific dimensions correlated moderately with overall felt intensity. S...

Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart

Abstract In a public good experiment one group member is replaced by another after a prespecified number of periods. Evidence of both strategic (forward looking) and adaptive (backward looking) behavior is observed.

Why people vote: experimental evidence

Abstract This paper reports the results of a series of experiments in which the voter turnout decision was analyzed as a participation game. The experiments were inspired by the model of Schram and Van Winden (1991). In the model, individuals favoring the same policy or candidate are members of a common reference group, and the vote decision is determined by inter- and intragroup relations. Our experimental data supported three hypotheses derived from this model. First, participation increased with group identity. Second, communication enhanced participation. Finally, participation was strongly related to individual characteristics. A simple analysis of the way people learn from their experiences in previous periods is used to argue that any model of voter turnout should take account of myopic adaptive behavior and inertia.

Voter turnout as a participation game: an experimental investigation

This paper reports the results of a series of experiments in which participation games are analyzed. Voter turnout is an example of an application of this game. Hypotheses derived from a game theoretic analysis are systematically elaborated, analyzed, and tested. The results are used to explore future paths of research. A distinction is made in two parameter configurations (representing winner-takes-all elections and elections with proportional representation).

Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm

One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer-one-worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers. We find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower. Gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce.

The Determinants of Subjective Emotional Intensity

Abstract What determines the subjective intensity of emotions? Four major groups of determinants are hypothesised: concerns (strength and relevance), appraisal, regulation, and individual differences. During six weeks subjects reported an emotion every week and answered questions on a computer. It appears that all four groups of supposed determinants are correlated with emotional intensity, the concern variables show the highest correlations. The importance of the determinants is not always the same, there are differences between the emotions and between the dimensions of emotional intensity. The relation between regulation and emotional intensity is complex: Causal relations are expected in both directions. On the one hand, a more intense emotion requires more regulation (positive causal effect), and on the other, regulation will decrease the intensity (negative causal effect). Indications of the existence of both relations are found. Regulation and intensity are positively correlated. The canonical corr...