Joerg Schiller
University of Hohenheim
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Featured researches published by Joerg Schiller.
European Economic Review | 2009
Martin Nell; Andreas Richter; Joerg Schiller
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets, a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insureds actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting, we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers if repair markets are imperfect.
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft | 2002
Martin Nell; Joerg Schiller
ZusammenfassungZiel dieser Arbeit ist es, in die ökonomische Analyse des Versicherungsbetrugs einzuführen und einige grundlegende Determinanten für vertragswidriges Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmern aufzuzeigen. Dazu werden zunächst die strategischen Entscheidungsprobleme von Versicherungsnehmern und Versicherern eingehend analysiert und optimales Verhalten unter realitätsnahen Annahmen hergeleitet, sowie Ansatzpunkte für die Betrugsbekämpfung aufgezeigt. Beispielhaft werden dazu die Auswirkungen von Betrugserkennungssystemen oder die konsequente Anzeige entdeckter Betrüger auf die Bekämpfung von Versicherungsbetrug näher untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ansatzpunkte erheblichen Einfluss auf die Kosten des Versicherungsbetrugs haben können. Ein häufig geäußerter Kritikpunkt an solchen Analysen ist, dass ethische Bedenken der Versicherungsnehmer meist unberücksichtigt bleiben. Die Einbeziehung von ethischen Bedenken führt aber nicht zwangsläufig zu einer niedrigeren Betrugshäufigkeit. Abschließend wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit Versicherungsbetrug auf versicherungsspezifische Faktoren zurückzuführen ist und wie bzw. in welchem Umfang Versicherer Einfluss auf die ethische Bewertung des Versicherungsbetrugs durch Versicherungsnehmer nehmen können.AbstractThe two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.
Journal of Risk and Insurance | 2013
Uwe Focht; Andreas Richter; Joerg Schiller
This article addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. We compare fee-based and commission-based compensation systems and show that they are payoff equivalent if the intermediary is completely honest. Allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. The possibility of mismatching gives the intermediary substantial market power, which will not translate into mismatching if consumers are rational. Furthermore, we offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions and address whether or not the ban of any commission payments is an appropriate market intervention.
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft | 2004
Joerg Schiller
ZusammenfassungBetrügerische Schadenmeldungen sind ein wohlbekanntes Phänomen und führen auf einzelnen Versicherungsmärkten zu schwerwiegenden Problemen. Im Rahmen des vorliegenden Beitrags wird zum einen erläutert, warum Versicherungsbetrug als ein vertragstheoretisches Problem angesehen werden kann. Zum anderen werden — vor dem Hintergrund bestehender Ergebnisse der ökonomischen Vertragstheorie — ausgewählte Ansatzpunkte zur Betrugsbekämpfung und insbesondere das Problem der Sanktionierung von ertappten Betrügern analysiert.AbstractFraudulent claims are a well-known phenomenon and a serious problem in some insurance markets. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First of all, it explains why insurance fraud can be considered as a contractual problem. Consequently, selected instruments to fight insurance fraud and problems concerning the punishment of detected defrauders are analyzed by using existing results of contract theory.
Archive | 2017
Jan Michael Bauer; Joerg Schiller; Christopher Schreckenberger
This paper analyzes the German market for supplemental dental insurance to identify selection behavior based on individuals’ private information. The rather limited underwriting by German private health insurers makes this market especially prone to selection effects. Although the standard positive correlation test does not indicate asymmetric information in this market, we conjecture that this outcome may result from sample heterogeneity when adverse and advantageous selection occur simultaneously and offset each other. Examining a large set of potential sources of selection effects, we find mainly that the holding of other supplemental health insurance policies, which is related to risk preferences, contributes to an advantageous selection in this insurance market. Our results suggest that even in the absence of a positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage, the German market for supplemental dental insurance suffers from information asymmetry, which is caused by multidimensional private information.
European Journal of Health Economics | 2018
Micha Kaiser; Joerg Schiller; Christopher Schreckenberger
In this paper, we analyze how a nationwide population-based skin cancer screening program (SCS) implemented in Germany in 2008 has impacted the number of hospital discharges following malignant skin neoplasm diagnosis and the malignant melanoma mortality rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Our panel data, drawn from the Eurostat database, cover subregions in 22 European countries, measured at the lowest nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) level for 2000–2013. Applying fixed effects methods, we find a significantly positive and robust effect of the German SCS on the number of patients diagnosed with malignant skin neoplasm. However, the program does not significantly influence the melanoma mortality rate. This finding conflicts with the decreased melanoma mortality rate found for the pilot SCS program in northern Germany. Our results indicate that Germany’s nationwide SCS program is effective in terms of a higher diagnosis rate for malignant skin neoplasms and thus may contribute to an improvement in the early detection of skin cancer.
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-issues and Practice | 2017
Renate Lange; Joerg Schiller; Petra Steinorth
This paper empirically assesses the selection effects and determinants of the demand for supple-mental health insurance that covers hospital and dental benefits in Germany. Our representative dataset provides doctor-diagnosed indicators of the individual’s health status, risk attitude, demand for medical services and insurance purchases in other lines of insurance as well as rich demographic and socioeconomic information. Controlling for a wide range of individual preferences, we find evidence of adverse selection for individuals aged 65 and younger for hospital coverage despite initial individual underwriting by insurers. The reverse is true for individuals older than 65; individuals with supplemental hospital coverage are healthier on average. In addition, insurance affinity and income are the most important drivers of the demand for both types of coverage.
Social Science Research Network | 2017
Jan Michael Bauer; Joerg Schiller; Christopher Schreckenberger; Max Trautinger
Using data from an insurance company, we examine the selection behaviour in the German market for private complementary long-term care insurance (CompLTCI). We provide a detailed analysis of the holding, the uptake and the lapse of CompLTCI policies. The analysis identifies the preference for insurance, the occupation as well as the residential location as unused observables. Our findings suggest that the socioeconomic status is a robust factor in explaining the uptake and lapse behaviour in the German market for CompLTCI. More generally, our findings indicate that the mere identification of unused observables is insufficient to derive robust conclusions about the redistribution between different risk types in insurance markets with long-term policies.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty | 2014
Andreas Richter; Joerg Schiller; Harris Schlesinger
Archive | 2003
Marcel Boyer; Joerg Schiller